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Abstract 
 
This study contributes to analyses of courtroom interactions building on previous research 
(Cotterill, 2003; Matoesian, 2001) through its investigation of the multiple layers of narrative 
and interaction. This work builds on the methodological approach of Thornborrow (2002) 
and brings together micro-analysis (drawn from Conversation Analysis) and macro-level 
discourses. These discourses include narrative in legal settings (Ehrlich, 2015) and the 
Foucaultian concept of power relations (Foucault, 1982). The jury is conceptualised as a 
‘silent participant’ (based on research by Carter (2011)) as opposed to Heritage’s (1985) 
conceptualisation of ‘overhearer’ and builds on research into the systematic format courtroom 
interactions (Atkinson and Drew, 1979). 
Data are taken from two US murder trials in North Carolina, USA. The selected trials 
are from mid-2013 and early 2014. Both concern the same homicide, with the defendants 
being tried separately. This allows for a localised comparison of data, as the judge and 
prosecution team remain the same whilst the defence teams (and jury) are different. 
This study analyses courtroom interactions from three areas of the trial process. These 
are: the cross-examination of the defendant from the trial of Amanda Hayes; opening 
statements across both trials; and interactions in the absence of the jury. This thesis shows 
how courtroom discourse operates at multiple levels within courtroom interactions. Using a 
three-level conceptualisation of agenda, macro-narratives and micro-interactions, this study 
will show how linguistic devices are employed by interactants to formulate their ‘version’ of 
events and how these linguistic devices are employed towards the jury. It will also show how 
broader social discourses are directly oriented to by interlocutors in the formation and 
presentation of their narratives. Particular attention is paid to the manner in which these 
(competing) narratives are made relevant, and their co-construction within micro-level 
interactions.
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Introduction 
 
This thesis presents an interdisciplinary analysis of two trials that took place in mid-2013 and 
early 2014 in North Carolina, USA. The defendants in these trials were Grant and Amanda 
Hayes (respectively), who were married to each other at the time of the crime. Both were 
charged with the first-degree murder of Laura J. Ackerson, a 27-year-old woman who had 
two young children with Grant Hayes. Grant Hayes was found guilty of first-degree murder 
and sentenced to life in prison without parole; Amanda Hayes was found guilty of second-
degree murder and was sentenced to approximately 13-16 years in prison, with credit given 
for time served. The crime of homicide took place in July 2011, with the trials taking place 
approximately 2-2.5 years later. For further information on the ‘story’ of the crime, please see 
Chapter 4, Sections 4.1.2-5. 
The literature used in this study is drawn from the fields of both linguistics and 
criminology, exploring the use of narrative and linguistic devices in courtroom interactions 
and unpacking how interactions between the state and the individual unfold within the trial 
genre. The data involve the same crime, but the defendants have been tried separately. This 
allows for a localised comparison within the criminal trial setting as much of the evidence, 
the prosecution team and judge are the same, with the defendant and defence teams changing. 
 This study is divided into five main sections followed by a conclusion. These sections 
are the Literature Review; Methodology; Cross-examination of Amanda Hayes; Comparison 
of Opening Statements; and Interactions in the Absence of the Jury. A more detailed 
summary of each section is provided below. 
In Chapter 1 an overview of relevant literature and underpinning concepts is explored. 
This includes previous research into courtroom settings, which range from the analysis of the 
2 
 
O. J. Simpson trial (Cotterill, 2003) to discussion of identity and the use of language and 
discourse in rape trials (Matoesian, 1993; 2001). In discussing courtroom research, this is 
divided into general courtroom research within the (forensic) linguistics field and narrative 
analyses of courtroom discourse. In reference to criminological research, the concept of the 
courtroom as a public space and what is meant by the terms public and private are also 
unpacked, as understanding the attribution of public and therefore widely viewable (or 
observable) impacts upon the lens through which one views interaction (as the interactants 
themselves are aware of being observed). Within this the blurred lines between public and 
private space and how these discourses can intermingle is also discussed, as courtrooms are 
an arena in which what may have been construed as ‘private’ actions can become matters of 
‘public’ interest. 
 Central to the theoretical foundation of this work is the concept of power relations as 
put forward by Foucault (1982). The literature review will also unpack power relations and 
what is meant by power in this thesis; delineating between theories of power as something 
possessed as opposed to something that is relational and negotiated within a discursive space. 
Power within courtroom research will also be explored, as this additionally feeds into the 
main thrust of this work. 
 Following this, Chapter 2 will outline the research questions, methodology, data 
collection, and ethics of the project. The interlinked and interactive three-tiered concept of 
courtroom interactions employed by this thesis will be unpacked, exploring how the 
theoretical approaches utilised feed into the relationship between micro-level interactions, 
macro-level narratives, and the overall agenda of participants in this institutional setting. 
Theories of narrative will be unpacked incorporating links between story-telling as a literary 
practice and as a co-constructed interaction. Micro-analytical principles drawn from 
Conversation Analysis will also be critiqued, drawing distinctions between different 
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approaches and uses of Conversation Analysis and its approach to context. The tension 
between Conversation Analysis and its use in discussing power will also be critiqued and the 
overall approach of this project as drawing together macro- and micro-level perspectives will 
be justified. The methodology will also provide an explanation of ‘legitimacy’ as borrowed 
from criminological research and how this can be interwoven with the Foucaultian approach 
to power relations and self-regulation through discipline. This will be done through utilising 
the dialogic approach to legitimacy as discussed by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012). 
 The data collection process is outlined, with the sources of data stipulated, following 
which the ethical observances and practices of this study are also stated. 
 Chapter 3 introduces the first analytical chapter of this thesis. This chapter discusses 
linguistic features of from the cross-examination from the trial of Amanda Hayes. As the only 
defendant to take the stand, it was of analytical interest to observe the linguistic features 
within this interaction, as well as the co-construction of conflicting narratives within the 
discourse. Linguistic features discussed in this chapter include self-selection on the part of the 
defendant; retaining the floor; and resisting questions within the institutional question and 
answer context. Further to this, a detailed analysis of the final two minutes of the re-cross 
examination are undertaken, showing the interactive tension between the two adversarial 
parties and the means through which these conflicts of interest manifest within the discursive 
space. Findings include the furthering of Foucault’s theory of power relations (1982) and 
Thronborrow’s (2002) approach to power within discursive space as being a negotiation 
separated to an extent from institutionally legitimised authority. 
 This is followed by Chapter 4, which discusses the four opening statements delivered 
across both trials. The narratives of all sides are explored in the context of their being 
introduced to the jury as the stance from which they will make their cases. A key feature of 
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this chapter is that both prosecution opening statements were delivered by the same attorney, 
with differences in approach and contextualisation highlighted as the focus shifts between the 
two trials. A detailed analysis of the opening three minutes of each statement is explored, 
focus being on linguistic structure and the topics oriented to by each attorney in their 
introductions to the opening statements. This also allows for comparison in performance and 
style of delivery between speakers, giving shape to the form as well as content of the 
utterances. Following this is a cross-comparison of topics and themes emerging from all four 
statements overall. 
 Narrative features of the opening statements are explored, particularly the use of time 
and space. Narrative time is viewed through Ricoeur’s (1980) theory, viewing narratives as 
beginning at the end and temporal aspects being retrospectively applied to otherwise 
disparate events. Labov’s narrative framework is mentioned, but is not explicitly used (for 
rationale, please see Chapter 4). 
In addition, the orientation by the speakers to aspects of gender, agency and the 
conflicting characterisations of law enforcement are also detailed. These discourses are 
explored as part of the analysis due to their direct references within the data, bringing 
together the macro-level theoretical aspects of these discourses as made relevant through their 
emergence within the micro-level interactions. This supports the use of macro-level discourse 
as a resource that is relevant to and made relevant within interactive space by participants. 
This also links with the overall three-level concept of agenda, macro-, and micro-level as 
elements of courtroom interaction that are interlinked with one another in a reflexive 
relationship whereby each aspect influences and is influenced by the other (as detailed in 
Chapter 2). 
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Findings in this chapter include the theoretical applications of Ricoeur’s approach to 
narrative form in courtroom discourse; the cross-comparison of four opening statements 
regarding the same crime event over two different criminal trials (as opposed to previous 
research comparing criminal and civil trials concerning the same event [Cotterill, 2004]); and 
the additional contributions to the study of opening statements in courtrooms (Heffer, 2005; 
2010), which constitute an area less extensively researched than their closing argument 
counterparts. 
The final analysis chapter in this study concerns the interactions in the absence of the 
jury. This chapter focuses on the role of the judge and the orientation to his role in these 
proceedings. Further to this is the impact of decisions upon the narratives deemed acceptable 
to be presented to the jury. These data are of relevance to the public-private discussion 
outlined in the literature review, as the viewing public has access to information that the jury 
does not. This thesis does not make this observation to criticise these decisions, as the issue 
of prejudice within a trial is a serious matter to consider and entirely removed from the focus 
of this study. 
Findings for this chapter include the formulations of judgements in sustaining or 
overruling an objection; the orientation towards the judge’s knowledge and understanding 
(and to relevance and the rules of evidence); and the active role of the judge in bounding 
what can and cannot be said in witness testimony through a ‘preview’ of the witness’ 
narrative as elicited through a preliminary examination-in-chief and (where necessary) cross-
examination. The findings of this chapter address the research focus of this study in exploring 
the role of the judge as an interlocutor whose role is explicitly positioned as acting on behalf 
of the concept of the ‘state’ (see Chapter 1 for definition). The concept of power relations as 
interactive and relational is explored throughout all three sections, with institutional 
restrictions vis-à-vis discursive negotiations expanded upon, as exemplified through a 
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detailed analysis of interactions between the judge and defence counsel when the latter 
attempts to have a prosecution witness make a phone call in court. A detailed analysis of this 
sequence was selected due to its marked presence in the data as an ‘unusual’ occurrence (and 
the only such instance across both trials comprising this dataset). 
In terms of the narrative thread running through all three chapters, the role of the 
judge in determining acceptable evidentiary support and how this can influence the narrative 
at the micro-level (and thereby its potential actualisation at the macro-level, consequently 
impacting upon the narrative’s perceived capacity to fulfil the agenda) is of relevance to this 
study. 
This study does not attempt to assert that findings herein are generalisable beyond the 
data analysed, but instead puts forward qualitative findings within the localised comparison 
of these two trials. Having a crossover in participation has allowed an in-depth analysis 
where evidentiary support is highly similar, showing how the institutional interactions are 
reflexive to circumstance and what devices are utilised therein. Drawing on an 
interdisciplinary approach, this study also provides a theoretical contribution to both 
criminological and linguistic work in this field. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
 This literature review provides an overview of the definitions of key terms applied 
throughout this thesis and the context in which they are applied. In addition to this, key 
themes will also be addressed, and include; defining and applying the term law; how power 
has been addressed throughout previous research; the issues inherent in discussing public and 
private space; and other relevant features highlighted in previous research. 
 In addition to identifying and evaluating the salient points of previous literature and 
outlining the core elements of this thesis, the sociolinguistic approach applied in this study 
shall also be outlined as warrantable and necessary to this research. As this approach is the 
lens through which the subsequent data is viewed, it is important to this study that this is 
outlined clearly. 
 
 
1.2 Key terms 
 
 In this section, some of the key terms that are used throughout this thesis will be 
described in accordance with their application in regard to this project. These include 
communication and interaction, the state, and the individual. 
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1.2.1 Communication, interaction and institutional settings 
 
Communication, intentionality and interaction have been linked together in this definition, as 
communication is viewed as an interactive process (Beach, 2013). The approach to 
communication utilised in this project draws on theories of sociolinguistics and Conversation 
Analysis and directly refers to these theories as applied to institutional settings. In this 
communication is not just a means through which information is passed along, but is talk-in-
interaction, whereby participants ‘pursue various practical goals’ through this medium (Drew 
and Heritage, 1992: 3). In referring to talk-as-interaction in specifically institutional settings 
(such as the courtroom), conversation is usually subject to restrictions, reducing the 
interactional resources available to participants based on the norms of that interactive 
framework (Heritage and Clayman, 2010: 17). 
 In defining what is meant by an institutional setting, this includes any setting that 
applies a restricted interactional framework distinct from ‘ordinary’ conversation. It is 
recognised that this boundary can be difficult to distinguish, for example, establishing the 
point at which a business meeting goes from an ‘ordinary’ conversation into a professional 
interaction, or a doctor-patient interaction moves from greetings to the focus of the visit 
(Ibid). Nevertheless, for the purposes of this analysis, with a specific view towards courtroom 
interactions, the institutional setting here is defined in terms of the participants’ engagement 
with and orientation to the institution’s interactional framework (Heritage and Clayman, 
2010; Atkinson and Drew, 1979. 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
1.2.2 State 
 
In this study, the state is not viewed as a central entity, but rather as a term that encapsulates a 
myriad of different discourses that fall under the perception of governance. Within this thesis, 
the state is not viewed as a single sovereign entity, but rather as a construct that is perpetuated 
through nodes of power/knowledge and legitimised through society’s own dissemination and 
propagation of discourses and truth claims (Gordon, 1980; Schirato et al, 2012). Discipline 
and its maintenance are part of a self-regulatory system upheld by legitimised institutions, 
thus creating a greater sense of hegemony amongst the population with punishment being tied 
to deviations from the established and perpetuated norm (Foucault, 1977; Schirato et al, 
2012). This is most assuredly not to say that criminal activity is justified or acceptable in any 
way (particularly as regards the research focus of this thesis), but seeks to identify the state 
not as a unified entity, but as a number of discourses (interlinked and otherwise) that are 
granted legitimacy through societal acceptance of claims to knowledge, hierarchy and 
veracity. The ethnomethodological approach of Garfinkel (Heritage, 1984) is relevant here as, 
by the view of this study, the state is contextually created and contextually renewed within 
society through interaction and ritual practice. 
 Despite this overall view of the ‘state’, the use of the term in situ becomes somewhat 
more complex when applied to legal interactions. In the context of trial settings, the term 
‘state’ takes on a number of explicit and implicit roles. As the data used is from the United 
States of America, the ‘State’ means the representation of the place and its governing body, 
which is, in turn, a representation of the public. For example, in the United Kingdom the 
parallel would be that of the Crown, as crimes are not against only the victims, but also the 
whole community and thereby imply both the place and the governing body representing the 
people (Smith and Natalier, 2005). The prosecutors in this data also refer to themselves as 
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representatives of the ‘State of North Carolina’, thus reinforcing the embodiment of the 
community of North Carolina as the ‘side’ against which a wrong has been committed as 
opposed to a civil case between two individuals (expecting civil cases involving prosecutions 
against the ‘state’ as in the institution of governance). 
 In separating the state from the community, system of governance, and geographical 
location, it is necessary to point out that the term state can take on a somewhat 
anthropomorphised role in which its existence as a whole and non-disparate entity could be 
implied. Despite this somewhat more Parsonian use of the term (Heritage, 1984), in such 
occasions as this arises, this project treats the term as an overarching encapsulation of said 
institutions and discourses as outlined previously. This usage is drawn on as a means through 
which such imagery and appearance of cohesive unity can be used within interaction to create 
and perpetuate the concept of an ‘entity of the state’, much as ‘law’ can be used to imply 
unification within a multitude of different discourses (see Section 3, this chapter). 
 
1.2.3 Individual 
 
The reference to the term ‘individual’ in this setting is used to represent any person not 
explicitly viewed as a representative of the ‘state’ in this setting. To this end, all those 
excepting the prosecution (‘representing the state of North Carolina’), the judge (as the 
adjudicator presiding over these proceedings) and court staffers (such as the court reporter) 
are viewed as individuals within the context of this trial and not as representatives of the 
court, and by extension, the state. The reason this does not include police officers who give 
testimony and other such individuals is that within the context of the trial (excepting civil 
cases) they do not claim to act as representatives of the ‘state’, but are questioned as 
individuals as to their own actions within the context of the case (such as what they did, what 
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procedures they followed, what they witnessed). Whether these other institutional roles are 
drawn upon to support truth claims or add weight to the veracity of testimony is a matter 
discussed within the analysis section and is not predetermined at the conceptual level. 
 
 
1.3 Defining law 
 
When discussing ‘law’ and all that is considered to be ‘legal’, it is important to recognise the 
context in which these terms are being utilised and what they encompass within them. This 
study does not intend to oversimplify the complexities inherent in these terms, but does mean 
to supply only a brief summary of their intended use, whilst still acknowledging that this does 
not wholly reflect the nuanced use often attributed to these terms (for example, ‘customary 
law’, whereby it is not an ‘official’ law but is recognised within the community). 
Within the terms ‘law’ and ‘legal’ there are a multiplicity of discourses which then 
become bounded by association with the concept of the justice system (Smart, 1989).  For 
example, within law one might discuss aspects such as family law, which in turn could 
encompass matters ranging from custodial rights to divorce. While in individual cases these 
issues might not necessarily be unrelated, in terms of discourse, to view the separation of 
persons and the custodial arrangements for a child as being bounded together could present 
an argument for post hoc ergo propter hoc and not take into account other matters such as 
adoption. Through this example, one can see how even one category within law can represent 
a number of discourses, much less the term ‘law’ alone. Consequently, this thesis draws on 
Smart’s (1989: 4) definition, in which: 
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‘… law constitutes a plurality of principles, knowledges, and events, yet it claims a 
unity through the common usage of the term ‘law’.’ 
 
In this study, the same conceptual outlook is applied to associated terms such as ‘legal’ 
whereby what is considered to be legal are those discourses which are linked with the concept 
and context of law and its associated system of governance. 
 
Conceptually, when discussing the approach being taken to law and the legal system, this 
thesis also draws on Foucaultian interpretations of the law when addressing courtroom 
interactions. Firstly, the concept of trial proceedings in the current age of increased 
interconnectivity and social media produces a new space in which the public connects with 
the courtroom processes (see Section 5, this chapter). Even without these developments, 
those testifying were largely doing so in a public arena (exceptions such as vulnerable 
witnesses notwithstanding). This allows for the concept of the panopticon and Foucault’s 
approach to self-regulation and surveillance to be drawn upon. 
If, as posited by Foucault, society is increasingly surveilled and, through this, our own 
behaviour is believed to be permanently under scrutiny by an observer at any given time then 
it could be argued that trials are a form of surveillance, particularly those that are televised 
and thereby have an unknown number of observers at any given time. Taking it a step further 
in a trial context, the jury are normally present and could be looking at any of the key persons 
of the trial at any given moment. Therefore, although courtrooms are already bound by 
institutional rules and norms, they are also producing and perpetuating the ‘diffuse’ 
disciplinary power theorised by Foucault (Golder and Fitzpatrick, 2009). 
This study also tends towards Golder and Fitzpatrick’s (2009) approach to Foucault 
and the law in that, rather than excluding the law from his approach (see Hunt and Wickham, 
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1999), it remained a part of his theoretical approach. Golder and Fitzpatrick outline two 
dimensions to Foucault’s law: firstly, ‘a determinate law which expresses a definite content’; 
secondly, law as responsive, illimitable and ‘in excess of its determinate self’, forming itself’ 
through… encounter[s] with… what lies beyond itself’. In this, the law is considered to be 
rigid and definite within society, and yet also responsive and adaptive to external influences, 
thus also having an element of self-resistance that forces the law to challenge its ‘position’, 
‘content’ and ‘being’.  These two dimensions are not viewed as opposing interpretations of 
the law, but as ‘two modalities of the very same law’. (Golder and Fitzpatrick, 2009: 71-2). 
 
The need to establish this conceptual approach towards law is necessary, as it links with the 
approach taken towards the state, the individual and power relations, all of which are of 
central relevance to this thesis. The proceedings of the trial and the enactment of legal 
requirements are all linked within the underlying theoretical approach through the concept of 
the state as a discursive construct, to the individual, to power as relational rather than 
absolute (see Section 4). 
 The following section will provide an overview of the approach to power taken within 
this thesis and discuss it within the context of previous literature regarding courtroom 
settings. 
 
1.4 Discussing power 
 
The pattern of adaptability and fluidity as a philosophical and theoretical grounding 
for this study should now be evident as a theme that will continue throughout this thesis. 
Already apparent, this theme will be revisited as a linking mechanism between the theories of 
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defining law (as already discussed), the approach this study takes towards power, and the 
public-private dichotomy (discussed in below section 5). 
Having discussed the definition of law that shall be utilised throughout this thesis, this 
section shall address the issue of power drawing on Foucaultian ideas of power relations, 
power-knowledge and truth claims. Further to this, the concept of power within courtroom 
interactions will also be discussed, particularly with reference to Conley and O’Barr (1998) 
and the works of Matoesian (2001; 1993). This will provide an outline of both the theoretical 
standpoint of this thesis with regards to power relations and the approach used by previous 
studies this thesis will use to inform its analysis vis-à-vis power and the courtroom data under 
analysis. 
 
1.4.1 Foucault: power relations 
 
 For Foucault, power was not something which could be possessed by any entity, but 
was rather a negotiated state; a ‘complex flow’ that changed ‘with circumstances and time’ 
(Schirato, Danaher and Webb, 2012: xxv). Foucault posited that in order to understand 
power, one would need to also understand resistance. This was because the two forces 
interacted with one another and each held the other as a prerequisite in order to exist 
(Foucault, 1982: 790). Foucault also put forward that in instances such as slavery, this was 
not a manifestation of power relations but of ‘physical determination’ (Ibid: 790). The theory 
behind this is that power is only exercised over ‘free subjects’ and that those who are 
physically constrained, therefore, cannot exercise the ‘recalcitrance of will’ or ‘intransigence 
of freedom’ necessary in order to truly create a power relation (Ibid: 790). 
In describing power as a dynamic relationship not possessed by any single entity, this 
links with the definition of the state (provided in section 2.2), whereby the state is not a single 
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entity with individual agency, but an umbrella term encompassing many different political 
and social discourses. This was a rejection by Foucault of the Marxist traditional view of the 
state, moving away from macro-level views of power and focussing instead on the ‘small 
powers’ (Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 16) As there is, by definition, no single and unified entity 
that is the state to enact agency it therefore cannot possess power as a thing. Subsequently, 
power relations are a form of micro-power, negotiated at various levels between individuals 
and groups within society (Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 16). This thesis also puts forward that 
the institution of criminal justice (being representative of and enacting the discourses of law 
and perpetuating the discourses that create the larger political state) performs relations of 
micro-power in the courtroom. This validation and recreation of the status attributed to 
various quarters in the discharge of a trial (such as the office of the judge, the respect owing 
to the courtroom, inter alia) can be argued to show how larger discourses are accepted and 
reproduced through individuals with agency. 
 
1.4.1.1 Foucault: power-knowledge and truth claims 
 
 Having outlined this relationship of power as a negotiated state, it would also be 
reasonable to consider Foucault’s theory concerning the link between power and knowledge. 
As outlined above, in order for power to be exercised it must exist in a relationship with 
resistance, however; Foucault also discusses another contingent relationship for power, which 
is its link with knowledge. For Foucault, the relationship between power and knowledge is 
associated with discourse; in which discourse allows the articulation of a particular view 
(often associated with – though not limited to – medical, political or academic discourse) that 
joins together power and knowledge (Schirato et al, 2012: 48). An example of this would be 
where the ‘expert knowledge’ of medical practitioners is used to influence a power relation 
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(for example, between a parent and child), as the parent can use the discourse (which has a 
higher status attributed to it courtesy of its source) to exercise prohibitions and monitoring 
over the child, thus resulting in a power relation (Ibid: 48-9). 
 Power and knowledge are conceptually intertwined as one implies the other. 
According to Foucault, power produces knowledge; yet this is not in the sense that 
knowledge is inherently subordinate to power. Knowledge is also interlaced with power, as to 
refer to a field of knowledge is to induce a power relation. (Foucault, 1977: 27).  In taking a 
Foucaultian approach, power is ‘productive rather than repressive’ (Schirato et al, 2012: 48). 
Therefore, the relationship between power and knowledge is one whereby knowledge 
produces power and power produces (and gives weight to) knowledge. This allows fields of 
knowledge and discourses to make claims of truth, as they are put forward by institutions as a 
vehicle and expression of power, both promoting and being promoted by the discourse (Hunt 
and Wickham, 1994: 11). These regimes of truth are consequently in a ‘circular relation with 
systems of power’, which both maintain and generate them (Gordon, 1980: 133). 
 
1.4.2 Power relations in court 
 
Various studies have addressed power in the courtroom, including Conley and O’Barr 
(1998); Matoesian (2001; 1993); Cotterill (2003); and Ehrlich and Sidnell (2006), amongst 
others. In this section, a brief overview of research on power in the courtroom will be 
presented, followed by a discussion on the question-answer format of courtroom interactions. 
 Approaches to power include not only the linguistic practice of questioning, although 
this is a large feature, but also incorporate ideological approaches. Gender discourses, for 
example, have been a part of this field of work through research into rape and sexual crimes. 
The concept of patriarchal frameworks and the discursive construction of gendered ‘norms’ 
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and interactive practices have been investigated by a number of researchers (see Ehrlich, 
2001; 2016; Cotterill, 2007; O’Barr, 1982; Matoesian, 1993; 2001; inter alia). Eades (1996; 
2004), Moeketsi (2004) and McCaul (2011) have produced work on cultural differences in 
language in legal settings and how these impact upon the interactants, influencing power 
relations and the ability to use discursive resources. 
 Ainsworth (2011) highlights some of the entrenched institutional discourses within 
the multiplicity that are encapsulated within law regarding perceptions and the ability to 
change these. As mentioned previously, the view of this study towards power is that it is 
relational, and that law is both reflexive and determinate through Golder and Fitzpatrick’s 
(2009) reading of Foucaultian theory. In this regard, that there is a reflexive shift to move 
from the concept of a ‘reasonable man’ to ‘reasonable person’ within the legal lexicon, does 
not, in Ainsworth’s view, demarcate a definite shift towards gender neutrality, but may only 
serve to ‘impose a superficial mask of purported universality onto the unchanged behavioural 
norms and values’ of that same ‘reasonable man’ (Ainsworth, 2011: 179). 
 This same concept of wider social discourse can be applied regarding research into 
‘rape myths’ and how it is perceived one ‘should’ behave in such a circumstance (for 
example, fighting one’s attacker vehemently). These discourses are then perpetuated within 
the courtroom, despite research to the contrary (Woodhams et al, 2012). 
 Consequently, research into power within the courtroom draws on a number of 
different fields of study and studies on discourse have referred to a range of interdisciplinary 
contexts when exploring this matter. 
As mentioned above, a common thread in research on power in the courtroom is the 
amount of ‘power’ attributed to the lawyers asking the questions versus the witnesses 
answering (be they lay or expert witnesses). The issue of power and control in courtroom 
questions is important to address, as the adversarial process utilised in Anglo-American 
18 
 
courts relies largely on the use of this adjacency pair. The lawyer is in the position whereby 
they can ask the question; allowing them to direct the topic and flow of the interaction, and to 
restrict or expand upon the responses provided by the witnesses. In order to address this topic 
fully, this segment shall be divided into two parts, the first addressing the issue of asking 
questions in adversarial courtroom settings, and the second examining the responses. Though 
these two issues represent to facets of the same whole, both halves deserve a good deal of 
attention; as indicated by Ehrlich and Sidnell (2006: 656), a lot of research has investigated 
the question element of this interaction, whereas it is only recently that studies have 
considered the power potentially exercised by the witnesses in this prescriptive setting. 
Consequently, the following segment discusses: the theory behind questioning in more 
general terms, outlining the types of questions and the answers normally associated with 
them; questioning as it is practiced in the courtroom; and the power associated with such 
practices. The subsequent segment outlines court rules on answering questions; the restriction 
on narrative in court; and the impact this has had on those who have provided testimony. 
 
 
1.4.2.1 Asking questions 
 
 Questioning is largely considered to be a regular, everyday activity. As has been 
alluded to, this is not necessarily the case when applied to courtrooms. Types of question 
become very important, with lawyers being trained in which types of question to use and 
which to avoid during witness testimony. This is understandable as asking a question where 
the answer is unknown to the lawyer or the witness may elaborate and may well prove 
detrimental to the case they are attempting to argue. Lawyers representing clients in court 
under the adversarial system are not attempting to present the truth. Indeed, if we continue to 
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follow Foucaultian principles, a truth that is rational and removed from power relations is 
singularly unachievable. Rather, both sides are attempting to persuade the jury that their 
version of the truth is the most plausible (Henderson et al, 2016; Cotterill, 2003). 
In the adversarial system employed in the UK and the USA, the burden of proof rests 
upon the prosecution. This means it is the role of the prosecution to present a version of 
events in which the accused is guilty ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ (McBarnet, 1981). The 
defence team typically has to refute this evidence by showing its validity to be in question; 
providing a different version as to how this evidence may have occurred; or provide 
alternative evidence, the conflict produced by which brings the original evidence under 
dispute (Ibid). In the case of witness testimony, presenting the witness as unreliable or 
placing a different emphasis on their account can alter how this evidence may be viewed by 
the jury. In order to do this, lawyers are trained in the art of questioning (O’Barr, 1982). 
It is important to note the difference between questioning tactics employed in direct 
examination (or examination in chief) versus those of cross-examination. Direct examination 
is where the witness is questioned by the lawyer who represents the side they are the witness 
for (an example being Oscar Pistorius, as the defendant, being questioned by the defence 
first). Cross-examination is where the opposing counsel questions the witness and is the more 
adversarial of the two as the witness is potentially more damaging to their case (Henderson et 
al, 2016). 
 Questions can be categorised at many levels, the most fundamental of which are open 
and closed questions. As the titles imply, open questions allow for longer answers driven by 
the respondent, whereas closed questions place a high restriction on the form (and even 
length of the answer). For example, Conley and O’Barr (1998: 24) describe these questions in 
terms of the WH- questions and tag questions. WH- questions consist of ‘why, where, when, 
which, who, what and how’, and are considered to be at the least controlling end of the 
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questioning spectrum as they do not necessarily impose a restriction on the form an answer 
can take (Ibid: 24). In contrast, ‘tag questions’ are often a statement followed by a question 
device attached to the end (Ibid: 24). For example, the question ‘[y]ou were attracted to 
[him], weren’t you?’ is a tag question, whereby the witness is being asked only to confirm the 
validity of the question and is not invited to add any additional information or narrative 
(Matoesian 1993: 154 in Conley and O’Barr, 1998: 27). Indeed, this example is used by 
Conley and O’Barr (1998: 27) to exemplify how a witness may attempt to resist the question, 
but is subsequently unable to due to the lawyer’s ability to continue framing and re-framing 
the question. They also indicate the extent to which lawyers may utilise elements of the 
witness’s response in order to do this and reach their goal. 
 In direct examination, therefore, it is more likely to see open questions that invite 
narrative from the witness or encourage elaboration. In contrast, cross-examination tends 
towards more tightly controlled questions that can be used to mitigate the damage done by 
the original testimony (Henderson et al, 2016). 
 Sidnell and Ehrlich (2006: 658) also discuss the concept of tag questions and have 
studied how presuppositions within questions are more damaging to a witness than a ‘psuedo-
proposition’. Taking the above example (as done by Ehrlich and Sidnell), the witness can still 
deny the proposition being made. In contrast, the presupposition is an element of the question 
that the respondent cannot challenge within the restrictions placed upon their ability to 
answer fully. A presupposition is where a fact is asserted within a larger statement or 
question, for example, ‘John didn’t hit Rosie’ contains the presupposition that someone did 
hit Rosie, it just was not John (Ehrlich and Sidnell, 2006: 659). In questions, these 
presuppositions can be particularly difficult for respondents to refute, for example: 
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49  M:  [knowing what you know no:w (.) 
50    do you have any regret in not interve:ning 
51   in the business plan p-process and saying: 
52   you’re go:ing: too fa:r. 
 
(Ibid: 666, emphasis in original) 
 
Though this example shall be revisited when looking at how questions may be answered, this 
question illustrates how a damaging presupposition may be inserted into a question and yet 
(should the respondent comply with the corresponding answer form) not be easily 
challengeable. The main thrust of the question is the issue of regret, which is framed in terms 
of a yes/no question. The presupposition is that the respondent did not intervene. Given the 
form of the question, if the respondent addresses the presupposition (as this respondent does), 
he is not answering the question (does he ‘have any regret’) (Ibid: 666-8). Consequently, 
where this method of questioning is used, respondents may be driven to accept a 
presupposition which may place a different twist on their testimony. 
 Cotterill (2003: 141-2) refers to embedded questions and the potentially convoluted 
form that such questions can take. In one example she shows how a question put to an expert 
witness contained ‘five separate propositional elements’, to which the witness was expected 
to (and did) answer with a simple yes or no. Cotterill’s observations during the O. J. Simpson 
trial were that should witnesses attempt to separate out these components and address them 
individually, they were often directed by the judge to ‘answer the question’ (Ibid: 142). She 
also discusses the questioning lawyer’s ability to frame the content of the answer expected 
from the witness. This can be done in the form of openly stating what is to be omitted 
(‘…without telling us what she said…’), as well as directing the respondents to monitor their 
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own responses (‘[b]eing very careful with your answer…’) (Ibid: 144-5). The ability of the 
lawyer questioning to continually frame and reframe the question until they reach the desired 
answer appears to be a generalised theme in cross-examination; in particular when the 
opposing counsel is attempting to shift the witness testimony away from damaging 
implications or discredit it entirely. This can also be seen in the way questions can also be 
used by lawyers to enhance a point or reiterate information already stated in order to draw 
further attention to it. For example: 
 
 1 Q: But when you first discovered it [the tape] during the first 
 2  week of March, who in the robbery/homicide division did 
 3  you talk to about this. 
 4 A: Nobody. 
 5 Q: You didn’t tell anybody at first? 
 6 A: No. 
(Ibid: 147) 
 
As Cotterill (2003: 147) illustrates, asking the question again appears to serve no other 
purpose than that of a rhetorical device used for emphasis rather than gaining additional 
information. The presupposition that he should have told somebody makes the declaration of 
having informed nobody appear all the more injurious (Ibid: 147), thus linking with the work 
of Ehrlich and Sidnell (2006) outlined above. 
 Taking the concept of reframing a matter to suit the purpose of the questioner, the 
issue of rape trials is one instance whereby this practice may result in the revictimisation of 
the victim. Though it should be borne in mind that the purpose of a trial is to ascertain guilt 
(and not presume it), the cross-examination of rape victims can result in revictimisation 
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through the regular practices of cross-examination (Conley and O’Barr, 1998: 36-7). Conley 
and O’Barr (1998: 36-7) argue that this particular realisation of power through linguistic 
practice is one which is unique to rape trials, however; the mechanics under discussion are 
generalizable (even if they lack the impact that may be attributed when used in the 
circumstances of a rape trial). 
 
Lawyer: Did have your pantyhose on when you got to the parking lot at 
the Kennedy home? 
  Witness: Yes. 
  Lawyer: Did you have your pantyhose on in the car, in the parking lot? 
  Witness: Yes. 
  Lawyer: Did you have your pantyhose on when you got out of your car? 
  Witness: I’m not sure. 
Lawyer: Did you have your pantyhose on when you went into the 
house? 
Witness: I’m not sure. 
Lawyer: Did you have your pantyhose on in the kitchen? 
Witness: I don’t remember. 
(Extract from Conley and O’Barr, 1998: 36) 
 
This reiteration and repetition of the question form is powerful in that it draws the focus to a 
particular item (in this case, the pantyhose of the alleged victim). The unique power of this 
example as part of a rape trial lies in the moral overtones that can be inferred from the 
repeated questioning (Conley and O’Barr, 1998: 37-8). This method of repeating and 
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reiterating questions and question form can be seen in other examples, including the previous 
example regarding the video tape. 
 That the power always rests with the lawyer is not necessarily true in every case. 
Whilst the questioner does have a significant amount of control in the proceedings that is 
ratified by the rules of court, the answerer does not always acquiesce and provide answers 
which conform to question type. In the following section this study shall look at the means 
through which respondents provide answers; the extent to which these answers conform; and 
the ability of the respondent to alter the power relation, redirecting control and potentially 
mitigating the damage that could be inflicted upon their testimony. 
 
 
1.4.2.2 Giving answers: ‘ask me no questions, I’ll tell you no lies’ (Oliver Goldsmith) 
 
Ehrlich and Sidnell’s study concerning a tribunal – in which people had died as a 
result of water contamination – pointed out that the power does not always lie with the lawyer 
and can be subverted by the witness. However, they also indicated that this circumstance may 
also be a result of who was being questioned (a high-ranking official). Nevertheless, the 
extent to which witnesses are willing and able to subvert questioning displays a potential 
negotiation within the interaction as to how the question-answer adjacency pair is adhered to. 
 
 
49  M:  [knowing what you know no:w (.) 
50    do you have any regret in not interve:ning 
51   in the business plan p-process and saying: 
52   you’re go:ing: too fa:r. 
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53  Harris:   Well:you assumed that I didn’t intervene 
54    in the business process and I think 
55    that’s-that’s not an assumption you ought 
56    to make. 
(Ibid: 666, emphasis in original) 
 
As can be seen in this extract, Harris responds to the lawyer’s question by orienting to the 
presupposition rather than the focus of ‘regret’. Embedded presuppositions can be 
problematic for respondents in that they can be sanctioned for noncompliance in certain 
institutional settings (as mentioned previously). Raymond (2003) shows how responses can 
be preferred or dispreferred when referring to yes/no interrogatives. These polarised 
questions invite a response that is already delimited by the question design (Heritage and 
Raymond, 2012). There is a preference in talk to deliver a type-conforming preferred 
response and where a dispreferred response is proffered it is interactionally ‘noticeable and 
eventful’; thus reflecting an asymmetry in the treatment of the two response types (Raymond: 
2003). In applying this to the strictures of responding in a courtroom setting, this results in 
witnesses invoking various strategies in formulating responses. 
 Atkinson and Drew (1979) discuss this and proffer evidence showing how witnesses 
can attempt to predict a line of questioning (particularly when it is perceived as damaging) 
and orient to this projection forward rather than the question being asked. In producing 
nonconforming responses in this institutional framework, resistance to the question can have 
an escalating impact. This is shown in Matoesian (2001: 60-1), whereby the victim attempts 
to resist the line of questioning and downgrades its importance, which only serves to prolong 
the sequence and ‘escalate’ the sequence. Within this is shown the restrictions for action 
placed on the respondent and the asymmetrical nature of the interaction. 
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Another aspect of responding to questions is not only based in structure and formulation 
within these interactions. In addition, there are also differences in social knowledge of 
questioning practices. For example, Eades’ (1996; 2004) work on the treatment of Aboriginal 
populations in Australian courts highlights the disparity that can exist when assumptions 
regarding interactional norms are made. In a case study presented by Eades regarding the 
imprisonment of a woman for murder, it was shown that she had acted out of self-defence 
after a period of domestic abuse. She had not been permitted to testify at her trial as her 
lawyers viewed her silence as uncooperative. For Kina, this was not the case, as long silences 
are not deemed inappropriate within her community. As she saw a different attorney for each 
interview, she was unable to establish the rapport necessary to confide details she found 
personal and embarrassing regarding her abuse. The legal questioning style did not allow 
time for a relationship to build between Kina and her legal representation, leading to 
misunderstandings and the defendant unable to express herself (1996). The purpose in 
highlighting this study is to show how questioning practices are not universal and should not 
be overgeneralised as such. Whilst questions can be purposefully designed to set restrictions 
upon the respondent, this can also happen through different normative frameworks as applied 
by participants upon the interaction, influencing how they interpret and orient to talk. As 
such, it is the view of this study, that while an inductive approach to research is preferred, 
there is merit in a two—fold approach that allows for the analysis of macro-level discourse at 
the point at which it emerges as relevant to that interactive event. Thus, while context is 
renewed within interaction (Heritage, 1984), the exclusion of all other factors cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. To elucidate, the point at which Kina’s communications with her legal 
team broke down can only be fully explained through an understanding of the difference in 
normative communicative practices between the participants. Therefore, one must be careful 
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to avoid attributing to interactive sequences an interpretation that inadvertently reflects an 
ethnocentric understanding of communication (such as the misinterpretation by her legal 
team of Kina’s alleged lack of cooperation). 
 
Having explored aspects of questioning and answering as an adjacency pair underpinning 
legal interactions, the following section will discuss the concept of public and private space 
and the positioning of legal discourses within this. 
 
 
1.5 The public-private dichotomy 
 
This section discusses the issue of public and private space and its relation to the 
courtroom. This is an important issue to examine in relation to the larger project of language 
use in courts, as the very concept of a trial itself is a merging of private and public issues 
presented in a judicial setting. Further to this, the concept of trials as a forum for state-
individual interaction implies, to a certain level, the existence of a public-private dichotomy, 
whose existence must be investigated and ascertained in order to cement the theoretical 
backdrop upon which this project is reliant. 
The development of this discussion establishes that the issue of public-private space is 
a complex matter both in theoretical and conceptual terms, as well as in actual discussions 
pertaining to the public-private nature of the courtroom. The inherent description of this 
space as placed in terms of a dichotomy will be displayed as an oversimplification of an 
otherwise grey and fluid area. Building on this, the discourses surrounding the public-private 
space of the courtroom will be shown in an American context to potentially produce a 
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juxtaposition of their own between the 1st and 6th Amendment (as briefly mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis), which is also not as straightforward as it may at first appear. 
 As discussed in detail above, it is relevant to emphasise that in using the terms ‘state’ 
and ‘law’, which shall appear frequently throughout, the meaning is not reflective of any 
single entity but follows the Foucaultian theory that these institutions consist of many and 
varied knowledge discourses, which are accepted by society as comprising the state and the 
legal justice system. Thus, though on the surface it may appear that these terms are accepting 
of the simple view of institute as entity, the use of these terms is simply for the sake of ease 
when referring to the complex matters which they encompass. 
 In addressing the matter of public-private space in court, this section discusses the 
following approaches, theories and debates surrounding the issue. Firstly, in order to 
comprehend the theoretical concepts of public and private within society and between the 
state and the individual, the theories concerning the public-private dichotomy shall be 
discussed in light of political science and criminological research in this area. Following this 
the discussion of public-private space in courts will be outlined, considering the issues of 
society’s ‘right to know’; the interests of the media and its role as public surrogate; the rights 
of the defendant; the distribution and dissemination of trial news and footage, and the courts’ 
role in this; and the potential and actual privatisation of public information. To conclude, a 
summary of the salient facts will be given, as well as a brief outline of the potential 
progression of this argument. Final remarks on this subject will highlight this debate’s overall 
impact on the wider project of language use in courtroom settings. 
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1.5.1 Public state and private society: a ‘clear’ divide 
 
The issue of public and private is often presented as a basic dichotomy between two 
obviously opposing factors; those being the public arena of the state, and the private realm of 
the individual. Despite this deceptively clear divide, however; the matters and extent to which 
the public and private spheres interact is adaptive and dynamic (indeed, it is not dissimilar to 
the articulation of law and society provided in section 2 of this chapter). Sales (1991: 296) 
describes the issue of a binary distinction in this case as problematic. Whilst Sales discusses 
public and private space in terms of differentiating and defining civil society, his critique of 
this binary distinction is relevant. Sales holds that this perspective creates a distinction in 
which the state is ‘a monster capable of subjugating the tumultuous social reality’ and 
everything else falls under the umbrella of ‘civil society’ (Ibid: 296). 
The labels of public and private are argued by Freund (and outlined by Sales, 1991) to 
have come from a means of distinguishing between the political sphere and the non-political 
sphere. Within this, it is important to note that the label of something as private is 
consequently not a reference to the individual’s relation with oneself but refers instead to ‘all 
of the relations within which he is but one individual among others’ (Freund [1965] 1978: 
292-293 in Sales, 1991: 297). If the term ‘public’ therefore is deemed to be synonymous with 
the state as a political manifestation, Freund subsequently argues that the state and the 
individual rarely meet one another directly. This is due to the private sphere encapsulating all 
non-political scope, including those areas which negotiate with the public sphere (Ibid: 297). 
In contrast to the wide range of issues and relations encapsulated within the category of the 
private sphere, the public realm can be argued to have a greater internal consistency and a 
much narrower scope as an umbrella for representing political issues and their manifestations. 
30 
 
Indeed, included within the four components which, for Freund, create the public sphere, 
there is one which relates directly to the law: 
 
‘… the demand for homogeneity through law, which means “a rationalisation of 
relations between individuals and of their relationships with the necessary organs of 
a political collectivity” (Freund [1965] 1978: 322 in Sales, 1991: 298). 
 
This delineation of public and private places the law within the public sphere and also 
categorises it as inherently political. 
 Whilst there is a clear boundary as to what constitutes public in this theory, for the 
purposes of this project it remains too narrow and does not include other attributions to the 
public sphere which may not be so categorically political. For example, matters pertaining to 
‘the public’ and their right to know; consequently bringing matters into a public sphere that 
encompass the social rights and obligations of society and community rather than a political 
state conglomerate. According to this theory, these matters may be viewed as private 
inasmuch as they are individuals reacting to the political (public) sphere, which would 
consequently place them under Sales term of civil society (Ibid: 308). Sales article critiques 
not only Freund, but also discusses Habermas’ model of System-Lifeworld. The particularly 
interesting conclusion his analysis draws is what should be included as the content of civil 
society. Out of the six points he lists, two are of especial relevance to this thesis: 
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 a place of association and social integration where mediations take place 
between individuals and groups, groups and social institutions, social 
institutions and political and economic institutions… 
 a reality primarily linked to the state, but also to the transnational economic 
system and, more and more, to the domestic or internal area of everyday life 
(Ibid: 309) 
 
 The interpretation this thesis draws from this is the concept of civil society as a 
blurred extension of the private sphere which engages with the public sphere. Indeed, the 
concept of the public and private spheres as two parts of the same whole provides an 
interesting visual, whereby one sphere can only expand at the expense of the other. Much like 
the interpretation of law as both determinate and adaptive, these realms interact, regulate and 
reshape one another (Ibid: 299). Nevertheless, when considering these arenas of social and 
political interaction, the Foucaultian concepts concerning power and negotiated space (as 
discussed above) do show that to categorise in such a binary manner runs the risk of 
interpreting the issues of public and private discourse as mutually centralised, where the 
reality is more disparate. Returning to the concept of power as discussed in section 1.4, 
discourses and truth claims are disseminated through institutions which hold claims to 
knowledge (as discussed in the outline of knowledge-power above). This dissemination can 
be construed as part of the public (political) sphere, however; not only is the private sphere 
blurred with the public sphere through the concept of civil society, but the public sphere 
becomes blurred with the private as matters which were not always considered public come 
under formal regulation (such as ‘identity’, ‘physical and mental health’, ‘social assistance’, 
inter alia) (Ibid: 299). 
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 The discussion to this point shows that a dichotomy between public and private space 
does not adequately encompass the complexities within state and non-state interactions. Sales 
(1991) concept of civil society helps bring an additional layer to the discussion and provides 
a means of visualising the extended interactions of private individuals as groups which then 
interact with the public sphere (which incorporates the numerous political institutions that 
represent the varied discourses presented as knowledge and truth claims). In order to link this 
theory of public and private space as a contested area with the practices of law, the issues of 
regulating the family and domestic abuse serve as practical exemplifications of the indistinct 
nature of this space. 
 Smith and Natalier (2005: 69-70) point out that in terms of the law as an institution 
there is no formal area of privacy outside of its purview, however; in discussing legal 
regulation of family life, there is a perception of reluctance to interfere in the realm of the 
family home. This perception, according to Keyes and Burns (2002: 583), is something of a 
fallacy as family law does arbitrate matters within the family. In fact the family, its 
constitution, and its structure are regulated by various institutions through practices 
including, inter alia, registering marriages and births, managing divorce proceedings, and 
declaring relationships (which might not be formalised by marriage) in order to calculate 
social benefits and taxation (Berns, 1992: 153-154). The laws surrounding abortion are 
arguably another area in which the public and private spheres become somewhat blurred. As 
outlined by Smith and Natalier (2005: 70), in the United States, in the Supreme Court case of 
Roe v. Wade, it was stated that a woman’s right to abortion was an extension of the 14th 
Amendment as it was directly related to privacy and personal liberty. Nevertheless, cases 
following this ruling have since argued that a ‘woman’s right to privacy is separate matter to 
the State’s responsibility to protect or fund that right’, with some cases concerning abortion 
concluding that state resources should not be used in abortions unless the woman’s life was at 
33 
 
risk (Ibid: 70). Consequently, the issue remains somewhat contentious and unsettled, with the 
boundaries of public and private rather indistinct. 
 The idea that the private sphere of the family should not be penetrated by the public 
institution of law is one that is often linked back to the concept of patriarchy with one man as 
the head of the household (Berns, 1992: 154). Yet the attitude propagated by this perception 
has been acknowledged to have proliferated and embedded discrimination and domestic 
abuse (Keyes and Burns, 2002: 583). The issue of domestic abuse is one which has been 
subject to various approaches. Mirchandani (2006), discusses how courts in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, have applied a style whereby the gender of governance is more matriarchal in the 
handling of domestic abuse cases. This study addresses the structural changes applied in their 
domestic abuse court, which are significantly altered in comparison with traditional court. 
Mirchandani outlines how ‘masculine’ values within law are promoted and proliferated at the 
expense of ‘feminine’ values, with masculine values encompassing matters such as: ‘abstract 
rationality, expressed as objectivity and distance’; the ‘adversarial model of justice modelled 
on the duel’; and the ‘emphasis on hierarchy encapsulated in the bureaucratic structure of 
law’ (Mirchandani, 2006: 783-4). Though the focus for this thesis is not that of feminist 
theory versus patriarchal structuring, that this exemplifies an instance in which legal 
structures were altered in order to address an ostensibly private issue is important as it serves 
it illustrate that the public-private dichotomy is an oversimplified means of addressing 
boundaries that are conceptually fluid and problematic to apply (Smith and Natalier, 2005: 
71). 
 Having considered the theoretical issues surrounding public and private space and the 
difficulties in clearly delineating these areas in terms of the institutions of the state and the 
private society of the individual, this thesis shall now consider how the application of public 
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and private space is applied concerning the dissemination of courtroom data and the 
developments of video cameras in the courtroom. 
 
 
1.5.2 Cameras in court: the United States of America 
 
Video cameras in the courtroom (hereafter simply referred to as cameras) is a fairly 
well-debated issue in various justice systems around the world. The United Kingdom, the 
United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, inter alia, have all 
encountered this issue and have all had varying responses to it (Stepniak, 2012). The largest 
concentration of filmed trial footage arguably comes from the United States, with CourtTV 
alone having famously aired hundreds of hours of trial footage. Consequently, it is from the 
United States that our data sources originate. Nevertheless, in order to contextualise the data 
footage that forms the mainstay of this thesis, it is pertinent to examine the arguments 
surrounding the availability of this data. This is due to its being closely related and relevant in 
addressing not only the issue of public and private space, but also the interactions of the state 
institution of the criminal justice system; the principle focus of this study. 
The core support for cameras in court appears to stem from the perspective of justice 
as ‘[being] seen to be done’ (Stepniak, 2004a: 791). This perspective often invokes the view 
that courtrooms are public space – not private. In this sense, ‘public’ appears to take on a 
broader sense of meaning than simply that which is political (as put forward by Freund). The 
public space in this sense appears to be the physical space (as well as the theoretical), in 
which this is an actual space that ‘the public’ are free to enter as members of society. As well 
as being a public space, in the USA, the concept of justice as public has been linked with the 
35 
 
freedom of press; a First Amendment argument. This has collided with the defendant’s right 
to a fair trial; a Sixth Amendment argument. 
In order to elaborate, the First Amendment in the constitution of the USA states that: 
 
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.’ (The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). 
 
Whereas the Sixth Amendment states: 
 
‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favour, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.’ (Ibid). 
 
In accordance with the societal development, many people now gather their news 
from broadcasters and other outlets (newspapers, news websites etc.). Included in this is the 
means through which members of the public learn of developments in the courtroom. News 
broadcasters have increasingly become something of a surrogate for public society in terms 
of how and where this information can be accessed without requiring attendance in the 
courtroom itself (Stepniak, 2012: 85). Consequently, freedom of press in reporting matters of 
public interest can be attributed to a right under the First Amendment (Stepniak, 2004b: 326). 
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In accordance with this, cameras in state courts are increasingly common and are often 
permitted on a case by case basis at the discretion of the presiding judge (though this is not 
always the case) (Sellers, 2008). In federal courts cameras are still generally banned, 
however; at the time of writing this thesis, a pilot scheme was underway in federal courts 
whereby civil cases were being filmed on a trial basis and uploaded to the US Courts’ 
Website. 
The conflict with the Sixth Amendment and the reason that cameras in court remains 
a debated issue both within and without the justice system and academia is where public 
coverage of a trial is believed to impinge or have impinged upon the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial. There have been instances where the media presence has been argued to have a 
negative impact on judicial proceedings, which in turn impacts upon the defendant’s right to 
a fair trial; one of the most famous being the case of Estes v Texas (1965), in which the 
Supreme Court ruled that the media coverage of the trial had been detrimental to the rights of 
the accused (Friendly and Goldfarb, 1967: 215). At the time, this was largely attributed to the 
‘physically disruptive’ nature of audio-visual recording equipment, however; it has long since 
been argued that technology has advanced to the point where this is no longer the case, and 
the physicality of recording equipment is no longer such as to prove ‘prejudicial to a fair trial’ 
(Stepniak, 2004b: 798). Although the stance has oscillated throughout the last fifty or so 
years and has varied greatly amongst individual states (as well as at the federal level), it has 
been noted that the right to a fair trial is not the right to a private trial (Stepniak, 2004b, 326-
7). 
 This links back to the previous discussion of the problematic arena of defining public 
and private space. If the courtroom is public insofar as it is an institution of the political, it is 
also an area open to ‘the public’, which could be argued to be the ‘civil society’ discussed by 
Sales (1991). This, one could argue, would thereby classify courtrooms as a space between 
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those two dynamic and adaptive spheres. In this space, private matters become a public 
concern (as discussed with regards to the issues of domestic abuse previously). Nevertheless, 
it is also possible for a courtroom to close its proceedings or limit who may view them. 
Though not an US-based example, this could be seen during the trial of Oscar Pistorius in 
South Africa during the spring-summer of 2014, whereby no one was filmed whilst providing 
testimony (including Pistorius himself). Thus those present in the courtroom viewed the 
proceedings in their entirety, but those who viewed the televised footage had a somewhat 
edited version of events. 
 Though this may place restrictions on the concept of open justice, the ability to reduce 
court access is arguably necessary, however; as the rights of the vulnerable must also be 
protected (such instances may include children providing testimony etc.). Consequently, 
though arguments for cameras in court have grounds, it is necessary that the rights of society 
to view proceedings in a more easily accessible form should not come at the expense of 
administering a fair trial (Sellers, 2008), nor should the concept of administering a fair trial 
automatically preclude the concept of its being broadcast. 
 A final point to be made is that of the importance attributed to wider society having 
access to judicial proceedings in the first place. The concept of justice being ‘seen to be done’ 
has been mentioned as an important part of the criminal justice system in countries such as 
the United States. In this case it can be argued that the public interest in criminal proceedings 
comes not only from trials as a form of entertainment (though this is undoubtedly a factor) 
(Peelo, 2005), but also stemming from the concept of matters of ‘shared concern’. Couldry 
and Markham (2006: 256), in a study concerning ‘public connection through media 
consumption’ describe shared concern as issues which are not ‘purely private’ and ‘that in 
principle citizens need to discuss in a world of limited resources’. Their study also addresses 
the public sphere as something which may have become fragmented into specialist 
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‘sphericules’ as a result of the increasingly connected digital world (Ibid: 256). Judicial 
proceedings are a matter of shared concern, particularly in a case which incites public 
outrage. Though referring to cases with child victims, Jewkes (2011: 117) points out that high 
profile criminal cases and the public mourning which may accompany them (rare though they 
may be) play a part in the ‘creation and maintenance of an imagined community’ (emphasis 
in original). This sense of community and cohesion is arguably strengthened through the 
‘negative characteristics’ displayed (such as child murder) that in turn fuel a public ‘need for 
unity’; this need could then be said to be fulfilled through the illusion of connectivity 
provided by mass media (Ibid: 117). 
Nevertheless, striking the right balance between the defendant’s rights and those of 
wider society continues to provoke strong opinions and generate discussion. Stepniak (2012, 
98) notes that high profile trials still generate societal criticism. This is arguably reinforced 
by the concept of the ‘media circus’ which has been seen to play out in various conspicuous 
cases that have famously aired at an international level. 
 
1.5.2.1 The ‘Media Circus’ 
 
The O. J. Simpson trial is one of the most noted internationally broadcast trials in 
history. Taking place over nine months, it was long and landmarked the use of cameras in the 
courtroom at a new level (Sellers, 2008). It has since been used as a reason both for and 
against cameras in the courtroom, given the extraordinary amount of attention it garnered and 
the resulting negativity it generated towards the inclusion of cameras in courtrooms on an 
international scale (Stepniak, 2012: 29-32). 
The reasons for this may include: that no one seemed to predict the amount of 
attention allowing cameras into this trial would generate; and there was no tried and tested 
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method for the court to handle the media coverage of such a high profile trial (Cushner et al, 
2009). Indeed, in the years following the Simpson case, trials involving Michael Jackson, 
Louise Woodward, Martha Stewart and Conrad Murray have garnered a large amount of 
public attention, not least because of who was involved. Cushner, Hartley and Parker (2009) 
published an article outlining the methods of communication used by courts to interact with 
the media and offering advice as to how these can be utilised to greater effect. 
Communicating with the media is by no means a recent development for the court, yet the 
means through which data are now disseminated have become increasingly fast (with 24 hour 
news coverage and the increasing role of the internet, inter alia). Taking this into 
consideration, Cushner et al indicate that effective communication with the media can aid in 
the creation of a ‘positive image’ of the justice system (Cushner et al, 2009: 52). 
In spite of the positive implications of well-managed, high profile coverage, there is a 
counter to this approach. This is the negative reflection that can fall upon the media outlets 
themselves as regards their impact upon the perceived serenity of the courtroom and the level 
of respect they are viewed as displaying towards the proceedings and the case. 
It has been noted throughout the history of this debate that one issue with allowing 
increased media access into the courtroom is that those representatives are then alleged to not 
abide by the rules and boundaries set (Cotterill, 2003). This stigma can be seen in the 1935 
trial of Bruno Hauptmann, who was found guilty of kidnapping and the murder of the son of 
Charles Lindbergh, a well-known aviator. An early international sensation, Stepniak (2004b: 
319) remarks that approximately 700 members of the press were believed to have attended 
and the public galleries were filled beyond capacity. The press where condemned for their 
behaviour as anyone linked with the trial became ‘fair game’, including witnesses and jurors 
(Ibid: 319). In 1937, The ABA Code of Judicial Ethics employed Canon 35, entitled 
‘Improper Publicizing of Court Proceedings’, which effectively prohibited cameras in court 
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(Ibid: 321). Thus the aforementioned vacillation between allowing cameras into the 
courtroom has continued. 
Returning to the O. J. Simpson trial in 1995, the trend of the press not entirely abiding 
by the rules set out by the court could still be viewed. Cotterill (2003: 109) outlines two 
instances of particular note, in which the cameras were cut courtesy of a ‘kill switch’ that was 
located by the presiding judge, Lance Ito, who had a screen under his desk in order to be able 
to view the broadcast footage. One of these was when an alternate juror was within the shot 
during the opening statements of the prosecution, which is prohibited under the California 
Rules of Court, Rule 980 whereby jurors are not to be identified (Ibid: 109); and a second 
took place during the closing statements of the prosecution, where the writing pad in front of 
O.J. Simpson was filmed constituting, as Judge Ito put it, a ‘flagrant violation and intrusion 
into the attorney/client privilege’ (Ibid: 110). Another issue raised by Cotterill is the pressure 
under which the jury were placed, as they were made aware of the viewing public by the 
attorneys and pushed to ‘do the right thing’ (Ibid: 112). Judge Ito expressed his concern over 
this and again considered terminating the video-feed, accusing the attorneys of ‘pandering to 
the cameras’ (Ibid: 112). 
Though cameras where permitted to continue filming after both of the events that 
resulted in termination and after the expressed concern, the scrutiny under which allowing 
news cameras into the courtroom underwent was not viewed by all as having been favourable 
towards the concept of video cameras in court. In fact, other countries have even cited this 
trial as a reason to continue their own prohibitions regarding video cameras. In Britain, 
despite the progress made in some instances in Scottish courts, England and Wales continue 
to have a ban on still photography (much less video recording). This has only been relaxed in 
regards to the Supreme Court with its livestreaming via Sky News (2017), and as of October 
2013 the broadcasting of the Court of Appeals via the BBC, amongst other broadcasters 
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(BBC, 2013). In spite of these large steps forward, the Simpson trial is said to have played a 
role in dissuading previous supporters of cameras in court. Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
reportedly came to the view that the participating lawyers had become distracted and that 
televising proceedings ‘appeared not to favour the administration of justice’, and the then 
Lord Chancellor ‘was also said to ‘go cold on the idea’’ (Stepniak, 2012: 30). 
Nevertheless, in regards to the progress made in US trial footage recordings, this 
appears to be an area of continued growth; despite any setbacks that may have occurred or 
arguments to the contrary. This heightened level of broadcasting has also had an additional 
impact on trial footage; that of potential privatisation of a public proceeding. 
 
1.5.2.2 Whose recording is it anyway? 
 
 To this point, it has been outlined that the public-private distinction has been more 
complicated than may be inferred from the labels. As well as having outlined the theoretical 
spheres, the concept has also been applied to the interactions of the court with the lives of the 
participants; the physical space of the courtroom; the involvement of wider society and the 
impact of the media as a surrogate for disseminating information. However, that a news 
company records the trials consequently means that they have the potential to own and brand 
the footage; thus making it privately-owned property. In the USA, courts do not necessarily 
keep the footage of trials they have tried. Upon telephoning the LA Superior Court, the 
author was informed that they did not keep the footage and the best people to contact were 
the media outlets themselves. This is not to say that all courthouses do not maintain a visual 
record or that all trial footage after the immediate airdate must be purchased, but it does 
highlight an interesting point in the concept of owning what was initially a public proceeding 
viewable by wider society. 
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 Using a contrast to elaborate, in the United Kingdom, footage of the Supreme Court is 
copyright of the court (not Sky News) (Sky, 2017). However, if a member of the public 
wishes to access past footage, the Supreme Court website states that this facility is not 
provided, as converting the broadcast footage into ‘domestic DVDs or other output formats’ 
is beyond their current resources (The Supreme Court, 2017). That being said, ‘footage of the 
Justices’ brief summaries of their judgements’ are placed on a dedicated YouTube channel, 
showing that progress in the developed use of cameras in court is certainly being made (Ibid). 
 In the case of gathering footage from overseas high-profile cases there are options, but 
these involve private outlets. For example, in order to view the trial footage of cases such as 
the Pistorius trial from South Africa it is aired live. To watch it after the fact, the options are 
reduced to contacting the primary company who filmed the trial (not the broadcasters who 
then had the rights to also air that footage), or searching for a public access (free or fee 
payable) online archive. When obtaining footage from a company, the recordings are their 
property and therefore the footage being bought can include the purchase of a license to use 
that footage, as well as the footage being provided in a preferred format (such as DVD) 
(TruTV, 2014). It should be noted that this is not a criticism of any private company 
distributing courtroom footage and that in the purchase of an item, such as a DVD, costs will 
undoubtedly need to be paid. The element of interest is the point at which a public proceeding 
becomes private property; courtesy of having been distributed by a surrogate who is acting on 
behalf of the wider society (for whom this matter is one of interest and shared concern). 
 Given the impact this issue has on the data collection element of this project, its 
theoretical implications link well with the public-private issues hitherto discussed, and further 
exemplify the intertwined nature of public and private space. 
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1.5.3 Section Summary 
 
 In bringing all of these elements together, it is clear that the concept of the public-
private dichotomy is an oversimplification of a more intricate theoretical and practical 
balance at many different levels in society and the courtroom. Despite the issues outlined at 
the level of politics and society, law and the private individual, and the courtroom and 
broadcast news, as outlined by Couldry and Markham (2006: 256) the labels of public and 
private maintain a certain use when discussing these spaces and the interactions therein. The 
adaptive nature of these spheres is important, as it shows that the space of the courtroom is 
not necessarily exclusive as either public or private space, but could be argued to be a 
negotiated space in which these two spheres adapt and interact. This links with the theory of 
law and its interactions with society (as discussed in 1.3) as being arguably both adaptive and 
determinate. 
 The concept of cameras in court and its impact on the discussion of the public-private 
dichotomy highlights a progression towards the courtrooms not only as accessible in person, 
but also as a space which can be disseminated on a larger scale. The importance of society, 
therefore, as an element of these proceedings (as well as the state and the individual) is 
worthy of note as it impacts upon how these proceedings are presented. 
 
 
1.6 Final remarks on linguistics and court research 
 
Much research regarding linguistics in court has already been expressed throughout various 
sections of this literature review. Nevertheless, this section shall provide some final remarks 
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on research that has yet to be explicitly discussed and is not incorporated into Methodology 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.4). 
As has been outlined previously, there is a growing body of research within linguistics 
concerned with courtroom interactions; and, as has been discussed above in Section 1.4 on 
power, linguistic analyses are not wholly divorced from other features under discussion, 
allowing for overlap within the field. 
 Research into courtroom proceedings as ‘talk-in-interaction’ has been conducted by 
researchers using Conversation Analysis, particularly Atkinson and Drew (1979) whose 
seminal work Order in Court provided a detailed analysis of interactions drawn from 
coroner’s court and tribunal testimony (for further information, see Chapter 2, Section 2.4). 
Heritage and Clayman (2010) and Drew (1992) discuss trial examinations. Within these is the 
concept of resisting the question and answer format (as discussed above) with a focus on the 
structural formation of the interaction and the identification of linguistic strategies. For 
example, Drew’s (1992) research discusses how participants in interaction display neutrality 
in Small Claims Court in London. Drew found a six stage sequence occurred in which the 
arbitrator asked a question with a ‘projection of minimal response’ (such as yes or no); the 
litigant responded with a non-minimal response; pause; arbitrator gives a ‘receipt’; pause; 
arbitrator asks a question (Ibid: 203). 
Other such patterns such as the formulaic nature of the question and answer format 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979) and resistance to questions (Thornborrow, 2002; Heritage and 
Clayman, 2010; Matoesian, 1993; 2001; Ehrlich and Sidnell, 2006; Ehrlich, 2001; etc.) is 
well researched within linguistics, utilising various approaches to analysing discourse. 
Though not part of courtroom analysis specifically, one core linguistic work in the 
area of legal linguistics is that of Carter (2011). Her analysis of police interrogations in the 
UK included the orientation by interactants to the tape recorder as a ‘silent participant’. The 
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role of the tape recorder is to create a record of the police interviews and can be called upon 
at a future point as a resource (for example, evidence in trial). In Carter’s view the tape 
recorder represents ‘future listeners’ who have yet to be realised. Using Conversation 
Analysis and drawing on Maynard’s research into plea bargaining (Maynard: 1984), Carter 
shows how the tape is involved within the interaction between police, the suspect and other 
relevant persons, even though it does not respond. 
This links with research into news and political interviews (Heritage, 1985), radio talk 
shows (Hutchby, 1996), etc. whereby talk is designed for an ‘overhearing’ audience that does 
not participate in the interaction itself (Heritage, 1985). Drawing this back to courtroom 
research, as Carter (2011) and Drew (1992) both point out, the jury have the means through 
which they can ask questions in a trial, but rarely do. Nevertheless, talk is oriented towards 
the jury (much like the tape) and has previously been described as an ‘overhearer’ (Heritage, 
1985). We would link back to Carter’s observation and further it by aligning this study with 
the position of the jury as a silent participant within the interaction, as ‘overhearer’ implies 
they are on a similar level to that of a television or radio audience far removed from the 
interactions being observed. In realigning the jury (as the with the police tape) with the role 
of ‘participant’ (even if non-vocalic), it more accurately reflects their position within the 
institutional proceedings. Building on Carter’s reference to the jury, this study contends that, 
in a manner extending beyond the concept of the tape, the jury are also more involved and are 
not just oriented to as a participating and yet potential future listener. The jury are still 
physically present and as such, there remains the concept of nonverbal feedback (whether 
voluntary or otherwise) resulting – in our view – in the interactions having the potential for 
an additional level of involvement and performativity. 
In concluding this section, linguistic analyses of courtroom interactions have focused 
on micro-analytical perspectives exploring structure and formulation within courtroom and 
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related legal proceedings (Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Heritage and Clayman, 2010; Maynard, 
1984; Drew, 1992; Carter, 2011; inter alia). However, there are differences between different 
linguistic approaches, be they corpus-based (Cotterill, 2003; Heffer, 2005) or discourse 
approaches that draw from wider contextual theories (Conley and O’Barr, 2005; Matoesian, 
1993; 2001). This provides an increasing body of work to draw upon, but also highlights 
where these approaches may be drawn together more closely and in a more cooperative 
manner when looking at both ‘form and content’ (O’Barr, 1982) as two parts of the same 
whole and addressing conflicting approaches to context and the extent to which it is 
considered to be emergent from the data. 
The following section will discuss narrative within courtroom proceedings, with a 
focus given to research on opening statements. 
 
1.7 Narrative in courtroom research and opening statements 
 
The role of narrative in courtroom research has been developed over a number of years, with 
studies exploring aspects including case construction, rhetoric, and discursive features within 
interaction (such as Bennett and Feldman, 1981; Brooks and Gewitz, 1996; Cotterill, 2003; 
Jackson, 1988). 
 When discussing the role of narrative within the adversarial courtroom system, the 
role of the jury is often discussed, with particular attention paid to how juries view cases and 
the extent to which they can be persuaded to the veracity of one side over another (ref). For 
Bennett and Feldman (1981), the use of narrative in court is a means of translating legal 
requisites into everyday understanding; thus, allowing for the fulfilment of legal requirement 
whilst endeavouring to ensure one not versed in law can discern relevant aspects of evidence 
from those otherwise to be considered extraneous to that side’s perspective. Through 
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narrative, therefore, one can use coherent storytelling as a means of persuading the judging 
audience that one side is more believable than the other. Within this is also a step away from 
the establishment of ‘truth’ within the trial phase, as there is a suggested shift away from 
establishing the facts of the case and a move towards the agenda of whether or not it is 
believed the person(s) on trial are guilty of the accused act. 
 Jackson (1988), however, considers there to be weaknesses within the framework of 
Bennett and Feldman (1981). Bennett and Feldman use three criteria for evaluating 
courtroom rhetoric: definitional, inferential, and validational. Definitional and inferential are 
linked with how pieces of evidence ‘fit’ with the overall narrative, whereas validational refers 
to the ‘weight’ or reliability of the evidence. In this approach, the overall effectiveness of the 
rhetoric is ‘a function of its relation to story structure’ (Jackson, 1988: 73). Jackson’s view of 
Bennet and Feldman’s model is that there is an ‘assumption that the jury is able to make 
judgements as to the “truth” of the “evidence”’ outside of the judgement as to the ‘coherence’ 
of the narrative that is being ‘constructed from that evidence. There is, consequently, an 
overall weakness in that the semantics of the narrative becomes the only view through which 
the pragmatics of the courtroom are then viewed. (Ibid: 73-5) Jackson summaries this as 
overlooking the potential for a ‘multi-layered discursive model’, in which narrative structure 
is analysed separately from the narrativization of the pragmatics of courtroom procedure 
(Ibid: 76). The development of the interactive three-layered concept of courtroom procedure 
used in this project (see Chapter 2) is partially formed from on this critique. 
 
Though reference has already been made to Cotterill’s (2003) work on the O. J. Simpson 
trial, it is a seminal work that provides an holistic and comprehensive analysis of a single 
trial, including an array of relevant areas for courtroom research. Though an analysis of 
language and power in court (see Section 1.4), Cotterill also discusses narrative. Her initial 
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approach to macro-, micro-, and multiple narratives is necessary to explore, as it lays the 
foundation upon which much of this thesis has been built. 
Cotterill (2003) provides a detailed deconstruction of the overall narratives of the trial 
in separating them into the ‘crime’ story, the ‘investigation’ story, both of which intersect at 
the point of the ‘trial’, which is in itself a narrative. In her analysis, she employs an overview 
of narrative as spans the entire trial, looking at the months in which types of witnesses were 
called and the story element they were linked with. Given the overall duration of the Simpson 
trial, this approach serves as the macro-level analysis for Cotterill’s research. In her analysis 
of the opening statements she examines the ‘strategic lexicalisation’ used through a corpus-
based approach. There is little detailed research on opening statements within an already 
niche area of linguistic analysis under the remit of ‘forensic linguistics’. In her findings, 
Cotterill (2003) expands upon the use of key words with a high frequency in both the 
prosecution and defence openings (for example, the word ‘encounter’) and their collocations. 
Her findings show that words such as ‘encounter’ are often collocated in the negative, whilst 
terms such as ‘incident’ are collocated as neutral. This emphasises the lexical awareness of 
the attorneys speaking and the strategic formulations of these interactions so as to create ties 
to the stance of the speaker. 
 This provides a linguistic corpus approach to an area that has previously been the 
remit of legal, sociological, and criminological research (such as Powell, 2001; Ahlen, 1995; 
Lucas, 1991). For example, Snedaker’s (1986) article on storytelling in opening statements, 
which provided a narrative analysis of the Chicago Anarchist Trials, focusing on form (as the 
structure shaping discourse), content (as the ideas shaped by form), and style (as the 
‘linguistic embellishment’ that presents form and content). Snedaker (1986) found that there 
was a contrast in the defence and prosecution styles. Her findings include the prosecution as 
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using a one-sided narrative approach, where the defence had a two-sided approach which 
‘refuted the allegations’ of the prosecution to and provided an alternate portrayal of events. 
 Stygall (1994) also brings a linguistic lens to opening statements in her work Trial 
Language. She describes opening statements as an ‘outline’ (a term used by judges and 
attorneys). Her analysis looks at opening statements through Schiffrin’s (1980) definition of 
‘metacommentary’, summarised as having three linguistic operators, which are: 
 ‘metalinguistic referents’ (demonstrative pronouns/ordering schemes) 
 ‘logical operators’ (‘right/wrong’; ‘true/false’) 
 ‘metalinguistic verbs’ (verbs talking about talk – ‘say’; ‘tell’; ‘ask’) 
(Stygall, 1994: 108) 
Stygall argues that opening statements are an extended form of metacommunication that 
occurs as a monologue (1994: 108-9). In addition to this is the concept of topic shift and 
bracketing, which are shown to be core features in the opening statements analysed, with a 
quantitative breakdown of their type, number, and percentage (Ibid). 
 Finally, research by Heffer (2005; 2010) and Harris (2001; 2005) shows narrative use 
in opening statements as having the structure of a ‘master narrative’ that largely conforms to 
Labov’s personal narrative framework (Heffer, 2010: 203-4). This application of narrative 
structure to opening statements provides an interpretive framework from which they can be 
viewed as the determination of the ‘crime story’. 
 Given the current research on opening statements, there is scope to further the field 
and provide a linguistic analysis of opening statements that considers the micro-aspects of 
delivery in terms of the opening statement as an interactive performance, as well as the 
potential to further examine the use of narrative form as it is created in situ and its links with 
assumed shared cultural knowledge and macro-level societal discourses. 
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 Other research into narrative use in the courtroom relates to the analyses of rape trials 
and the construction of identities within these settings (Ehrlich, 2015; Matoesian, 1993; 2001; 
as discussed previously for their linguistic focus). This research draws on both language use 
within these settings and the application of ideological standpoints to construct and 
deconstruct both narrative and identity. 
There is an overlap in this section with the analysis of linguistics in court that should 
be mentioned at this point, as it is not the intention of this subdivision of sections to imply 
that these analyses are mutually exclusive and held apart from one another as either narrative 
or linguistic – indeed such a stark distinction could be viewed as potentially problematic as 
methodological approaches utilised by linguistics, such as Conversation Analysis, emerged 
from sociological research (Sidnell and Stivers, 2013: 3). 
From this, the summary of the literature review will be presented before moving to 
the methodological approach of this thesis. 
 
1.8 Chapter summary 
 
To conclude, in reviewing the literature above, there are three areas that this study will 
contribute to. 
The first area is in adding to literature on defendant cross-examination. Though this is 
not understudied, the qualitative analysis of cross-examination of a defendant, rather than a 
victim or witness, adds to the information available in this area. Defendants do not have to 
speak on the stand and can choose to remain silent. The analysis in this data also lacks the 
‘expert identity’ dimension found in Matoesian’s analysis of the Kennedy-Smith rape, 
resulting in further expanding and comparing the means through which identity and narrative 
are established and linguistically formulated in this area. 
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The second area of study is that of opening statements. Whilst there is some research 
on opening statements (Cotterill, 2003; Stygall, 1994, etc.), there is room for expansion and 
development. Much of the emphasis on trial monologues is placed on closing arguments, 
through the lens of this being the last ‘packaging’ of the adversarial narratives the jury will be 
exposed to prior to their deliberations. As an area with comparatively less research, this study 
intends to contribute and develop research in this aspect of trial procedure. 
Finally, there is little research on the specific area of interactions between participants 
in the absence of the jury. This aspect of courtroom interaction has been touched upon in 
other studies, but as yet remains an underdeveloped matter in this field. 
The means through which these areas will be built upon and the manner in which they 
link together will be expanded upon in the following chapter on Methodology. This will 
provide the research questions that guide and underpin this project, an overview of the 
methodological approach to analysis, and the data and ethics at the centre of this study. 
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Chapter 2: Research Questions and Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Having discussed previous literature in this field and identified where this work is situated 
within the larger framework of research into courtroom discourse, the research questions, 
conceptual model and methodological approach underpinning this thesis will now be 
outlined. 
 Firstly, the research questions and the overall conceptual approach will be set out, 
followed by the contextual narrative of the trials, and then the methodologies that are being 
used to underpin this. This study brings together linguistic principles from conversation 
analysis (and discourse analysis more broadly) and Foucaultian theories of power as a 
negotiated space. Though these two methodological approaches are often characterised as 
being removed from one another ontologically, particularly regarding context, this study 
argues that in drawing on both micro- and macro-level theories, a rich analysis of courtroom 
interaction can be put forth. The reason for this approach is that, in viewing courtroom 
interactions, testimony does not take place wholly in isolation or without a broader social 
context. Additionally, broader social context can be viewed within the micro-interactions. 
Given that each ‘side’ has an agenda within the adversarial system and that this can be 
considered shared knowledge amongst the participants, this study takes the stance that both 
macro- and micro-level approaches are relevant, as the agenda of each side is permanently 
relevant throughout all subsequent interactions. 
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2.1.1 Overview of trial narratives 
 
In order to fully contextualise the methodological approach and the data which is under 
analysis, this section will provide an overview of the trial narratives and the overall ‘story’ of 
the case. A more concise summary, divided by the narratives of the prosecution and 
defendant(s), can also be found in sections 4.1.2–4, with particular relation to the narrative as 
relevant to the opening statements of the two trials. 
 
The trials of Grant and Amanda Hayes were held separately, but both took place in Wake 
County, North Carolina in the United States of America. Grant Hayes was tried first in mid-
2013, and Amanda was tried in early 2014. Both accused the other of having been 
responsible for the death of Laura J. Ackerson, which led to a decision by the presiding judge 
that they be tried separately, as a potential ramification would be a mistrial (Fanning, 2016). 
The overall story of events emerged as follows1. 
 Laura Ackerson was the ex-girlfriend of Grant Hayes at the time her of death on 11th 
July 2011. She and Grant Hayes had two children (Grant IV and Gentle Hayes). At this time, 
Grant was married to Amanda Hayes and they had one child together (Lily, who was then an 
infant). 
 Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson had been in a relationship that was characterised by 
both sides as being somewhat turbulent. This friction was increased as both sides were 
engaged in a custody dispute for Grant IV and Gentle Hayes, which was due to return to court 
in the August of that year. 
 
                                                          
1 Please note that this summary is provided by the researcher on the basis of the trial footage reviewed, 
including any quotations, unless otherwise stipulated. 
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2.1.1.1 Background to the custody narrative 
 
 In order to contextualise the relationship, throughout the trial, the following details are 
made salient in characterising events leading up to the custody dispute. 
Prior to his marriage to Amanda, Grant and Laura had moved to the US Virgin Islands 
with their two sons, however, Laura Ackerson and their sons eventually moved back to North 
Carolina while Grant Hayes pursued a music career. Whether or not they were still a couple 
at this point is disputed, but it marked the beginning of Grant’s relationship with Amanda. 
When Amanda Hayes moved to New York with her eldest daughter, Sha Guddat (née Elmer), 
Grant Hayes followed soon thereafter and they began living together as an established couple. 
Following Grant and Amanda’s move to New York, Grant Hayes visited North 
Carolina and kept contact with his sons and Laura Ackerson. During the course of this 
contact, Grant Hayes took his eldest son (Grant IV) to New York for what was characterised 
by Laura Ackerson (through various communications with friends, her brother and statements 
pertaining to the custody case) as being of a limited duration. This turned into Grant Hayes 
having his eldest son living with him, and Laura Ackerson began motions to have her son 
returned. Included within this were medical complications for Grant and Laura’s youngest 
child (Gentle), who required surgery. 
This situation evolved into a full custody dispute, and primary custody of both 
children was given to Grant Hayes, as Laura’s work and living situation were not as stable. 
Grant and Amanda Hayes also married during this time and moved to North Carolina from 
New York; one of the reasons the marriage took place so quickly was indicated to have been 
the custody dispute. 
The custody arrangements were of particular note in this case, as it was the deviation 
from this arrangement that placed Laura Ackerson in the apartment of Grant and Amanda 
55 
 
Hayes at the time of her death. Due to allegations on both sides (Grant accused Laura of 
soliciting male attention for money, and Laura stated that Grant had used prohibited 
substances), custody was divided by the judge so that the children were with Grant and 
Amanda during the week, and with Laura at weekends. The exchange of the children took 
place at a petrol station in Wilson roughly midway between both parents (Grant lived in 
Raleigh and Laura lived in Kinston; all locations being in North Carolina). This arrangement 
was characterised as being less than ideal, and a source of friction between the Hayes’ and 
Laura Ackerson. Grant and Laura also exchanged various messages that communicated a 
tense relationship and their apparently differing approaches to parenting. Laura Ackerson and 
Grant Hayes did agree to attempt a midweek meeting between the boys and their mother, but 
this did not go well and the original arrangement was subsequently adhered to. 
There was also evidence of some tense exchanges between Amanda Hayes and Laura 
Ackerson, where the two are believed to have argued over the exchanges and Laura’s alleged 
treatment of Sha Guddat (Amanda’s eldest daughter, who also moved to North Carolina), and 
Laura wrote in her diary regarding her concerns over how Grant had portrayed her to 
Amanda. 
As part of the custody case, all three adults (Grant, Amanda, and Laura) underwent a 
psychological evaluation – though the focus was primarily on Grant and Laura, with 
Amanda’s involvement being comparatively peripheral, though present. As part of this both 
parties (Grant and Laura) had to complete a parenting history survey and undergo 
observations by Dr Ginger Calloway. These surveys and Dr Calloway’s evaluation became of 
key importance in the trial narratives (and is explained further in sections 2.1.1.4 and 2.1.1.5), 
as this was said to look promising for Laura’s bid for custody and she was likely to be 
successful in having a more even custody split at the very least. 
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This was characterised by the defence as forming part of the motivation on the Hayes’ 
part for Laura’s death, as they would have been unable to follow through on plans to leave 
the state and travel if Laura had at least joint custody of her two sons, and there were 
indications in the report by Dr Calloway that they wanted Laura removed from their lives and 
not further integrated into them. 
 
2.1.1.2 The events of 13th July its aftermath 
 
On Wednesday, 13th July 2011, Laura Ackerson went to Grant and Amanda Hayes’ 
apartment to visit her children midweek. She had been invited by Grant and had, according to 
the people she had spoken to that day and a voice message she had left for a friend, been 
looking forward to seeing her sons. This was a deviation of the regular custody agreement, 
which had the boys with Grant and Amanda during the week and with Laura at weekends. 
After the previous negative experience of trying a midweek visit, this was marked by the 
prosecution as important, and it is largely uncontested that Grant Hayes instigated this 
alteration to the regular routine. Adding to this were the recent revelations of the 
psychological evaluation, which looked promising for Laura Ackerson in the custody case. 
 Laura Ackerson was last known to be alive when she entered the Hayes’ apartment on 
the evening of the 13th July 2011. What happened inside the apartment is characterised in 
following ways. 
 
Inside the apartment: the prosecution 
Laura arrived inside the apartment, having been lured their by Grant and Amanda Hayes, who 
had the premediated intention of killing her. At some point, a letter was written that was 
forensically shown to have been part written by Grant Hayes and part by Laura Ackerson 
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(though who wrote Laura’s alleged signature remains inconclusive). The letter granted full 
custody of the children to Grant and Amanda, with Laura receiving $25,000 in return. 
 The prosecution contends that Laura Ackerson would not have written this without 
being under duress, given the lengths she had gone to in order to gain custody of her sons 
(regular employment, keeping records, having a child friendly apartment, etc.) and her 
attitude towards her children as a loving and devoted mother. 
 An altercation of sorts is believed to have potentially taken place and Laura Ackerson 
was murdered. Both Grant and Amanda were involved, as they were ‘acting in concert’ (legal 
terminology for both working together), and, consequently, who struck the fatal blow is 
characterised as less important. 
 Once Laura had been murdered, Amanda Hayes took the children out of the apartment 
(who had presumably been in a separate room), allowing Grant time and space to remove 
Laura’s body from the living room. Laura Ackerson is then believed to have been (at least at 
some point) then hidden in one of the apartment’s two bathrooms. 
 During the night of Wed 13th July, Grant Hayes purchased coolers, plastic sheets, a 
Skil saw and extra blades, amongst other items. Following these events, Amanda Hayes 
purchased bleach and cleaning utensils, eventually borrowing the vacuum of her eldest 
daughter Sha, as theirs had broken. Both Grant and Amanda Hayes then worked together in 
the removal of Laura’s remains and the disposal of her body in Texas. 
 
Inside the apartment: the defence of Grant Hayes 
The position of Grant Hayes’ defence outlined the events in the following way. 
 It was not unusual for Laura Ackerson to be at Grant Hayes’ apartment. The custody 
arrangement had been deviated from before, and they were trying to make the midweek visit 
work as it was something Laura Ackerson wanted. Despite the argument that had taken place 
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the last time this had happened, Grant offered to try again. Numerous exchanges via text 
message and email took place, with Grant originally suggesting 3 o’clock in the afternoon 
and meeting in a public place that was child friendly (Monkey Joe’s). Laura could not make 
that time, so it was pushed back to closer to 5 o’clock, and she would meet them at the 
apartment instead. 
 Once she had arrived at the apartment, Laura and Grant began discussing the custody 
case and this led to them both writing out the letter, filling in what they wanted from the 
agreement. This gave Grant full custody, but Laura still had visitation rights, and Laura 
would receive the sum of $25, 000. The defence for Grant Hayes contends that the signature 
on the document is that of Laura Ackerson. 
 Amanda Hayes was present during this arrangement and became angry at the 
agreement, as Grant and Amanda Hayes did not have the money and she did not know where 
they were going to find it. Grant left the room to get the two boys ready to spend time with 
Laura, leaving Amanda holding their daughter Lily (who was still an infant) with Laura in the 
sitting room. At this point, the defence for Grant Hayes indicates that we do not know exactly 
what happens, but references an alleged confession Amanda Hayes is said to have made to 
her sister, Karen Berry. In this Amanda is alleged to have said that Laura attempted to grab 
Lily and that Amanda ‘hurt her bad’, resulting in her death. 
 After this, Grant’s defence characterises Amanda as having taken charge in the 
disposal of Laura Ackerson’s body, citing Amanda’s calling Sha to look after the boys the 
next day, and it being Amanda’s family they then go to in Texas. Grant Hayes is portrayed 
here as having made a ‘terrible’ decision and being ‘terrified’, trying to protect his family by 
disposing of the body and not calling law enforcement. 
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Inside the apartment: the defence of Amanda Hayes 
The position of Amanda Hayes’ defence is outlined as follows. 
 As outlined in the defence of Grant Hayes above, Laura Ackerson was invited to the 
apartment as she would be late in seeing the children. 
 Amanda Hayes’ defences purports that Grant wanted to discuss the custody case with 
Laura, but did not want to do so in front of the children. Amanda took the children out the 
room and in her absence, the letter regarding the custody case was written including the 
$25,000 payment to Laura in exchange for her dropping the custody case. Amanda is then 
claimed to have re-entered the room with Lily (her one month old daughter) and seen the 
letter. Laura asked if she could hold Lily, but Amanda turned around and walked away. As 
Amanda was walking away, it is claimed that Laura tripped over a rug and bumped into 
Amanda’s back, who called for Grant. It is then asserted that Grant ‘grabbed’ Laura from the 
back to pull her from Amanda, resulting the Grant and Laura ‘falling to the floor’. Amanda 
Hayes’ defence states that she then left the room and re-joined the two boys. 
 Following this, it is said that Grant Hayes came to Amanda and recommended that 
she take the boys out of the apartment, as Grant needed to call an ambulance for Laura due to 
her having sustained a head injury in the fall, and Grant did not wish for the children to see 
their mother injured. Amanda took the children out of the apartment for a drive and dinner, 
giving Grant time to have emergency services tend to Laura. Amanda Hayes then returned 
once and saw Laura’s car still outside, so left again assuming that the situation was ongoing. 
The second time she returned with the children, Laura’s car was gone, and Amanda and the 
children went to the apartment. 
 Amanda Hayes’ defence states that Grant claimed that Laura had driven home and 
was fine, and that Amanda had no knowledge that Laura Ackerson was, in fact, dead until 
after she, Grant, and the children had arrived in Texas. 
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 The cleaning supplies purchased by Amanda Hayes are said to have been due to the 
family leaving the apartment (having received an eviction notice prior to the night of 
Wednesday 13th July 2011), and that she was in no way involved with the dismemberment or 
the removal of Laura Ackerson’s body from North Carolina. 
 
Texas, the disposal of Laura Ackerson’s remains, and the arrest of Grant and Amanda Hayes 
Following the events of that evening, Laura Ackerson was reported as a missing person by a 
business associate, Chevon Mathes. Chevon Mathes reported Laura Ackerson as a missing 
person to the Kinston police department, and this was eventually passed to Raleigh for further 
investigation (as her last known location). Her car was located in Raleigh and, during the 
course of the investigation, Grant Hayes was questioned regarding Laura’s last known 
whereabouts. 
 Grant and Amanda Hayes travelled to Texas on 16th July 2011, where Amanda’s older 
sister, Karen Berry lived. Grant Hayes’ defence claims that this was Amanda’s idea 
(evidenced by this her family) and that Amanda confesses to her sister that she killed Laura 
Ackerson. Amanda Hayes’ defence claim that once they had arrived in Texas, Grant told 
Amanda that Laura was dead and that she had to help him or the safety of herself and the 
children would be at risk (threatening and coercing Amanda into co-operating). 
 Both defence teams and the prosecution state that Grant and Amanda Hayes were 
present at the disposal of Laura Ackerson’s remains in Oyster Creek, Texas, which was 
accessible from the Berry’s home. 
 During the Hayes’ absence from North Carolina, the police investigation continued, 
with the Hayes’ apartment being searched and evidence of extensive cleaning (bleach stains) 
being found, along with items missing from one of the bathrooms (such as the bath mat, 
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shower curtain, inter alia). As a result of the investigation, Grant and Amanda Hayes were 
arrested on 22nd July 2011, after their arrival at the home of Grant’s parents. 
 Police from North Carolina travelled to Texas, working with Fort Bend County 
Sheriff’s office (the local police department). Though this case crossed state lines, Federal 
law enforcement were not involved and it was a co-operative investigation. Laura Ackerson’s 
remains were discovered in the creek, and subsequently recovered by law enforcement. A 
search warrant was executed on the property of Amanda’s sister, including the discovery of 
the coolers and the boat used by Grant and Amanda Hayes in the act of getting rid of Laura 
Ackerson’s body. Karen Berry and her family were questioned, and Karen Berry is said to 
have quoted Amanda as having confessed, ‘I hurt her. I hurt her bad. She’s dead.’, regarding 
the fate of Laura Ackerson. 
 
This summary provides an overview of the salient events that are referred to in these trials. 
Further to this, sections 2.1.1.4 and 2.1.1.5 (below) will provide further details on relevant 
evidence and witnesses referred to in this thesis. 
 
2.1.1.3 Summary of salient evidence referred to in this study 
 
The phone numbers 
Perhaps one of the more convoluted aspects of evidence presented in this case was the issue 
of the mobile phone records and is particularly salient in section 5.3.1. 
 Grant and Amanda Hayes’ mobile phone records were extensively referred to in 
Amanda Hayes’ trial in particular. One of the numbers on these records is indicated by the 
defence to be indicative of Grant Hayes’ illicit activities. This number is said to be linked 
with a voicemail centre and not a mobile phone. This is claimed to mean that when dialling 
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this particular number, the caller will access a voicemail system. From there they can leave 
and access voice messages, without this being traced to a specific phone. The defence for 
Amanda Hayes put forward that this was a practice commonly used by drug dealers, as it left 
no records as to which mobile number the message had been left for – only that the voicemail 
centre itself had been contacted directly. In creating this link, they also put forward that this 
was further evidence to support the claims of the danger Grant Hayes posed to Amanda 
Hayes, and that she was as much a victim of Grant Hayes as Laura Ackerson was. 
 Regardless of the veracity of this claim, this became an important point for the 
analysis of interactions in the absence of the jury (see section 5.3.1), as they were removed 
from the courtroom when the defence attempted to have an ‘experiment’ conducted in court 
and was prevented from having a witness call the indicated number by the prosecution, with 
the objection sustained by the judge. 
 The witness (a police officer who was involved with the investigation and who had 
previous experience with ‘Vice’ – a department within the police force which investigated 
drug crimes, amongst others), claimed to have no knowledge of this particular practice 
involving the use of voicemail centres and was consequently deemed unable to comment on 
this, nor to partake in an ‘experiment’ in court. 
 Another aspect of this denied experiment was that the trial was taking place over two 
years after the crime, which led to doubts about whether the evidence of this phone number 
(as presented in the current timeframe of the trial) would be applicable to the case timeframe 
of two years prior. 
 
The parenting history survey 
This document was completed by both Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson (independently of 
one another) and informed the court ordered psychological evaluation of both parents. This 
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document was extensively referred to by the prosecution and the defence of Amanda Hayes’, 
particularly regarding what Laura Ackerson wrote about Grant Hayes, and is referred to at 
various points during this thesis, particularly throughout Chapter 4 (analysis of opening 
statements). This document characterised Grant Hayes as a ‘sociopath’ and was where the 
claims were made that Grant characterised himself as characters from the movies The 
Talented Mr Ripley and Six Degrees of Separation. 
 The document was a key piece of evidence in both how the victim’s voice was 
presented in describing Grant Hayes and the threat she felt he posed, and by the defence of 
Amanda Hayes, who used this as evidence to indicate that Grant had also posed a threat to 
Amanda, coercing her through threats of violence to become involved with the disposal of 
Laura’s body after the crime had taken place. 
 
Dr Calloway’s report 
The psychological evaluation reported by Dr Ginger Calloway was also a key part of the trial 
narrative and of particular relevance to Chapter 4, though it is also referred to throughout this 
study. Dr Calloway’s report included the findings that Grant and Amanda Hayes wanted 
Laura Ackerson ‘obliterate[d]’ from their lives, and that Grant Hayes was untruthful (thus 
potentially undermining his credibility). 
 This report was said to look promising for Laura Ackerson in the court case (and 
consequently less so for the Hayes’), thus contributing to the prosecution’s narration of the 
motives of the case being linked with a hatred of Laura Ackerson and the desire to have her 
‘erased’ from their lives. 
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The muriatic acid, coolers, and cleaning supplies 
Muriatic acid was purchased by Grant Hayes and evidence was found that indicated this had 
been used on the disembodied head of Laura Ackerson, post mortem. This evidence is 
important to highlight as it is referred to in both trials as evidence of the different attempts to 
dispose of the body (dumping in the remains in Oyster Creek is believed to have become the 
method of disposal after the acid did not work as expected). Amanda Hayes is seen on a 
surveillance camera dumping the empty acid boxes whilst in Texas. 
 The coolers are also important to highlight as these are believed to have been the 
means through which Laura Ackerson’s remains were transported from North Carolina to 
Texas. CCTV evidence and testimony from the sales assistant confirmed the purchases made 
by Grant Hayes. Amanda Hayes’ defence claims that these were hidden during the move 
behind a large piece of furniture and that she had no knowledge of Laura’s death or that her 
remains were there until after their arrival in Texas. The coolers were placed into the boat and 
the remains were put into the creek. The empty coolers were subsequently found on the 
property of Amanda Hayes’ sister, Karen Berry, by investigators. This evidence is of 
particular contextual importance in Chapter 3. 
 
The large piece of furniture 
The final piece of evidence worth noting is that large piece of antique furniture owned by 
Amanda Hayes’ as a bequest of her late husband. The piece of furniture is both large and tall 
(potentially reaching the height of a ceiling). It is believed that Laura Ackerson’s remains 
were hidden in coolers behind this piece of furniture. It is made relevant in the cross-
examination of Amanda Hayes, as she claims that she did not help Grant Hayes remove the 
piece from the U-Haul trailer used to transport their belongings, and had no knowledge of 
what was hidden behind it. 
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 That Amanda Hayes owned the furniture is also salient, as it is part of the defence of 
Grant Hayes that Amanda was the person responsible for Laura Ackerson’s death and the 
disposal of the body. That the furniture was owned by Amanda and it was Amanda’s family 
they went to visit was emphasised as being evidence of Grant’s lack of culpability, and not 
vice-versa. 
 This evidence is relevant in Chapter 3, but also provides further understanding in the 
context and overall narrative for Grant Hayes’ defence. 
 
The final aspect of this overview, (outlining the key aspects of the trial for the purposes of 
contextualising the approach, analysis and findings of this study), a summary of key 
witnesses shall be provided. 
 
2.1.1.4 Summary of key witnesses and related testimony 
 
Laura J. Ackerson 
Though not a witness, per se, it would be remiss to exclude Laura Ackerson from this list, as 
she was the victim in these trials. Laura Ackerson was the 27 year old, ex-girlfriend of Grant 
Hayes, who also had two young sons with him. Laura Ackerson was running two businesses, 
one graphic design business, and one with a business associate (Chevon Mathes) making 
restaurant menus. 
Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson were in the midst of a custody dispute regarding 
their children. She was last seen alive in North Carolina on Wednesday 13th July 2011. Laura 
Ackerson’s remains were recovered from Oyster Creek, Texas. 
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Grant Hayes 
Grant Hayes is one of the two defendant referred to in this thesis, though he did not testify 
during either trial – exercising his right to remain silent under United States law. He was 
convicted of the first-degree murder of Laura Ackerson in 2013, receiving a sentence of life 
without parole. Grant Hayes’ defence claimed that Amanda Hayes was responsible and that 
he was only guilty of accessory after the fact (helping to dispose of the body). 
 Grant Hayes appealed his case on the grounds of prejudicial evidence in March 2016, 
but this was rejected by the Court of Appeal. 
 Grant had two sons with Laura Ackerson and one daughter with Amanda Hayes. 
Grant and Laura were in the middle of a custody dispute at the time of her death. 
 
Amanda Hayes 
Amanda Hayes is one of the two defendants referred to in this thesis. She testified in her own 
defence at her trial in early 2014, giving evidence that she was coerced and threatened into 
assisting Grant Hayes in the disposal of Laura Ackerson’s remains, but had no knowledge of 
Laura’s death until after the family’s arrival in Texas. 
 Amanda Hayes was convicted of second degree murder in early 2014 and sentenced 
to 13-16 years in prison, with credit given for time served. Amanda Hayes has one daughter 
with Grant Hayes and the couple have divorced since the trials took place. 
 
Heidi Schumacher 
Heidi Schumacher testified in both trials and was a close friend of Laura Ackerson. Heidi 
Schumacher testified regarding Laura Ackerson’s relationship with Grant Hayes and 
behaviour she observed from Grant, as well as threats she alleged to have received as well. 
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She testified regarding Laura’s parenting history survey (see section 2.1.1.4 above), having 
proofread it for Laura. 
 Heidi Schumacher’s testimony was subject to extensive voir dire (heard by the judge 
in the absence of the jury for the purpose of making a ruling), which resulted in limitations 
being placed on what she was permitted to say regarding allegations of domestic abuse in 
Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson’s relationship, due to its potential as prejudicial evidence 
(see section 5.4). This ruling was later overturned in light of testimony elicited by Grant 
Hayes’ defence counsel during cross-examination. 
 
Ginger Calloway 
Dr Ginger Calloway was responsible for the psychological evaluations of Grant Hayes and 
Laura Ackerson as mandated by the court in their custody dispute. Dr Calloway testified in 
both trials as a lay witness (not an expert witness), having spent time with and observed both 
Grant and Laura as part of her remit for the custody case. 
 Dr Calloway had both Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson complete a parenting history 
survey each (as outlined above in section 2.1.1.4) and observed their interactions with the 
children. As a result of her observations and evaluation, the prosecution contends that Laura 
was in a strong position in terms of the custody case. Dr Calloway also observed in her 
evaluation that Grant and Amanda Hayes wanted Laura removed from their lives. The 
testimony of Dr Calloway and her link with the overall narrative of the case is salient 
throughout this thesis (though particularly in Chapter 4), as the custody case and the evidence 
of Grant and Amanda as wanting Laura ‘obliterate[d]’ is cited as a motivating factor leading 
to Laura’s death. 
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Jason Ackerson 
Jason Ackerson was the elder half-brother of Laura Ackerson. Jason gave testimony 
regarding Grant Hayes’ behaviour and character, as well as its impact upon Laura Ackerson. 
He also described threats Laura had claimed Grant had made against her and the children and 
her state of mind during the custody case. 
 It was claimed that he and Laura had discussed her moving in with him (and away 
from Grant) at a prior point in the relationship, but that they had decided against this due to 
the threats of violence, as Jason Ackerson had the safety of his own child to consider as well. 
 As with Heidi Schumacher, Jason Ackerson’s testimony was subject to voir dire 
(heard by the judge for a ruling in the absence of the jury), as made relevant in section 5.4. 
 
Having established the background to the trials, key evidence and witnesses, and the overall 
narrative approaches salient for understanding the contextual backdrop of this study, the 
following section shall explore the conceptual approach and research questions that form the 
basis of this thesis. 
 
2.2 Research questions and conceptual approach 
 
The above-mentioned conceptual approach this study takes draws upon both micro- and 
macro- analytical approaches. The layers within these interactions have been called ‘agenda’, 
‘macro narrative/context’, ‘micro-level interactions’. This concept is expanding on the work 
of Heffer (2005; 2010) and Cotterill (2003), who both explore the narrative elements of the 
trial process. Cotterill (2003) explored the two narrative strands of the O. J. Simpson trial, 
drawing a distinction between the narrative of the crime and the narrative of the investigation. 
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This thesis argues that the multiple layers of contextualisation and interaction that 
take place within the courtroom interact with and influence one another. This is not to say 
that drastic changes take place at any of these levels, such as major changes in the narrative, 
as a consequence of this, but that the adversarial element of the criminal justice system being 
analysed provides an additional level of interaction and influence. This will be explored more 
thoroughly using Figure 2.1 (below) as a visualisation. 
 
Figure 2.1 Visualisation of conceptual approach 
 
 
In unpacking these terms (in fig. 2.1), agenda represents the desired outcome for each side; 
for example, the prosecution has the agenda of influencing the jury to make a guilty verdict 
and the defence that of an acquittal (both defendants pleaded ‘not guilty’ to the charge of first 
degree murder). This in turn influences both the overall narrative (at the macro level) and the 
interactions and questions themselves (at the micro level). Furthermore, the overall narrative 
influences the potential actualisation of the agenda and directs the micro interactions. As a 
result of the micro level interactions, the narrative can also be influenced as well as the 
potential for realising the agenda. These three interacting elements are not locked on one side, 
as they are also influenced by the self-same elements of the opposing counsel; particularly 
when one considers matters such as cross-examination of witnesses and wherein what one 
Agenda
MacroMicro
Agenda
MacroMicro
Prosecution
Defence
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side presents can then potentially influence and alter the other side’s argument or approach. 
This approach to courtroom interactions draws strongly upon Heffer (2010), but also takes a 
slightly different approach to narrative in that theoretical influence is drawn from Ricoeur 
(1980) rather than Labov’s narrative structure (Heffer, 2005) (see 2.2 and Chapter 4). The 
interactive processes between the three levels and each side are also important, as courtroom 
interactions are reactive as well as active, creating a discursive space that responds and adapts 
as well as remaining determinate within their institutional role. This echoes the conceptual 
approach taken to the matter of Foucaultian theories and law (Golder and Fitzpatrick, 2009) 
(see 1.3), as it is the position of this study that, as law is both fixed and reactive, so are each 
of these elements as outlined above. 
 
This conceptual approach is used to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. In what particular ways do the state and the individual communicate with each other in 
the trials of Grant and Amanda Hayes? 
2. What functions do these patterns serve in these interactions (including the 
(co)construction of narrative and associated strategies)? 
3. How are power relations between the individual and the state established and 
represented in these interactions (including narrative (co)construction, subversion, 
statement interpretation, and (re)direction of subject matter)? 
 
Within these questions, the narrative thread and agenda remain constant elements, as each of 
these contextualising factors remains relevant in terms of contextualisation and shared 
knowledge the jury has already been exposed to throughout the course of the trial to that 
point (remembering, of course, that the jury members have already been exposed to some 
71 
 
elements involved in the case through the jury selection process). The approach to context is 
discussed in more detail in 2.4. 
 
2.2.1 Overview of chapter contributions to research questions and methods applied 
 
The following is an overview of how each analysis chapter addresses the research questions, 
the methods applied, and the corresponding data analysis sections. 
 
Chapter 3 (the cross-examination of Amanda Hayes, as a witness in her own defence): 
 
RQ1: 
 
- The emergent ways in which the state and the individual interact, focusing on the 
question and answer structure of the interactions (all sections). 
 
RQ2: 
 
- The ability of the defendant to provide information outwith the established question 
and answer format (section 3.2). 
- The co-construction of conflicting narratives through the phrasing and lexical choices 
of the prosecution and defendant (sections 3.3; 3.4). 
- The ability of the defendant to reframe and respond to questions from the prosecution 
to support her narrative position, and the ability of the prosecution to, in turn, 
reformulate these responses for the prosecution’s agenda (such as being in a negative 
comparison with the fate of the victim) (sections 3.2; 3.4). 
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RQ3: 
 
- The demonstrable ability of the prosecution to impose institutional restrictions in 
spoken interactions and enact these (section 3.3.2). 
- The ability of the defendant to resist the question (section 3.3.3). 
- The ability of the defendant to self-select outside of the institutional norms of the 
question answer format (section 3.2). 
 
Method(s) applied: 
 
- Linguistic micro-analysis using principles of Conversation Analysis (throughout 
chapter 3; addresses all research questions) (see section 2.6.1 for further information 
regarding application of method). 
 
Chapter 4 (analysis of opening statements) 
 
RQ1: 
 
- The communications of the state (as the prosecution) with the court (and primarily the 
jury) through a narrative monologue (section 4.2). 
- The communications of the defence(s) with the court (and primarily with the jury) 
through a narrative monologue (section 4.2). 
 
 
 
73 
 
RQ2: 
 
- The topics introduced in the first three minutes of each opening statement, and the 
order in which they are introduced in comparison with the other opening statements 
(sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). 
- The comparison of these performances at a micro-analytical level, demonstrating 
differences in strategy, approach to the narrative, and performance of the interlocutor 
when directly addressing the jury (sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). 
- The contrasting narrative presentations of the same evidence (section 4.2). 
- The function of time and location in the establishment of narrative coherence (section 
4.2.3.1). 
 
RQ3: 
 
- The variance in the narrative portrayals of both defendants in terms of agency and 
responsibility (section 4.2.3.2). 
- The power relationship of the state and the individual as characterised through the 
portrayal of law enforcement (section 4.2.3.4). 
- The invocation of epistemic positioning in the narratives of the defence as a claim to 
knowledge (section 4.2.3.5). 
 
Method(s) applied: 
 
- Linguistic micro-analysis using principles of Conversation Analysis (sections 4.2.1, 
4.2.2, and 4.2.3.2) (addresses research questions 1 and 2). 
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- Narrative coding and analysis (section 4.2.3) (see section 2.6.2 for further information 
regarding application of method) (addresses research questions 2 and 3). 
 
Chapter 5 (interactions in the absence of the jury) 
 
RQ1: 
 
- Communications of the attorneys as being managed through the judge, particularly 
regarding rulings to objections and contested testimony (sections 5.2 and 5.3). 
- The role of the judge as arbiter, determining the information the jury is allowed to 
hear as applied to the rules of evidence (sections 5.2 and 5.3). 
 
RQ2:  
 
- The judge’s application of a reason-ruling format in the vocalisation of rulings for the 
record (section 5.2.1 and 5.3). 
- The judge’s orientation to knowledge and understanding of the rules of evidence in 
the determination of rulings (5.2.2 and 5.3). 
- The editing of prosecution/defence narratives in voir dire (testimony heard in the 
absence of the jury), as previewed by the judge and based on the potential prejudicial 
impact of the evidence, relevance, and the rules of evidence (section 5.4). 
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RQ3: 
 
- The judge as a personification of the state in a position oriented to and legitimised by 
participants within the interactions (sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). 
- The increased participation of the judge in interactions taking place when then jury is 
absent (section 5.3 and 5.4). 
- The gaining and retention of the floor by the judge in these interactions (5.3 and 5.4) 
 
Method(s) applied: 
 
- Linguistic micro-analysis using principles of Conversation Analysis (addresses all 
research questions). 
 
Having provided an overview of the research questions in the context of each chapter and a 
brief descriptor of applied methods (linguistic and narrative), the following sections will 
discuss the theoretical and methodological approaches underpinning this research in more 
detail, and how they have been applied to this thesis. 
 
2.3 Approach to narrative 
 
In the literature review, previous studies concerning narrative and courtroom discourse were 
discussed, as well as linguistic research in this area, and the theories of Foucault as concerns 
the law and power relations. Expanding on this, the following sections in this chapter will 
discuss the methodological applications of narrative and linguistic theories within the context 
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of this study and summarise the implementation of Foucaultian theories of power relations 
for analysis purposes. 
 
In 1.7 narrative in courtroom research was presented. Having looked at previous research in 
this area, this section will provide the methodological approach to narrative as applied by this 
study. 
 Within previous research, Labov’s (1972) model of narrative structure has been 
utilised as a means of unpacking those areas where courtroom narratives are most explicitly 
outlined (such as opening and closing statements) (Cotterill, 2003; Heffer, 2010). Whilst 
there is merit in this approach, this study does not actively apply Labov’s narrative 
framework, but rather applies the approach of Ricouer (1980). Within this approach, time is 
not viewed in a sequential linear fashion, but as a means through which events are connected 
through a retrospective lens. For Ricouer, the ending of the narrative is the primary function 
for how the narrative is formed (Mishler, 2006). (For further discussion and development of 
Ricouer’s approach, please see 4.2.3). 
 Within the approach to narrative, this thesis draws on literary theories as well as 
interaction based methods of unpacking narrative formulations within data. Though the 
monologic aspects of proceedings (such as opening and closing statements) are interactive 
only in terms of their engagement with the jury (though the jury cannot respond in any 
vocalic regard); these soliloquies are not delivered into a vacuum, but are presentations made 
to a listening audience. This audience will then have these presentations as a potential 
resource to draw upon as part of their deliberations. As such, the narratives can be analysed 
from the perspective of broader literary theory, as well as incorporating aspects of their in situ 
performativity as (somewhat) interactive sequences. 
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 When looking at the ‘stance’ taken by interactants at the micro-level, where narratives 
are produced (or reproduced) for an audience, one aspect of import is that of epistemic 
positioning. When witnesses testify, there are those who provide what is termed ‘eyewitness 
testimony’, that is they claim to have seen something that coincides with the events deemed 
salient to the trial (by one side or another). These can be described as ‘personal narratives’. 
According to Schiffrin (2006: 207), personal narratives are the verbalisation of experiences in 
which characters – including the ‘self’ – act and react, pushing forward a particular plot. In 
the act of telling a story, one person is interacting with another; this creates yet another 
situated ‘self’ and ‘other’ within the act of doing the ‘telling’. The interaction that takes place 
in the telling of a personal narrative to another is also interwoven with and part of larger 
discourses (ideological positioning of the teller and hearer, social practices, shared cultural 
knowledge, etc.). When discussing the ‘stance’ of a speaker, Schiffrin (Ibid) puts forward that 
this is a combination of epistemology and evidentiality, whereby epistemology is the 
knowledge one has and evidentiality refers to the source of the information. For Schiffrin, 
this produces ‘epistemicity’ or ‘certainty of information’. Added to this is an assumption 
within narrative telling (and hearing) and the more direct the connection between the teller 
and the source of information, the more valid and reliable said narrative is (Ibid: 210-11). 
This is of direct relevance to courtroom testimony and links with the concept of ‘legitimacy’ 
(discussed below in 2.4), as one aspect of narrative in the courtroom is the attempt to 
establish it as the more likely of the adversarial narratives presented (or, given that there is no 
burden of proof on the defence to provide an alternative narrative, that the prosecuting 
narrative is invalid and/or lacks reliability). Testimony from witnesses who appear to have a 
credible epistemic claim to knowledge can therefore be said to be preferable in terms of 
shaping the overall narrative for that side (Henderson et al, 2016). 
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To summarise, narrative is perpetuated through the micro-level interactions in which 
witnesses are guided through their testimony courtesy of the lawyers’ questions. In this, they 
act as witnesses with a recognised claim (by at least one side) to speak of what they have 
observed with a sense of legitimacy – though this may be opposed or undermined by the 
other side. In testifying, it can be argued that a witness is taking an epistemic position in 
which they become a ‘legitimate teller’ of their ‘story’, which in this instance would be their 
sworn testimony. This allows us to link Schiffrin’s (2006) conceptualisation of personal 
narratives and elucidation of epistemic stance with Hutchby’s (2001: 483) approach to 
‘witnessing’ as applied to talk radio. Lay witnesses in court (much like those on talk radio) do 
not speak in abstract, detached terms, rather in terms of ‘immediacy, experience and 
authenticity’. Whilst there are arguably additional limitations on speaker rights and processes 
within the court system in comparison with call-in radio, that witnesses are placed in a 
position of having a knowledge claim that is subsequently accepted or brought into doubt 
(usually by the questioner). Hutchby puts forward that there is an element of asymmetry (see 
Section 2.4 below) introduced in this setting, as the caller uses various strategies to legitimise 
their rights to ‘witness’ and recount their narrative, but it is the voice of the host that manages 
the interaction and remains constant throughout the programme (whilst those who call in 
have a limited duration to speak and are in a pre-allocated institutional setting) (Hutchby, 
2001). 
Taking a more literary approach to narrative, the very concept of narrative comes 
from the term narrates in Latin, meaning ‘made known’ (Berger, 1997). According to 
Richardson, narratives function as both a means of reasoning and of representation (Ibid). 
Through narrative coherence is given to life events, providing a structure in which they can 
be understood. In a similar way, narratives are also a conduit for learning both in the 
receiving and in the telling (Ibid: 9-10). The underlying assumption of narrative as meaning-
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making through both its enactment and reception also ties in with theories of Ricouer (1980), 
whereby the ending of the narrative is the point at which it can be made sequentially linear. 
One aspect of storytelling that has also been touched upon is that of characterisation. 
Some researchers argue that in telling a story, the speaker places their own ideological views 
within the language used (Reissman, 1993). Thus, the content of a narrative can be argued to 
be subjectively linked with the teller, even in situations where there may be claims of 
detachment. Within the telling of the story are those involved (regardless of whether or not 
the teller is a principle person or relating a narrative without having borne witness to it). 
Literary concepts such as victims, villains, heroes, bystanders, inter alia, can be pervasive 
aspects of a narrative, even if this is not universally present in all stories ever told. Berger 
(1997) states that in ‘describing a character’ some of the following characteristics might be 
included: 
 Name 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Body language 
 Clothes 
 Facial expression 
 Occupation 
(For full list see Berger, 1997: 53) 
Though this is applied to fiction, many of these characteristics can be mapped onto 
descriptions of participants in a trial setting. Without seeking to trivialise the trial process, it 
is not extending beyond analytical reach to state that, much like the dramatis personae of a 
play, the persons involved in a trial are presented with such features oriented to as relevant. 
Indeed, these characteristics arguably humanise and create a personification of the person for 
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the jury, which can be of particular important in cases where, for example, the victim is 
deceased and therefore unable to speak for themselves (Gerwitz, 1996). 
 In view of the distinctions within approaches to narrative analysis as outlined by De 
Fina and Georgakopoulou (2012), the methodological stance of this study will be discussed 
further. The approach to narrative taken within this work closely views two aspects as being 
under consideration that are both distinct and yet, one would argue, interlinked. The first of 
these is the structure of the narratives as presented in a specific format and targeted at a 
specific audience (see analysis of opening statements, Chapter 4). The second aspect refers to 
the narrative as macro-level construct used by each side of the adversarial court system that 
permeates interactions through discourse (where discourse refers to broader social practices 
outwith interpersonal interactions). 
 A final aspect of narrative analysis that influences this work is the research of Ehrlich 
(1990) on points of view. The concept of represented speech and thought (RST) refers to 
third person narration events rather than first person. As first-person pronouns can be present 
(as found in character voices within literary text), the concept of third and first-person 
narratives has been deemed by some to be problematic. According to Tamir (1976 in Ehrlich, 
1990: 6), this could be described in terms of personal and impersonal narratives, whereby 
references by the narrator to themselves are ‘personal’ narratives, and where the narrator 
themselves is absent are ‘impersonal’. RST involves the narrator reporting on thoughts and 
activities of ‘characters from an objective perspective’ (Ibid: 6-7). This is particularly salient 
when looking at opening statements in courtroom discourse, where such literary devices are 
employed.  
 Finally, a remark on involvement strategies in discourse. Research by Tannen (1989) 
shows that literary scholars and research in conversation have separately identified 
involvement strategies that both hold to be of import. These include, but are not limited to, 
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rhythm; repetition; content words; collocations; figures of speech; tropes; and imagery 
(Tannen. 1989: 17). In particular, repetition can be both a deliberate rhetorical device, or an 
‘automatic’ linguistic device contributing to multiple functions such as connection, 
comprehension, clarification, emphasis and production. As such, both aspects of repetition 
are deemed salient to this analysis as operating at a narrative level and a micro-interactive 
one. Imagery is also salient, as can also operate at multiple levels. Tannen (1989: 166) 
describes the use of imagery in relation to meaning making as a device which allows the 
‘individual imagination to create involvement’. In invoking imagery and use of imagination, 
the individual is more involved in the interaction as they ‘recreate a scene’ that can be 
recalled. This increases ‘interpersonal involvement’ which, in turn, potentially increases 
understanding (Ibid). 
 Having discussed narrative approaches and some of their links with interpersonal 
discourse, as well as drawing on literary theory and macro-level discourse, the following 
section will discuss the concept of legitimacy and its links with the approach to Foucaultian 
theories as applied by this study. 
 
2.4 Summarising use of Foucault and links with legitimacy 
 
As outlined in 1.3 and 1.4, this study takes a Foucaultian approach to the conceptualisation of 
the law and power relations. The ‘state’ is not considered a unified entity, but rather an 
umbrella term for multiple discourses that function within society with its acceptance. These 
discourses are perpetuated and reproduced by our interactions; making them relevant at the 
macro-level, as discourses which are considered shared knowledge within society; and at the 
micro-level, as discourses which are reproduced within our interactions with one another. 
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 Building on the concept of power as a relational concept rather than something to be 
possessed by one person over another, this thesis also links with criminological approaches to 
‘legitimacy’. Legitimacy can be defined as the recognition of an organisation as holding 
authority within society through a shared normative framework in which it is viewed as ‘right 
and proper’ (Tyler, 2006). An authority (or organisation) is deemed to hold its position as that 
to which society defers and obeys through its normative establishment as holding the right to 
do so. Much work in legitimacy discusses power in terms of that which is ‘held’ by an 
authority, of which legitimacy is one form. 
For the purposes of this study, however, it is contended that the view of legitimacy 
actually links with the Foucaultian principles of power relations and truth-claims. If one takes 
the view of legitimacy as a means through which authority can be established over another, it 
stands to reason that legitimacy (as with power) is arguably constructed in the face of 
resistance, whereby that positioning can be challenged, thus leading to the negotiation in 
which that authority seeks to demonstrate legitimacy through the perpetuation of discourse. 
Within criminology, research has shown that people do as law enforcement officials 
say through a belief that law enforcement have a legitimate right to tell them what to do. This 
was described by Tyler as ‘normative compliance’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). As put 
forward by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), legitimacy can only be found where there is a 
‘positive recognition by the citizens’ (italics in original) of the organisation’s ‘right to 
govern’, thus rendering it a conditional relationship through which those who obey recognise 
and legitimise the authority. By extension, this also means that such legitimation can be 
‘defeasible’ and withdrawn (Ibid: 125). 
In maintaining legitimacy, those who acknowledge the right of the authority to govern 
are believed by Weber to internalise this recognition in terms of social norms and values. 
This becomes a form of self-regulation, separate from any rewards or sanctions that might be 
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brought to bear externally (Tyler, 2006). Though these approaches are somewhat divergent, it 
can be argued that Weber and Foucault converge in certain areas, despite differences in the 
articulation of power (inter alia) (O’Neill, 1986; Rudolph, 2006). It could be argued that there 
are links between this and Foucault’s approach to surveillance as a means of forming self-
regulatory practice. Foucault’s use of the panopticon as a means of describing this, could be 
extended to include the idea that if one is subject to an authority legitimised through legal 
discourse and that self-same authority is perceived to, therefore, have the right to enforce 
these laws as legitimised by society, then these standards become internalised norms of 
behaviour (Foucault, 1977). 
This is not to say that all people recognise the authority of law enforcement or self-
regulate. Indeed, the concept of legitimacy relies upon its being part of the bilateral 
relationship between those who would exercise authority and those who decide whether or 
not that authority is to be recognised (Tyler, 2006; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). 
In disseminating discourses that propagate legitimacy, various means can be used. For 
example, media exposure can increase or decrease the perceived legitimacy of law 
enforcement (Chermak and Weiss, 2005). Van Leeuwen (2007:91) moved towards the 
creation of a framework for analysing the ‘language of legitimation’, in line with Habermas’ 
approach to ‘demarcating types of legitimate authority’. Despite the conflicting philosophical 
approaches, one consistent factor within legitimation is its existence being predicated on 
acceptance by those over whom it would exercise authority. With specific reference to 
courtrooms, Rosulek (2010: 183) determines that legitimation refers to the ‘reasons’ and 
‘validations for how things are’. In the context of closing arguments, she discusses the 
multiple voices invoked in closing arguments by the speaker in order to legitimate the version 
of the narrative being presented. Aside from the narratives themselves in terms of each side, 
she states that closing arguments incorporate a mythopoetic narrative, the purpose of which is 
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to legitimate the speaker’s position that those listening (i.e. the jury) should act in the manner 
proposed. 
Legitimation in this sense is not simply a means of promoting one’s own side; it is 
also the means through which one can delegitimise the conflicting narrative. In the closing 
arguments analysed, Rosulek concluded that the use of multiple voices within narrative (or 
heteroglossia) were invoked not only in terms of witness testimony, but also to invoke the 
law as an authoritative and ‘impersonal’ voice that could be applied as a legitimising force 
for their side (Ibid). 
To summarise, the theories of Foucault and the concept of legitimacy are of import to 
this study in the following ways. In applying Foucault within a grounded, evidence-based 
approach, this study will analyse interactions in terms of how discourses emerge and are 
oriented to by participants. The view of the state as a series of discourses that are then 
potentially anthropomorphised through interlocutors who invoke that label allows for the 
analysis of the multiple levels of interaction that take place within the courtroom. In adding to 
this the concept of legitimacy, there is the potential to determine whether or not the concept 
of the ‘state’ and its representatives are oriented to as a legitimate authority with both 
institutional and discursive rights within this setting. 
Having discussed these concepts, this following section will explore the micro-
analytical and linguistic discourse approaches applied to this study. 
 
2.5 Micro-analysis and approach to discourse 
 
This project utilises the micro-analytical tools of Conversation Analysis as part of the 
approach to analysing the interactions at the micro-level (as applied to the conceptual model 
outlined in Section 2.1). 
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 Conversation Analysis is an inductive approach attributed to Harvey Sacks 
(Liddicoat, 2011: 4-5). It is used in the analysis of naturally-occurring data (i.e. data that has 
not been scripted or pre-prepared, such as experimental data) (Ibid). Though often used in 
analysing interactions in ‘everyday’ settings, Conversation Analysis has increasingly been 
used in research investigating institutional settings (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008). Before 
discussing institutional applications of micro-analytic principles, the more general practices 
and tenets will first be outlined. 
 When one is analysing talk, one of the first things to consider is that interactions are 
not merely communicative means of imparting information, though this is undeniably one 
aspect. Language and talk are also means of ‘doing’ things; through talk, action takes place, 
such as requesting, inviting, complaining, inter alia (Schegloff et al, 2002; Maynard, 1984). 
Furthermore, talk is fundamentally organised, whether or not overt restrictions on interaction 
are present. This organisation can take the form of order of participation and speaker rights or 
turn-taking (who speaks when), designing talk for specifically for both the conveyance of the 
message and for the recipient (lexical choice and recipient design), whilst taking into account 
the context and ‘normative parameters’ framing the interactional setting (Ibid). Consequently, 
talk and interaction taken in this vein are seen as a way of achieving goals through the means 
of communication (Liddicoat, 2011: 5). 
 The three main elements that form a foundation for Conversation Analysis are; a) 
order is produced through the coordination of the participants and not as something pre-
existing outwith the interaction; b) order is the result of reflexive interactions between 
participants who orient to the conversation as it unfolds, resulting in order as internally 
accomplished by the interlocutors and not externally presumed by the analyst; and c) the 
order is ‘repeatable and recurrent’, in that it recurs across numerous speakers and not only 
one individual (Ibid: 5). Though in this study, the data does not allow for a particularly large 
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corpus with which to engage fully with this notion, a localised comparison can be made 
without forming generalisations that extend beyond the dataset. 
 A salient feature within Conversation Analysis that is highly relevant to this work is 
that of ‘recipient design’. This is relevant to discuss, as the design of turns within the 
courtroom context is multifunctional with multiple audiences. Recipient design is the means 
through which a turn is tailored to other parties within the interaction (including, in the 
context of this research, the overhearing audience of the general public and the silent 
participants of the jury). This tailoring is managed through lexical choice, ‘topic selection’, 
‘options and obligations for starting and terminating conversations’, and the ‘ordering of 
sequences’, amongst others (Sacks et al, 1974: 727). 
 Additionally, given the nature of the data micro-analytic features such as repair, 
overlaps, turn-taking and silence are considered to be of relevance to the methodological 
approach undertaken, as it is the micro-level features of interaction that determine how the 
narratives are perpetuated (or undermined) within the questioning sequences (see 1.4.2.1 and 
1.4.2.2). 
 
An important point that has already been alluded to and remarked upon is that of the broader 
contextual approach taken by this study that results in its utilising principles from micro-
analysis, whilst not employing a ‘pure’ Conversation Analysis approach. 
 Conversation Analysis views talk as ‘context-shaped’ and ‘context-renewing’. In 
other words, talk is shaped by the context in which is occurs and responds to that context, 
thus perpetuating (or renewing) the context as relevant and oriented to within talk. As 
Heritage (1984: 107) puts it, ‘actions reflexively and accountably redetermine the features of 
the scenes in which they occur’. Context, therefore, can be taken as a two-fold consideration, 
that of context which is external to the interaction, and that which occurs within it. For 
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Conversation Analysis, the extrinsic factors (such as social categories, etc.) cannot be viewed 
as equally relevant within a given interaction, as context is ‘invoked… rather than something 
which impacts on’ the communicative exchange (Liddicoat, 2011: 8). 
Komter (2013: 627-9) puts forward that context is the courtroom is a ‘multi-faceted 
and flexible interpretive resource’ with three dimensions; a) the ‘organisation of talk’; b) 
‘institutional tasks and interests’; and c) ‘underlying beliefs and ideas’. This study holds with 
this view to an extent, however; even though the micro-level interactions are considered to be 
context renewing and reflexive in their construction through the question and answer process, 
the overall setting of the courtroom and the previous shared knowledge remain relevant, 
regardless of whether or not they are oriented to within the interactions at that moment, 
particularly as regards the overall narratives. In that regard, this study addresses Komter’s 
ideological dimension of courtroom interaction. Though one cannot (in accordance with 
Komter) establish the extent to which the ‘overhearing audience’ (referred to as the ‘silent 
participant’ in this study) has construed the interactions they have been witness to, that this is 
part of constructing (and deconstructing) the two adversarial narratives remains part of an 
overarching context that is both determinate and reflexive in nature (vis-à-vis the approach 
taken to law by this study). 
 
One of the seminal works for Conversation Analysis as applied to courtroom settings 
is that of Atkinson and Drew (1979). In this work, the researchers studied interactions within 
a Coroner’s Court in the United Kingdom and from the Scarman Tribunal. The findings of 
this work highlighted the sequential nature of legal proceedings and the manner in which this 
was structured and adhered to. Atkinson and Drew identified courtroom settings as multi-
party settings, but where those able to actively participate are restricted and predetermined by 
institutional rules (1979: 35). In terms of sequential patterns within the spoken data, they 
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determined that rather than just ‘question and answer’ adjacency pairs, there was the pattern 
of accusation-response. In this pattern, the preferred response was to mitigate self-blame 
through denial and reduction strategies. Responses to accusation could include denial, 
justification, admission, or apology (amongst others). Furthermore, in using a Conversation 
Analysis approach, Atkinson and Drew (1979) identified eight key features (though this list 
was not considered exhaustive). Of these features, the following are of particular relevance to 
this study: 
 ‘The placement of questions about the factual status of a description’ within an 
utterance (‘isn’t it a fact’; ‘isn’t it true’ etc.) 
 Questions which prepared the preferred response as agreement in the next 
turn. 
 The length and frequency of pauses. 
 The categorisation of a person from the options made relevant by the setting 
(such as ‘defendant’). 
 The name form chosen and its use when referencing the person who is to 
speak next (such as ‘title + surname’). 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 195-6) 
 
These features add to the foundation upon which this study builds, as the systematic features 
of court identified in this work remain an active part of Anglo-American legal proceedings as 
conducted today. This also contributes to a Conversation Analysis approach to courtroom 
settings as institutional talk, the concept of which will be expanded on next. 
 
In the context of this thesis, institutional settings are not considered divorced from ‘ordinary 
talk’. This study takes the view put forward by Thornborrow (2002), in which institutional 
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talk is not simply identified through its difference to ‘ordinary talk’, but is defined rather by 
talk that displays a number of characteristics. These include (but are not necessarily limited 
to): 
 ‘Talk that has differentiated, pre-inscribed and conventional participant roles, or 
identities’ (in this instance the roles of the courtroom, such as judge, prosecution, 
defence, defendant, etc.). 
 ‘Talk in which there is a structurally asymmetrical distribution of turn types between 
the participants such that speakers with different institutional identities typically 
occupy different discursive identities’. 
 ‘Talk in which there is also an asymmetrical relationship between participants in 
terms of speaker right and obligations’. 
 ‘Talk in which the discursive resources and identities available to participants to 
accomplish specific actions are either weakened or strengthened in relation to their 
current institutional identities’. 
(Thornborrow, 2002: 4) 
This applies directly to courtroom analyses, as it allows for the asymmetrical interactions 
between participants as attributed through legitimisation of the institutional role, but also 
accommodates the concept of power as relational and discursively managed within the 
interactions. 
 Power within Conversation Analysis has had some contention placed around it, as it 
could be argued that in analysing power relations, there is presupposition of power as a 
concept to exist within interactions, thus applying power to analysis in a top-down deductive 
way. This then runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby power relations 
are determined to exist because the researcher was looking for evidence to support that 
hypothesis, rather than it emerging from the data in an inductive manner; thus also allowing 
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the researcher to ‘read in’ to the data the ‘relevance of external factors’ where supporting 
evidence may be lacking (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008: 210). In addressing the issue, the 
concept has been viewed through the lens of asymmetry by Hutchby (Wooffitt, 2005). 
 Hutchby proposes that Conversation Analysis analyses of institutional talk allow for 
the exploration of interactional features that can be interpreted ‘in terms of interpersonal 
power relations’ (Ibid: 193). This does not mean a rejection of the Conversation Analysis 
approach to context, but rather that ‘asymmetry’ could be said to include observable power 
relations as ‘an oriented-to feature of the interaction’ (italics in original) (Hutchby, 1999: 90). 
Hutchby’s (1999; 2001) work on talk-radio (as mentioned in 2.2) shows an established 
sequential normative framework for that setting that callers adhere to, and can be subject to 
sanctions from the host if they deviate from this established pattern. Hutchby refers to this as 
an ‘asymmetrical distribution of argumentational resources… in which power becomes 
observable as a discursive phenomenon’ (Hutchby, 1999: 90). This is to say that hosts have 
argumentational resources available to them that are not available in the same way to callers. 
Paralleling this with courtroom interactions, witnesses are similarly left without the 
confrontational resources that are available to the questioning attorneys. Attorneys are 
institutionally legitimised in dictating the topic, question form, and (to an extent) 
predetermining the form a response can take (though this does not mean that the preferred 
response is the one that will be received, merely that the groundwork for this formulation can 
be made). Through Hutchby (1999; 2001), micro-analytical principles can arguably still be 
applied and maintain a valid inductive approach. In addition to this, reference is also made to 
the agendas of the caller and the host, which are characterised as a ‘contest’, this again links 
with the conflicting agendas as prescribed by the adversarial court system and realised 
through the interactions between attorneys and witnesses. For Hutchby (1999), the host is in a 
position with greater confrontational resource through the position of second speaker, 
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whereas this could potentially contrast with courtroom sequential discourse, in which the 
witnesses are the second speaker but have their ability to respond potentially curtailed and 
directed through the formulation of the preceding turn (Hutchby 1996); and their ability to 
resist this potentially opening them to sanctions from the institutional setting (though also 
arguably orienting-to resistance as part of the negotiated state of an interpersonal power 
relation (Foucault, 1982).  
 
Other aspects of discourse analysis relevant to this research are the features of topic 
management and reported speech. Both of these aspects of discourse analysis are salient to 
the setting, as both have been shown to be important and consistent features of courtroom 
interaction in previous research (Cotterill, 2003; Matoesian, 2001; Stygall, 1994). 
 In looking at topic management, it is important to unpack what is meant by a 
seemingly innocuous, common sense term. As put forward by Myers (2004), topic can be 
attributed simply to what an interaction is ‘about’. This can, however, become problematic 
when one considers the boundaries between topics and the point at which a topic can be 
determined to have moved onto something different (Ibid: 90). In courtroom interactions, 
topics are managed through the question and answer process and are largely determined by 
the questioning attorney. Nevertheless, this form of management should still be considered 
interactive, as the initial question of a sequence might begin an interaction, but subsequent 
questions that follow are formed in response to the preceding response (ref). This influences 
topic management for although the questioner has an agenda and previously prepared topics 
to cover, it is argued in this study that this does not necessarily link directly with a topic-
closing sequence followed by a new topic-opening. 
Though discussed by Jefferson (1984) in reference to ‘troubles-telling’, this study 
utilises the concept of ‘stepwise’ topic shift as being relevant to the interactional management 
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of topics by participants in the structure of question and response sequences. This is in 
accordance with the approach used by Myers (2004: 101-4) and his work on focus groups, in 
which participants’ responses are monitored by a moderator for relevance (applying this to a 
courtroom would be the questioner, who in turn can ask for appeal to the judge if witness is 
considered not to be addressing the topic at hand), though it is the interactants within that 
discursive space that determine whether or not a topic is appropriately oriented to. 
 Stepwise topic transition is described by Harvey Sacks as follows: 
 
‘… conversation is movement from topic to topic, not by topic-close followed by a 
topic beginning, but by a stepwise move, which involves linking up whatever is being 
introduced to what has just been talked about, such that, as far as anybody knows, a 
new topic has not been started, though we’re far from wherever we began.’ 
 
(In Jefferson, 1984: 198) 
 
The concept of moving from one topic to the next through a linking transition is also salient 
to the overall methodological concept employed by this thesis. That is, in linking potentially 
disparate topics through transitional shifts, it is arguable that this could potentially add an 
appearance of coherence to otherwise disparate events. In this regard, the micro-level 
interactions could then be said to fulfil not only legal requirements in terms of presenting the 
relevant evidence of the case, but also perform a connective function that is not necessarily 
linked with spatial of temporal aspects (for more on space and time in narrative, see 4.3.2.1). 
 Though the concept of step-wise transition adds both an analytical depth to the overall 
analysis and is relevant to the methodological approach, it does not however, address the 
previously mentioned issues regarding the determination of topic boundaries and at what 
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point a topic can be determined to have shifted or transitioned (please note that for the 
purposes of this study, these terms are used interchangeably throughout). In determining 
topical boundaries, the analyst may view emergent themes and topics differently from the 
interactants and their utterances in situ. In determining appropriate coding strategies, one 
must, therefore, be aware of how a gloss is framed and whether this could alter the 
interpretation of the interaction that actually took place (Myers, 2004; Saldaña, 2016). 
Consequently, it should be acknowledged that a certain amount of subjectivity can be 
involved when teasing apart topics, the point or utterance at which they are determined to 
have shifted, and how these are subsequently summarised within the research despite any 
aspirations one may have towards an inductive, data-driven approach. 
 
Finally, as outlined above, reported speech will now be discussed. Reported speech (or direct 
reported speech) is a feature within discourse that in layman’s term could be summarised as 
quoting another person (within a given degree of accuracy). According to Coulmas (1986: 2), 
traditionally, reported speech was placed within two categories: ‘oratio recta (direct 
quotation) and oratio obliqua (indirect quotation)’. The first category is defined as 
reproducing ‘the original speech situation’ wherein the speech is claimed to be an exact 
reproduction of the utterance in question. The second allows for adaptation, whereby the 
speech can be altered to fit the circumstance within which it is being reproduced (Ibid: 2). 
 Previous research on reported speech is applicable to this study, as reported speech 
has been determined to imply a level of objectivity to the claim being made (Holt, 1996; 
Clift, 2006). Direct reported speech is shown to imply a ‘fidelity’ to the original source and is 
used by lawyers in court given the general perception that it is more accurate (Holt, 1996). 
Given that reported speech is often used as a means of providing evidence (not necessarily in 
terms of ‘evidence’ as bound by legal restrictions, but in more general terms of relating an 
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account), Holt (1996: 226) also outlines that psychological research has shown, despite the 
perception of accuracy, that the ability to recall an utterance verbatim is ‘often not possible’. 
Buttny (1998) puts forward that reported speech is contextually altered in its reproduction 
within the reporting circumstance. To expand upon this, by reproducing the speech 
(accurately or otherwise) in a contextually different scenario (the ‘current’ context in which 
the reporting is being enacted), the meaning of the speech being reported is already inherently 
altered. Tannen (1989: 105) also takes this same stance with reported speech, with the view 
that it is ‘creatively constructed’ within that interactional setting by the speaker. 
 Reported speech is often used in recounting narrative, but, importantly, adds other 
voices to the interaction when they are not physically present. Myers (2004: 137-9) highlights 
that a link within research on the use of reported speech within interaction is that it is 
‘rhetorical’. In this sense, reported speech is used when ‘participants assume the existence of 
opposing views and use reported speech to dramatize, shift, or reinforce a view, or to bring 
out the tensions between views’. This is then divided into two categories: firstly, 
‘detachment’, in which ‘reported speech is separated from what the speaker says’ for 
themselves; secondly, ‘direct experience’, in which reported speech is a ‘depiction of what is 
said, rather than a description’, thus ‘[carrying] an immediacy, an indexical connection to the 
original setting’. 
For the purposes of this study, the focus is primarily on the second of these categories. 
As will be shown (see in particular Chapters 3 and 4), the concept of reported speech as a 
depiction, whereby the speech does something. Though, as Myers (2004) states, these 
categories are not wholly mutually exclusive, the focus on direct experience when invoking 
reported speech ties in with the concept of epistemic positioning and claims to knowledge 
within testimony. The use of reported speech can also be considered damaging (as will be 
shown in Chapter 4) when one considers that reported speech can also come in the form of an 
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alleged confession that is then reproduced in court. As shown in Matoesian’s (2001) research 
on the Kennedy Smith rape trial, lawyers are encouraged to involve the jury at an emotional 
level and reported speech is one means of attempting to invoke an affective response from the 
listener. 
In discussing reported speech, one must invoke Goffman’s work on footing, which 
underpins much interactional research in this area. According to Goffman (1981), identities 
are not static within interaction, but are dynamic and emerge through interaction, responding 
to changes in context. Goffman postulates that the notion of a single speaker model in 
interaction does not fully account for complexities therein. Instead, Goffman puts forward the 
concepts of animator, author and principle. To elucidate, the idea of the ‘animator’ would 
refer to the production of the speech or ‘sounding box’, as Goffman describes it; the ‘author’ 
would be the person who selected that which is being expressed; and the ‘principle’ would 
denote the one who is committed to what those words say and the beliefs articulated 
(Goffman, 1981: 144). The ‘speaker’ can shift footing within an interaction, allowing them to 
change social roles within the same conversation (Goffman (1981) describes this as 
‘changing hats’), and not every aspect need be subject to change within a given interaction. 
With this underpinning sociological approach to interaction, reported speech can be viewed 
as a means of displaying multiple voices, without each of those voices being singly attributed 
to the concept of a static identity of the speaker. This allows for a more nuanced and fuller 
view of the function of speech and interaction overall, and reported speech in particular. 
 It would be remiss at this stage to close a discussion on multiple voices without 
reference to Bakhtin’s work in this area. In line with the postulations on reported speech as 
fundamentally altered from its original state, Bakhtin also puts forward that reported speech 
can be altered through the act of being reported. Tannen (1989: 108), claims that in the work 
of Bakhtin there is no role of ‘animator’ (as described by Goffman), as this implies a 
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‘conveyor of information’ wholly removed from the utterance they are producing. For 
Bakhtin, language is interactive and incorporates multiple voices and ideologies. These 
‘dialogic relations’ are intertextual and are formed in relation to past and current discourse, 
wherein speech cannot be reported without being influenced and altered by its current context 
(Matoesian, 2001). 
 In analysing reported speech within the context of this project, the role and 
formulation of the speech is of particular regard, as the reported utterance has been selected 
in accordance with the larger agenda and macro-narrative, thus being oriented to as relevant 
by that party to that case. Thus, the theoretical concept of reported speech as context-
generated and context-altered through its use within interaction is of import to the subsequent 
analysis. 
 
Having discussed the theoretical underpinnings of the methodology and methods employed 
within this study, the application of these methods, the data, its collection, and the ethical 
considerations of this project will be outlined in the following sections. 
 
2.6 Application of linguistic and narrative analysis methods 
 
Having discussed the theories and methods that are relevant to this study (sections #) and 
outlined where these methods are to be applied throughout this study (section 2.2.1), this 
section will outline the process through which these approaches have been applied in the 
analysis of data. Firstly, the application of linguistic analysis will be discussed, followed by 
that of narrative analysis. The concepts of legitimacy and the Foucaultian approach to power 
relations (as discussed in section 2.#) are evidenced in relation to the findings as they 
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emerged from the data (and were not applied or assumed to be present a priori by the 
researcher. 
 
2.6.1 Linguistic analysis: Applying micro-analysis and identifying features in talk 
 
2.6.1.1 Data selection 
 
In applying the micro-analytical principles drawn from Conversation Analysis, the data was 
viewed first in its entirety (approximately 119 hours of trial footage from both trials; for 
further details on data specifications please see section 2.8) for a minimum of two whole 
viewings. After reviewing this footage, the particular foci of the data (cross-examination of 
Amanda Hayes; opening statements; interactions in the absence of the jury) were determined 
by the researcher through the identification of areas for further development as a result of 
extensive literature review; the ability to utilise an holistic approach to the trials and 
(co)construction of (conflicting) narrative(s); and potential contributions in terms of both the 
research questions and originality. Due to the volume of footage and limited scope of the 
study, full transcription of all 119 hours of footage using Jefferson transcription conventions 
(as provided in Jenks, 2011) was not undertaken, with this only applied to identified areas for 
analysis. 
 
2.6.1.2 Applying linguistic analysis 
 
Having identified the areas of the trials that were to be analysed in detail, transcriptions were 
produced by the researcher using Transana Standard (Version 6.21b) transcription software. 
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 As the one of the core conceptual aims of this study is to triangulate data across a 
multi-level perspective (see section 2.2, figure 2.1), it was deemed important that findings 
emerged from the data, and were not ascribed to it, by using the inductive (or bottom-up) 
principles of micro-analysis (Sidnell and Stivers, 2013:2). 
 In identifying conversational features, these emerged as patterns within the data 
through close review of the transcripts and the videos themselves. It is worth highlighting that 
transcripts in this study were a tool to aid with data analysis and were not considered data in 
and of themselves, as the data was regarded to be the video-recordings (Jenks, 2001: 5). In 
accordance with the conventions outlined in section 2.5, features of talk identified were a) 
produced through the coordination of the participants; b) reflexive interactions between 
participants who orient to the conversation as it unfolds; c) repeatable and recurrent within 
the data (Liddicoat, 2011: 5). 
In adapting this to the institutional context of the courtroom and the dataset under 
review, the rules that bind courtroom interactions did not mean that these concepts could not 
be applied. Though restricted through format of the interactions (such as the question-answer 
format), in transcribing and analysing this data, it will be shown that, emergent from the data, 
participants still coordinated interactions, were reflexive in their responses (see particularly 
Chapters 3 and 5), and that identifiable patterns could be established that were repeatable and 
recurrent in the data (see particularly 3.2; 3.3; 5.2; and 5.3). What is worth noting here is that 
the even though the patterns will be demonstrated to be recurrent, this is within the bounded 
context of the two trials analysed and not across a sample of multiple trials. As noted 
throughout this thesis (and particularly Chapter 6), generalisations outwith the dataset are not 
claims that will be made from this study. 
In identifying conversational features within these interactions, observable 
phenomena were identified and interpreted in line with Conversation Analysis principles. 
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These included the identification of overlaps in talk; repair; intonation and prosodic features; 
turn length; lexical choice (including the re-use and recycling of terms); and orientation by 
speakers to the previous turn, inter alia (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008; Liddicoat, 2011). 
Linguistic features were interpreted within the context of the talk itself and their relationship 
with surrounding talk (considering the turns that came before and after), addressing the 
fundamental question of ‘[w]hy that now?’(Heritage and Clayman, 2010: 17). In examining 
observable phenomena within the context of the interactions, patterns and functions of these 
occurrences are then discernible features. This interpretation is in accordance with the 
application of this method in linguistic research, including Atkinson and Drew (1979), 
Heritage and Clayman (2010), and Hutchby and Wooffitt (2008), inter alia; where talk is 
considered to be both context creating and context renewing, with institutions as ‘talk[ed] 
into being’ (Heritage and Clayman, 2010: 20),  
In reviewing the data and identifying features, the concept of asymmetry as defined 
by Hutchby (1996; 1999; 2001) was employed (see section 2.5). This was necessary in 
analysing institutional footage as it allowed the concept of power relations (Foucault, 1982; 
section 1.4 and 2.4) to be analysed without imposing the theory upon the data. In observing 
details such as floor management (for example, who has the floor and when do they have it?) 
and how speaker rights are managed (such as, who claims/is permitted to speak and when 
does this occur within the interaction; to what extent is the talk allowed/curtailed, and by 
whom [if anyone] is this managed; and in what ways?), it is possible to identify the 
‘asymmetrical distribution of argumentational resources… in which power becomes an 
observable phenomenon’ (Hutchby, 1990: 90) as discussed in theoretical terms in section 2.5. 
Having power as an observable phenomenon that can emerge from the data, in turn, 
means that the Foucaultian concept of power relations (wherein power is negotiated within 
interactions and not possessed and resistance is a pre-requisite for a power relationship to be 
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established; sections 1.4 and 2.4) can be evidenced and interpreted as emerging from the data, 
without the assumption that it will be inherently found within it. This adds to the 
methodological triangulation of data as purported by this study (section 2.2), in which macro-
level and micro-level theories are brought closer together as complimentary forms of 
analysis, rather than in conflict. 
 
Narrative (as a concept and not a method of analysis in this instance) is also relevant in the 
analysis of talk through the use of micro-analysis, as it is closely intertwined with topic. In 
analysing topic and topic shifts within the talk (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), how the narrative(s) 
unfolds, is oriented to, and shifts becomes observable within the data. 
In reviewing the data and transcripts, and in accordance with the theory of topic (as 
discussed above and in section 2.5; Myers, 2004; and Jefferson, 1984), transition between 
topics is observed within the data (as applied in Chapters 3, 4 and 5). With topic and topic 
shift as observable phenomena (particularly notable through the institutional interactions, and 
their question and answer based framework), this study reviews topic within the context of 
micro-level interactions; addressing how/if it is oriented to by participants, shifts between 
topics, and how these topics are framed both at the micro-level, and as part of the larger 
macro-level narratives of the defence and prosecution, relating to the overall agenda. As 
narrative is co-constructed in these interactions, the emergence of conflicting co-constructed 
narratives through the discussion of topics at the micro-level is also observable and emerges 
from the data (applied in Chapters 3, 4 and 5). 
 In addition, this approach addresses the research questions (and particularly RQ2), as 
it contributes to the function(s) of the patterns of interaction (and the [co]construction of 
narrative), as well as addressing the concept of power relations (RQ3), as the asymmetrical 
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nature of the interaction with the questioner also having the capacity to manage the topics 
within the interaction can also be observed (Chapters 3 and 5). 
 
In addressing more functional aspects of the application of methods to this study, transcript 
extracts accompanied by the video recordings and preliminary findings were presented at 
regular data sessions (Newcastle University’s Micro-Analysis Research Group [MARG]), 
and conferences (including the Germanic Society for Forensic Linguistics, 2015; 2016; 
Sociolinguistics Symposium, 2016; and International Association of Forensic Linguists, 
2017) for purposes of peer review (see 2.7 for further information regarding reliability and 
validity). 
 
2.6.2 Narrative analysis, coding data, and identifying themes 
 
In utilising narrative analysis in this thesis, this section will outline how narrative approaches 
(as discussed in 2.3) were applied, including the application of narrative within discourse; 
Ricoeur’s (1980) approach to narrative time; coding data; and identifying themes. 
 
2.6.2.1 Narrative in discourse 
 
This thesis draws on discursive and literary theories as well as interaction based methods of 
unpacking narrative formulations within the data. As discussed in section 2.3, applying 
Schiffrin’s (2006) approach to personal narratives is considered to be parallel to witnesses 
providing testimony in the context of the trial data of this thesis. In analysing the narrative 
formulations one aspect identified is the ‘stance’ of the speaker (their position within the 
narrative), which is observable through their epistemology (evidenced through their claims to 
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knowledge) and evidentiality (evidenced through the source of the information). These were 
interpreted in the data through the speakers’ positioning of the ‘self’ within the testimony 
(Schiffrin, 2006: 210-11) and use of direct, indirect or reported speech (Myers, 2004: 137-9). 
 In having epistemology and evidentiality as observable and emerging from the data, it 
is also possible to observe and interpret the enactment of ‘legitimacy’ (section 2.4), which is 
also in line with the research of Bottoms and Tankebe (2012); wherein legitimacy is not 
possessed but, as with power relations, is negotiated within interactions. The invocation of 
different voices within testimony (such as the use of Amanda Hayes’ alleged confession by 
the prosecution [Chapter 4] and the testimony of Heidi Schumacher in which she quotes 
Laura Ackerson [Chapter 5]), also allows for the identification of patterns and functions in 
interactions, whereby it is possible to interpret the enactment of legitimacy as emergent from 
(and not applied to) the data. As such, the stance of speakers and the voices that they invoked 
in producing testimony are identified and analysed as part of this study (see Chapters 3, 4, 
and 5).  This is applied in accordance with Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), Schiffrin (2006), 
and Myers (2004). 
 
In the formulation of macro-level narratives and the identification of the overall ‘story’ for 
each aspect of the trial, a more literary approach is applied. 
After reviewing all of the video footage available (after a minimum of two viewings 
of all 119 hours), the overarching narratives for both prosecution and defence in both trials 
were identified, with extensive notes made and coded by the researcher identifying evidence, 
witnesses, objections, inter alia at the broader level. After this initial stage (as mentioned 
previously), it was determined that a focus would be made on the opening statements (four in 
total across the two trials; Chapter 4). The concepts of victim, villains, heroes, bystanders, 
and other such ‘characters’ could be identified in the framing of these narratives, with these 
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characteristics being actively applied in the courtroom setting (Berger, 1997). Having 
outlined these characteristics in more detail in section 2.3, they can be observed as directly 
oriented to and invoked by the interlocutors in the opening statements, emerging from the 
data in both micro-analysis and coded, thematic analysis (Chapter 4). 
 
Although it has been used in previous linguistic research on courtroom and narratives 
(Cotterill, 2003; Heffer, 2005; inter alia), Labov’s (1972) narrative schema was not applied in 
this study (due to the critique discussed in sections 2.3 and 4.1.1); and it is part of the 
contribution of this thesis, that Ricoeur’s (1980) approach to narrative time is employed 
instead (for further details of the theoretical approach, see sections 2.3, 4.1.1, and 4.2.3.1). 
In order to operationalise this theory Ricoeur’s (1980) theory of narrative time and to 
perform a thematic analysis of the opening statements (as the primary introduction of the 
narratives of each side to the jury) to this study, narrative coding was utilised, with further 
details of this process provided below. 
 
2.6.2.2 Narrative coding and the identification of themes 
 
In order to apply Ricouer’s (1980) approach to narrative time as retrospective, non-linear and 
outwith a predefined schema (such as Labov, 1976), there are two main considerations. 
Firstly, the episodic dimension (‘which characterises the story as made out of events’), and 
secondly the configuration dimension (where the plot constructs the whole out of ‘scattered 
events’). In order to employ these concepts, the events themselves must be identified. This 
was done through the application of inductive coding, using Saldaña’s (2013: 135) approach 
to narrative coding as an initial guide, the process of which being as follows. 
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 Transcripts were produced by the researcher for all four of the opening statements. 
These opening statements then went through the process of open coding, in which codes were 
generated based on details emerging from the data. This coding process was undergone twice 
by the researcher for each opening statement at separate points in the production of this thesis 
to check the consistency and reliability of the coding process. In accordance with Saldaña 
(2013: 198-206), codes were clustered according to emergent similarities which formed the 
themes that emerged from the data (for tables of topics, summary and themes for each 
opening statement, please see Appendix B). 
 As part of the coding process, topics and temporal features of the data were coded and 
analysed. This allowed for the identification of each ‘episode’ outwith a linear framework. It 
is contended that identifying these episodes, as made relevant by the interlocutors, allowed 
each element to be identified without applying a linear model. As will be evidenced in 
Chapter 4, all court case narratives are arguably retrospective (through the act of being told at 
trial) with the jury already aware of how the ‘story’ ends (Dershowitz, 1996). In identifying 
the individual episodes which make the ‘scattered events’ that have occurred, it can be seen 
how otherwise disconnected events (such as shopping or meetings) are drawn together in the 
configurational dimension to form the overall narrative plot (Ricouer, 1980; section 4.2.3.1). 
In removing a linear approach to time as a preconceived schema, it can also be seen how 
episodes themselves are oriented to outwith the narrative chronology of the plot (not all 
events discussed at trial are done so in the order that they are claimed to have occurred in), as 
will be shown in section 4.2.3.1, for example, the defence of Amanda Hayes does not adhere 
to a narrative chronology in the same way as the prosecution does. 
 
This section has discussed how the methodological approaches introduced in this chapter are 
applied in this thesis, including both linguistic and narrative approaches at both the micro- 
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and macro-level. The conceptual constructs (such as power relations and legitimacy) have 
been discussed as observable phenomena that can be evidenced and interpreted within the 
data analysis, and the importance and means through which data is triangulated (as links with 
the overall three-level concept introduced in 2.2) has been reviewed. Sections and chapters of 
particular relevance to each approach have been identified throughout, and for a further 
outline of which methodological approaches were applied to which chapters, please see the 
overview provided in section 2.2.1. 
 
The following section will discuss the role and relevance of the jury in this study, followed 
by an overview of the data and its collection; ethical considerations; and concluding remarks 
for this chapter. 
 
2.7 Characterising the jury and its role in an adversarial criminal trial 
 
As part of the methodological approach of this study, it is of value to outline the role of the 
jury and its characterisation throughout this thesis. As much as the jury is oriented to in court, 
and talk is tailored for the purposes of persuading the jury (Heffer, 2005) (and as is evidenced 
in Chapters 3 and 4), in Chapter 5, the role of the jury becomes highly relevant through its 
absence. It is the jury who determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant; and questions, 
answers, and narratives are all put forward with the agenda of persuading the jury in one 
direction or the other (Heffer, 2010). In examining the interactions in the absence of the jury, 
this study will show the ways in which testimony is edited and what is required to be 
removed before it is considered suitable for the jury to hear. The role of the judge as arbiter 
as to which aspects of evidence are permissible becomes more interactive (see Chapter 5), 
and it is for the purposes of presenting to the jury, testimony that adheres to the legal rules of 
106 
 
evidence. Therefore, even in its absence, the jury remains of key importance in the trial, and 
the evidence to which it is exposed is determined through the judge’s role as decision-maker 
and gatekeeper (Ibid). 
The concept of the jury as a ‘silent participant’ (Carter, 2011) was introduced in section 1.6 
and will expanded further here, along with the rationale for its application to this thesis. 
The jury are oriented to throughout the trial, both directly and indirectly. Their impact 
on the courtroom through their presence is demonstrated in Chapter 3, the cross-examination 
of Amanda Hayes (one of the defendants). As those tasked with passing judgement, the jury 
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant and, as such, play a major (if largely non-
vocalic) role in these trial proceedings. Goffman (1981: 132) refers to ‘overhearers’ as those 
who are listening, but are not ‘ratified participants’ of the talk. He also acknowledges that not 
all talk is dyadic (between a speaker and an ‘addressed recipient’) and that once these 
boundaries are broken, there is the potential for the interaction to be ‘played out’ for those 
who are listening, with an example including that of a jury ‘overhearing’ the elicitation of 
witness testimony (Ibid: 132-3). For Goffman, this allows ‘subordinate talk’ to take place, in 
which there is a layered message and inference within the dominant communication directed 
towards the ratified participant (Ibid: 133-4). 
This provides a good foundation upon which to build our approach to the role and 
characterisation of the jury in this study. Goffman allows for the complexities of 
communication and challenges the simplistic conceptualisation of a ‘hearer’ or ‘recipient’ 
within an assumed formula of dyadic communication (1981: 134-7). 
 Within the specific context of jury trials, however, the term ‘overhearer’, whilst a 
forward-moving conceptualisation of those who ‘hear’ or receive talk, has been highlighted 
as failing to fully encompass the role of the jury and the orientation of talk within this 
specific institutional context (Heffer, 2005: 48-50); particularly as the term is also applied to 
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an audience listening to a radio or watching television (Heritage, 1985), and whose role in 
proceedings is arguably more passive (and without the implications of judgement pertaining 
to a person’s possible loss of liberty – or life – depending on the charges, jurisdiction, and 
court). 
 
In building on the characterisation of the jury, this thesis is presenting a shift towards 
terminology that it contends encapsulates the active role of the jury in a trial (as a 
participant), even if this role does not have an obvious ‘on-stage’ vocal presence (silent). It is 
the actions of the jury at the end of the trial that determine its overall outcome, and it is the 
jury for whom the majority of talk is designed. Thus the phrase ‘silent participant’, as 
introduced by Carter (2011) has been used throughout this study. Carter (2011: 69-70) 
referred to the tape recorder in interviews as a ‘silent participant’, as the tape is oriented to by 
police officers in the interviewing of suspects. Through an application of Drew (1992: 495 in 
Carter, 2011: 70), in which it is identified that ‘the structural feature that talk in (cross)-
examination is designed for multiparty recipiency by nonspeaking overhearers can 
immediately be seen to have certain consequences for sequential patterns and activities in 
talk’. In the process of questioning a witness, the attorneys will provide an uninitiated third-
turn receipt of the answer received (as will be demonstrated in Chapter 3 in the reformulation 
of responses in cross-examination), which is structurally designed for the jury. It is important 
to note here that juries can, in fact, ask questions, but rarely exercise this right (Drew, 1992: 
517). This further contributes to the argument of this study that the jury can be characterised 
beyond the implications of an ‘overhearing’ audience, as they also have institutionally 
bounded participant rights within trial proceedings. 
 As such, the jury is ‘oriented to and accounted for’ in the talk of the interlocutors. 
Further to this, Heffer (2005: 48-51) also indicates that attorneys interact with the jury during 
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questioning through gaze and prosodic features such as intonation within trial talk, thus 
shifting their position from indirect to direct recipients of talk. 
 
On the basis outlined above, having considered Goffman’s (1981) use of ‘overhearer’ and in 
accordance with the developing terminology in reference to the jury in trial proceedings, this 
thesis refers to the jury as a ‘silent participant’. This builds on the work of Heffer (2005) and 
Carter (2011), shifting the term from its application to the tape recorder (as in Carter’s 
research) and applying it directly in the characterisation of the jury (as was proposed as a 
potential application in Carter, 2011: 70-1). 
 
2.8 Data collection 
 
Having discussed the methodological approach utilised within this study data, its collection, 
and other salient features will be outlined. 
 As discussed previously in 1.5.2.2, data collection and who owns courtroom footage 
were issues that needed consideration throughout the conception of this project. The result of 
this was that the data in this study are comprised of video footage of two trials (those of Grant 
and Amanda Hayes) that were published on a video archive available to the public via 
WRAL, a news site for Raleigh, Durham and Fayetteville in North Carolina (wral.com). For 
the trial of Grant Hayes, the general overview of the data is as follows: 
 Data collected from: http://www.wral.com/news/local/asset_gallery/12826513/ 
 Approximate length of footage viewed overall: 57 hours 
 Verdict: Guilty (first degree murder) 
 Sentence: Life in prison 
 Appeal: Dismissed on Tuesday, 3rd March 2015 
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For the trial of Amanda Hayes, the general overview of the data is as follows: 
 Data collected from: http://www.wral.com/news/local/asset_gallery/13329437/ 
 Approximate length of footage viewed overall: 62 hours 
 Verdict: Guilty (second degree murder) 
 Sentence: 157 – 198 months in prison (approx. 13 – 16 years) 
 Appeal: No known appeal 
In the sentencing of Amanda Hayes, it should be noted that credit was given for time already 
served. 
 
In order to ensure validity and reliability in transcription and analysis, aspects of this study 
have been presented at for peer review at linguistics conferences (such as the Sociolinguistics 
Symposium 21, Spain, June 2016) and data sessions with Newcastle University’s Micro-
Analysis Research Group (MARG) throughout the duration of the period of study. 
Data were transcribed using Transana Standard (Version 6.21b) transcription software 
(Woods and Fassnacht, 2017) and the Jefferson transcription system (Jenks, 2011: 114-115). 
This manner of transcription was chosen in order to allow for a full analysis of data selected, 
including features which would not be noted in other transcription methods, such as overlaps, 
asymmetry in turn length, and prosodic features that can impact upon the interpretation of an 
utterance, as form impacts upon interpretation of content (O’Barr, 1982). 
 
2.9 Ethical considerations 
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This study was undertaken in accordance with the Codes of Ethical Practice of the ESRC, 
Newcastle University, the British Association of Applied Linguistics and the British 
Sociological Association. 
Matters such as anonymity were not required for this project as this was a desk-based 
study with information gathered from the public domain. However, despite the public nature 
of this data, some details were redacted by the author (these included telephone numbers and 
addresses) as these were considered to be a matter of conscience to the author, who saw no 
need to further distribute such details as their inclusion had no bearing on the quality of the 
analysis. 
 
2.10 Final remarks on methodology and summary of original contribution 
 
This chapter discussed the interactive, three-fold approach between agenda, macro-, and 
micro-levels of discourse within courtroom settings. Drawing on research from approaches to 
narrative, sociology and criminology, and linguistics, this study utilises a fundamentally 
inductive, data-driven approach that uses evidence drawn from the data to identify features 
that are oriented to by interactants as salient. These features are contextually linked with the 
broader aspects of the trial as made relevant by the setting and overall institutional roles of 
those present. In drawing together micro- and macro-approaches to data analysis, this study 
builds upon previous research in this field (including Thornborrow, 2001; Haworth, 2006; 
inter alia). 
 In terms of data, this thesis contributes to the field on knowledge in its ability to form 
a localised comparison between two criminal trials that maintain the same judge and 
prosecution team, but have different defendants and defence counsel. Whilst broader 
generalisations are not made from this study, it provides a platform from which observances 
111 
 
can be made regarding interactions between the anthropomorphised label of the ‘state’ and 
the interactants who partake of the embodiment of what is here believed to be a multitude of 
different discourses, and those who testify as ‘witnesses’ but are outwith this ‘state’ 
embodiment (thus classifying them in this study as ‘individuals’). It also provides a means 
through which narrative use and changes within narrative can be observed within the criminal 
trial system and without comparison to a civil trial; thereby building on previous research 
(such as Cotterill, 2003). This can be done as the victim, and a large amount of the evidence 
and witnesses remain the same across both criminal trials. 
 Having discussed the methodology, methods and contribution of this project, the 
following chapters will present analyses across three main areas. These areas are: the cross-
examination of Amanda Hayes; the opening statements between the four trials; and 
interactions in the absence of the jury. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis of Amanda Hayes Cross-examination 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout these two trials, Amanda Hayes was the only one of the two defendants to speak 
on her own behalf from the witness stand. Under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States of America, defendants have the right to remain silent and (in contrast with 
judicial practice in England and Wales) the prosecution cannot infer guilt. Consequently, for 
example, Grant Hayes could not be inferred to be guilty by not taking the stand and refusing 
to be questioned under oath concerning the charges, as he was exercising what is considered 
to be a basic right in this judicial process (Justia, 2017). As part of her defence, Amanda 
Hayes took the stand and, in doing so, was able to put forward her version of events in person 
(as opposed to through an interlocutor in the form of her legal representation). Nevertheless, 
in doing so, she was also able to be questioned by the opposing counsel regarding the events 
of and surrounding the death of Laura Ackerson (the victim and former girlfriend of Grant 
Hayes, with whom he had two young children). 
 The questioning of Amanda Hayes took place over two days and the viewable video 
footage is almost 6 hours long (see 2.6 for link to video archive). The process took the form 
of direct examination (questioning by Ms Hayes’ attorney), cross examination (questioning 
by Assistant District Attorney), re-direct examination, and re-cross examination. It should be 
noted that as part of this process, certain limitations were placed on the re-direct and re-cross 
segments. Particularly with regard to the re-cross segment, the Judge ruled that questions had 
to be limited to the re-direct only (and, consequently, the prosecution could not ask new 
questions regarding the original direct examination from the previous day). Amanda Hayes 
(hereafter referred to as AH) was only questioned by one person from each ‘side’ whilst on 
the stand: her primary attorney (GAS), and a female Assistant District Attorney (ADAH). 
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Though this analysis does not draw overly on gender-based arguments due to space 
constraints, it is worthwhile to note that although her direct questioning comes from a male 
defence attorney (even though there is a female member of her team), the cross-examination 
is performed by the female member of the two-person prosecution team. 
During this cross-examination, several features came to be of note which can be 
divided into two sections for discussion. These two sections form the basis of this chapter. 
The first section examines the use of self-selection during cross-examination by the 
defendant. Though the frequency with which this was exercised was limited, its occurrence at 
a micro-analytical level was significant in the pattern that emerged when this took place. In 
the second section examines the means through which the defendant retained and maintained 
the ‘floor’ were also deemed significant. These features also, in the view of this study, 
support the Foucaultian theoretical approach posited in 1.4 regarding power and resistance, 
and the negotiated state in which they exist. In support of Thornborrow (2002), these 
interactions display a discursive shift in power and resistance that can – at times – contradict 
the expected norms of the institutional roles being performed; particularly in this instance 
those of the cross-examining lawyer and the defendant. It is the stance of this thesis that these 
interactions also demonstrate this theory of power and resistance at a micro-analytical level, 
thus providing evidence in support of the macro-level theory (1.4) without imposing a ‘top-
down’ approach. 
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3.2 Self-selection during cross-examination 
 
3.2.1 Background 
 
As outlined by Atkinson and Drew (1979) in their analysis of a coroner’s court and 
tribunal testimony, the institutional roles of the courtroom are predetermined factors within 
the context of the interaction. These roles ascribe to the interactants when they can and 
cannot speak and what form their interactions should take. In the case of Amanda Hayes’ 
cross-examination, there are three key roles which are oriented to; those of the defence and 
prosecuting attorneys, and that of the witness (in this case, also the defendant). As has been 
discussed by various scholars (Ehrlich, 2006; Matoesian, 1993; 2001; Cotterill, 2003, inter 
alia), one of the mainstays of courtroom interaction is that of questioning. Though often 
viewed as a fairly commonplace process, questioning has been extensively researched and the 
forms that questions take are taught to aspiring lawyers (Conley and O’Barr, 1998). 
Questioning is also a dimension of adjacency pairs within CA (conversation analysis), with 
the question-answer format being extensively researched (Heritage and Raymond, 2012; 
Raymond, 2003). 
Though discussing self-selection, it is important to outline the institutionally expected 
norms of a question-answer format, as self-selection in the context of this courtroom setting 
breaks the established pattern and deviates from the expected norms of courtroom interaction 
(as outlined through the institutional roles discussed above). This is discussed in greater depth 
below. 
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3.2.2 The use of self-selection in the case of Amanda Hayes cross-examination 
 
There are three key points during Amanda Hayes’ cross-examination in which self-selection 
occurs. In all three of these instances there has been pause which is longer than those which 
have occurred previously within that exchange, though the length of these pauses is not 
uniform. Contextually, the following extract is discussing whether or not Amanda Hayes’ 
discussed the victim, Laura Ackerson, after she had been supposedly injured in the apartment 
(the prosecution narrative being that at this point she was likely deceased). 
 
 
Extract 3.1 
 
91 ADAH so you don't remember if you (0.7) 
92  u:m (0.4) Asked about lau:ra: how she wa:s= 
93 AH =i don't believe so no↓ (0.3) i-i 
94  don't believe she was brought up (.) 
95  no 
96  (3.1) 
97 AH i'm just not gonna swear that we never 
98  eve:r spoke about her i don't 
99  recall any conversations we had about 
100  her .hh i'm just not gonna say she was 
101  never men↑tioned↓ 
 
As can be seen in extract 3.1, Amanda Hayes’ is denying asking about Laura Ackerson’s 
wellbeing after she was supposedly injured in the apartment; after which, Grant Hayes is 
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alleged to have informed Amanda Hayes that the victim had returned home while Amanda 
Hayes was out with the children. At this point Amanda Hayes claims that she had no 
knowledge that Laura Ackerson was deceased and would not learn this information until after 
she, Grant Hayes, and the children had arrived in Texas. 
As can be seen in extract 3.1 at line 96, the duration of the pause is 3.1 seconds. At no 
point during this segment (or in extracts 3.2 and 3.3) does the camera show what is happening 
in a wide-pan view of the courtroom, however; throughout both Grant and Amanda Hayes’ 
trials, long pauses have not been unusual with various actions taking place during these from 
documents being organised to attorneys briefly conferring with one another. There is no 
visible or audible prompting for the defendant to continue speaking or to elaborate on her 
answer, making the orientation by AH to continue speaking a marked occurence. Though 
there must be some allowance made for the possibility of a nonverbal cue to continue, this 
must be weighed against the potential lack of such a cue becoming part of the permanent 
record as it would not necessarily be documented by the court reporter. 
 The question, which is put forward by ADAH at lines 91-2 is framed in terms of a 
statement to be confirmed (or denied) by the defendant (AH) as a binary yes/no (Raymond, 
2003). This is responded to swiftly by AH as can be seen by her latched response at line 93. 
AH repeats ‘no’ at both lines 93 and 95, but hedges this denial with ‘i don’t believe’ both 
times. The negative response to this question fulfils the requirement of responding to 
complete the adjacency pair and is within the interactional ‘rules’ established within this 
setting. In spite of this, and of the ‘usual’ preconception that witnesses should not volunteer 
information under cross examination beyond answering the question, AH waits 3.1 seconds 
and then continues to elaborate. This second turn from lines 97-101 is a (seemingly) 
voluntary elaboration of the previous turn’s content that provides additional hedging. AH 
shifts slightly in this elaboration from ‘i don’t believe’ to qualifying the use of ‘no’ with 
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reference to her inability to recall such a conversation and that she is ‘not gonna say she was 
never mentioned’. In this second turn the words ‘swear’, ‘spoke’, and ‘never mentioned’ are 
all emphasised. 
 This leads to extract 3.2, in which a similar pattern is observable. Contextually, after 
the death of Laura Ackerson, her body was dismembered and disposed of in Texas near the 
family of Amanda Hayes. A large piece of furniture was alleged to have been in the U-Haul 
trailer and placed in front of the coolers in which the victim’s remains were being stored. 
Amanda Hayes claims to have had no knowledge of this and denies having helped remove 
the large piece of furniture. 
 
Extract 3.2 
 
61 AH well i did not help (.) unload the 
62  furniture↓ i don't know how it got 
63  out↓ (0.5) like i said i thought that 
64  they had helped↑ (1.3) but if they 
65  didn't (.) then i don't know how he got 
66  it out↓ 
67  (11.2) 
68 AH when i went outside that night (0.2) 
69  it was already on the grass↓ (.) and he: 
70  was: (.) in the trailer↓ 
71  (1.3) 
72 ADAH °okay what night are you speaking of° 
73 AH monday night↓ 
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During this extract, AH is outlining that she did not help Grant Hayes remove a large item of 
furniture from the trailer while they were in Texas. AH is claiming that she believed other 
members of her family had helped him, which is being brought into question by the 
prosecution. 
In this extract, it can be seen that the pause length at line 67 is 11.2 seconds long 
before AH self-selects. This is the longest pause of the three extracts under discussion and 
again, there is no audible evidence that AH has been encouraged to expand upon her previous 
answer. AH answers the question in line 61 (‘well i did not help’) and expands after a 
micropause to complete the first part of the turn at line 63 (‘unload the furniture i don’t know 
how it got out’). This is then followed by a 0.5 second pause, after which there is further 
elaboration of this initial negative answer. This elaboration is again broken up by a 1.3 
second pause at line 64, before the conclusion of the elaboration at line 66. After the 11.2 
second pause, AH self-selects and offers additional information, thereby continuing to 
elaborate on her previous response. 
Again, an interesting feature of this self-selection is the apparent voluntary provision 
of additional information, particularly when the question has already been answered. 
Compounding this is the contextual setting where the defendant is not even under an 
obligation to take the stand; much less the apparent breaching of the established question-
answer pattern to volunteer information to the opposing counsel. Further to this is the 
implication of the wider narrative, Amanda Hayes distances herself from helping Grant 
Hayes move the furniture behind which the victim’s remains are hidden. There is a potential 
narrative inference that could be drawn from this; that of Amanda Hayes distancing herself 
from acts surrounding Laura Ackerson’s death and disposal and attempting to subvert an 
implicit line of questioning (in helping Grant Hayes move the furniture, she could also be 
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placed epistemically closer to the crime), rather than an explicit one (Atkinson and Drew, 
1979). 
Examining this closely, this follows a similar pattern to the previous extract which 
could be described as an initial answer followed by an elaboration; this leads to an apparent 
conclusion of the answer with a pronounced pause and no immediate follow-up question 
(there are also no obvious cues for AH to continue); this is then followed by the defendant’s 
self-selection and another elaboration turn. Interestingly, in this extract, ADAH then follows 
this self-selected turn with an audibly quieter clarification question at line 72. Again, as with 
the previous extract, AH emphasises certain words. In this extract, the words ‘did not help’ at 
line 61 are stressed, making them emphasised – which also form the initial answering of the 
question. However, there is no apparent evidence in the extracts selected to currently suggest 
that although certain words are stressed in these turns, they are done so in terms of a 
particular formulaic or repeatable pattern. 
The final extract examining self-selection comes from the last two minutes of 
Amanda Hayes’ time on the witness stand during the re-cross examination segment of her 
questioning. This extract is part of the conclusion of Amanda Hayes’ testimony (which shall 
be examined in more detail in 3.4), before she is allowed to step down. 
 
Extract 3.3 
 
65  AH  i ↑am concerned about my safety i'm 
66    a-afraid he's gonna tip the boat over↑ 
67    we're gonna go ↑in the water i- i'm 
68    afraid of- for lots of things↓ 
69    (4.9) 
70  AH  i- i don't think you can imagine (.) the 
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71    kind of fear that i was under↓ (0.5) i i 
72    honestly don't think you can imagine↓ 
73    (1.0) 
74  ADAH  the fear that you were under was that 
75    the boat would tip over= 
76  AH  .hh 
77  ADAH  =and the animal[s would hurt you (   )] 
78  AH        [i had lots and lots of] 
79        fear 
 
Extract 3.3 is in response to a question made by ADAH regarding AH’s concern for 
her own safety. This is being placed in contrast with the victim, as the discussion is focussed 
on the disposal of Laura Ackerson’s remains in a Texas creek. 
As can be observed in lines 65-8, AH does not make any significant pauses in the 
initial response to this question. There is use of the historical present tense in lines 65-8, 
which has been attributed with demarcating ‘dramatic’ events (Wolfson, 1979). This then 
subsequently reverts to the past tense after self-selection (lines 70-9). 
The pause at line 69 of 4.9 seconds does not receive any audible response from 
ADAH, nor is there any apparent evidence of this turn orienting to a nonverbal cue to 
continue, as discussed above. The pattern of Extract 3.3 is in keeping with the previous two 
examples, showing an initial response (with elaboration) (lines 65-8); a pause with no 
apparent response from the questioner (line 69); and then a self-selected elaboration turn 
(lines 70-79). 
In this final self-selected turn, however, AH appears to directly address ADAH 
through both the position of gaze (the camera angle is static and there is no obvious 
movement of her head/gaze to the left towards the jury), and through her use of direct address 
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(‘you’), which is also a use of active rather than passive voice. This turn seems to take the 
form of a direct statement to the prosecuting attorney with ‘i don’t think you can imagine the 
kind of fear that i was under’ (lines 70-1). This analysis continues to frame this as an 
extended elaboration of previous content, as the topic under discussion was AH’s ‘fear’ and 
being ‘concerned for [her] own safety’ (see 3.4, extract 3.13) whilst she was in the boat. The 
self-selected elaboration turn, though different in terms of using direct address and forming a 
possible accusation, attempts to support the previous turn (as in extracts 3.1 and 3.2) through 
further mention of AH’s alleged fear and her framing its extremity in terms of what cannot be 
‘imagined’ by her listening audience. 
 The follow-up by ADAH to this self-selected turn comes after a 1-second pause 
(much like the 1.3 second pause in Extract 3.2), however; this response takes the form of a 
reformulation (Heritage, 1985) of previous content (lines 74, 75, and 77), rather than the 
clarification question found in extract 3.2. This reformulation is then overlapped at line 78 by 
AH, who makes an implicit resistance to this reformulation through her restatement of ‘fear’ 
(lines 78-9). 
 Though the scope of these three extracts is limited, it can be seen that in these 
instances a pattern does emerge through which these self-selected turns occur and are 
managed by the defendant. This is discussed in more depth below. 
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3.2.3 Summary 
 
These three extracts are admittedly limited in terms of frequency and length, and cannot at 
this stage be deemed a generalizable pattern beyond the scope of this particular defendant’s 
testimony. Comparisons with the trial of the other defendant cannot be made within this 
thesis as the other defendant did not take the stand. Nevertheless, these occurrences, though 
particular only to this testimony, do demonstrate an emerging formulaic (linguistic) approach 
taken by the defendant when faced with some instances of marked pauses and where a receipt 
token has not been received from the prosecuting attorney. As put forward by Heritage 
(1985), third turn receipt tokens within a courtroom are not common. This contrasts with 
settings such as radio interviews, where there is an audible acknowledgement when receiving 
‘news’ (which in this case takes the form of testimony) (Ibid). 
 That the defendant self-selects in each of these instances is also marked, however; the 
reasoning behind these self-selections would be speculative as there is not enough evidence 
within the data to put forward a viable hypothesis. That being said, the role of the overhearing 
audience and the silent participants (Heritage, 1985; Carter, 2011) should also be raised when 
discussing the orientation to turns within the courtroom. The questioning prosecutor does not 
censure the defendant for self-selecting in any of these extracts and makes no obvious attempt 
to prevent her from adding to her testimony, despite the question having already received a 
response. 
That there is an agenda for each of the participants cannot be dismissed at the micro-
level and can be argued as oriented to; particularly if extract 3.3 is cited as evidence, where 
the self-selected turn is challenged by the prosecution using a reformulation of previous 
content provided by the defendant (for example, ‘the fear you were under was that the boat 
would tip over’, lines 74-5). These turns occur with the full awareness of the interlocutors 
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that the main audience to receive their content is the jury. In addition to the jury is also the 
audience in the form of news media, as the video camera situated at the back of the room also 
represents the viewing audience of the general public. As the jury make the decision 
concerning the liberty of the defendant, the general public in this instance could be 
considered the less important of the two; nevertheless, the existence of both audiences should 
be given due consideration. The jury are not active participants within this interaction and 
have no ‘voice’ of their own (with the judge ensuring that evidence is clarified for the jury 
through his own questions should the need arise). However; in accord with Carter (2011) and 
her discussion of police interviews and the role of the tape, the presence of the jury is a 
constant undercurrent within the courtroom. Consequently, the voluntary presentation of 
additional testimony, whilst addressed to the prosecution, is arguably directed at the jurors. 
Therefore, although the jury do not actively contribute to the proceedings vocally, they do 
provide an important contextual influence in shaping proceedings. In this sense they could be 
argued to be ‘actively observing’ the interactions up until the point of judgement: the only 
point at which the jury are seen to vocally partake in proceedings within the courtroom. 
Taken in this light, the elaborative form these turns take and the information they 
supplied could be viewed as an attempt at additional clarification for the jury and a response 
to the pause following the previous turn. According to Eades (2004; 1996) and her research 
concerning Aboriginal uses of silence, such pauses are not handled by everyone in a uniform 
manner and can provoke different responses depending on cultural influences2. For Eades’ 
research, silence as used by Aboriginal communities was not deemed uncomfortable but 
allowed space for formulating responses. This contrasted with the perception of 
                                                          
2 The term ‘culture’ in this instance is used in a broad sense with a nonessentialist view to include various 
social and ideological influences that can influence one’s perception of accepted norms within a given setting, 
such as use of silence (ref). For this study, therefore, although Eades (ref) focusses on the use of silence in 
Aboriginal communities, it is acknowledged that perceptions may be influenced by more factors than 
belonging to a particular community. 
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white/Caucasian Australian lawyers, who deemed silence as indicative of lack of 
communication and resistance to questions (Eades, 1996). 
In the context of the self-selected elaborations made in this cross examination, if the 
pauses are considered a dispreferred response to the answers given as the second part of the 
question and answer adjacency pair, then the self-selection to continue could be an 
orientation to this contingency. In other words, there is potential to interpret the continuation 
of this turn as the respondent elaborating due to the lack of receipt from the questioner (in 
this case the cross-examining attorney) (Hepburn and Bolden, 2013; Pomerantz, 1984). 
That this self-selection also potentially breaks the established turn-taking system of 
the courtroom has been evidenced. However, this is not oriented to by the prosecution, who 
would have the authority to do so. The courtroom setting and its institutional rules are macro 
considerations; that they are not always oriented to discursively is of import to this 
discussion. This continues to build on Thornborrow’s (2002) discussion that institutional 
roles and the authority that they can bestow on an interlocutor are not necessarily a constant, 
manifest or oriented to in the negotiated discourse of interaction. 
This concept of negotiation within the cross-examination data of this trial is expanded 
upon in the following two sections, discussing how the defendant retains the floor within her 
testimony, and finally a detailed analysis of the final stages of the re-cross-examination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
3.3 Retaining the floor 
 
3.3.1 Background 
 
It has already been established that the question-answer format is a core aspect of eliciting 
testimony within the institutional setting of the courtroom. The testimony provided by 
witnesses (which can also include the victim and/or defendant) becomes part of the evidence 
provided to the jury that claims to support one ‘side’ or the other (though one would 
emphasise that this is not necessarily a clear dichotomy). It has also been established within 
this study that there are restrictions within this institutional setting in terms of how and what 
questions can be asked, and how they can be responded to. Part of these restrictions are put in 
place by the judge prior to the witness being questioned and in accordance with the rules of 
evidence (see 5.4 for a more detailed discussion of restrictions on narrative and testimony). 
These limitations can also be made obvious through objections raised by the opposing bench 
(which are then ruled on by the judge), and also through the active censure that an attorney 
deliver to a testifying witness should they breach the interactive norms of the courtroom 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979). 
 In the cross examination of Amanda Hayes, there is evidence which supports the 
expected censure that a witness can expect if violating one of these norms; however, this is 
not exclusively the case. As has been outlined above regarding the issue of self-selection, this 
section will expand upon this theme of violating institutional norms and present examples of 
the defendant both facing rebuke from the prosecution for speaking out of turn and examples 
of her retaining the floor, examining the manner in which these occur. 
Through these examples, this study puts forward that the Foucaultian concept of 
power relations is both relevant and demonstrable whilst drawing on concepts from micro-
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analysis. Power relations as being negotiated within interaction will be shown to be 
perceptible within these extracts, as is the act of resistance. As outlined in 1.4, the theory that 
power can only exist where there is resistance (Foucault, 1982) is a concept that becomes 
manifest within the data and, in the view of this study, is empirically observable within the 
interactions analysed below. It will be shown, through the following analysis and discussion, 
that although the theory of power relations is a macro- level concept, this does not result in its 
being incompatible with micro- level analysis. One can argue that the use of micro-analysis 
in these cases does not ascribe a pre-existing theory to the data, but instead provides evidence 
in support of this larger-scale concept through observable trends within the interactions 
themselves as they are oriented to by participants. 
 
 
3.3.2 Reasserting institutional norms 
 
In this section, extracts will be examined that focus on the performance of the prosecuting 
attorney’s institutional role and the manner in which the identity of and interactive norms 
expected within this setting by the witness become reinforced. There are three extracts that 
will be analysed demonstrating the forms this interaction took within the cross examination 
of Amanda Hayes. 
 
Extract 3.4 
 
21  ADAH  miss↑ ha:yes↑ (1.0) isn't↑ it↑ true (0.6) 
22    that when you were out in the boat↓ 
23    (1.1) that you were taking (0.3) laura 
24    ackerson's remains↓ and 
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25    [throwing them into (   ) wait to the-] 
26  AH  [ma'am i never saw anything  ] 
27  ADAH  (.) >wait to the end of my question 
28    please ma'am↓< (1.3) isn't it 
29    true (0.4) that you were taking laura 
30    ackerson's remains which included  
31    her torso (0.4) and her head (0.2) and parts 
32    of her leg↓ (.) and throwing them 
33    over the side of the boat↓ 
34  AH  again (.) i never saw any↑thing↑ (.) that 
35    was going on (.) behi:nd me 
 
In extract 3.4, Amanda Hayes is being questioned regarding the disposal of Laura 
Ackerson’s remains in a creek in Texas and the extent to which she was involved in that act. 
It can be seen in this extract that the initial point of deviation from the question-answer and 
turn-taking format occurs in lines 26 and 27 in the form of an interruption that results in an 
overlap with line 25. Leading up to this, ADAH begins the question at line 21. The delivery 
of the question over lines 21-5 is not fast-paced interaction, but includes several notable 
pauses. Particularly noticeable are the 1.0 second pause after ADAH addresses AH (‘miss 
hayes’) at line 21; the 0.6 second pause after the emphasised word ‘true’ (also at line 21); and 
the 1.1 second pause at line 23. These pauses slow the pace of delivering the question and 
AH overlaps with a response at line 26. The deviation from the expected turn-taking pattern 
occurs directly after the mention of the victim’s remains (line 24) and overlaps at the point in 
which ADAH reaches their disposal in the creek (‘throwing them into…’). AH’s attempt to 
gain the floor at line 26 is unsuccessful, as ADAH does not stop talking but instead requests 
that the defendant ‘wait to the end of [the] question’. This injunction is repeated twice, firstly 
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an aborted attempt during the overlap at line 25, and then repeated in a complete form at line 
27 after a micropause. 
In comparison with the slower pace of use when delivering the question, the request 
for AH to wait until the question is finished is delivered at a quicker rate (lines 27-8). This 
pace then slows again once questioning is resumed midway through line 28, though the pause 
lengths are no longer as pronounced as they were in the first question turn (lines 21-5). 
The response AH gives is in accordance with Atkinson and Drew’s (1979) 
observations of a tribunal. They noted that witnesses could see the direction of a particular 
line of questioning and attempted to take steps to pre-empt the question or mitigate its impact 
on their testimony. Here AH does not respond as to whether or not she was ‘taking laura 
ackerson’s remains and…’ (which is where the overlap occurs) but responds that she ‘never 
saw anything’. The word ‘saw’ is stressed in this initial attempt to respond at line 26 and 
without reference to the disposal of the remains, which was the question being posed by 
ADAH. 
The question is then repeated by ADAH in lines 28-33. However, the question is not 
directly restated in its initial form. Instead, it is reformulated and extended to include a more 
detailed – and graphic – description of the victim’s remains (‘which included her torso…’), 
with each named part being stressed. The word ‘throwing’ was a term from the initial 
question (line 25) and is used again (line 32); but instead of ‘throwing them into’, which was 
the point at which the question broke off at line 25, it now makes a completed turn in the 
form of ‘throwing them over the side of the boat’ (lines 32-3). This could be surmised to 
show a shift in the formulation of the question from where they are being thrown to 
(presumably, the creek), to where they are being thrown from (the boat). The use of the term 
‘throwing’ as a lexical choice should also be noted. This question is being delivered with the 
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jury as the main audience and the description of the alleged crime and the choice of words 
that are being utilised adds to the imagery being established by the prosecution. 
The second response turn delivered by AH in lines 34-5 is now in a completed form 
and restates ‘i never saw anything…’, but now includes the physical aspect of the answer in 
the form of her position in the boat (‘… that was going on behind me’). Though there is a 
limited amount of space in the boat (that the jury have seen previously as part of the evidence 
submitted in this case), this choice of words by AH could be argued to create a distance 
between the defendant and the alleged crime. Through claiming not being able to have seen 
the act as it was going on behind her, it could also be inferred that AH is answering the 
question regarding the physicality of whether or not she handled the human remains, as if she 
could not see them (they were behind her) how could she have handled them and participated 
in putting them in the creek? 
The censure faced by the defendant in this extract and the subsequent structure of the 
interaction is relevant as it shows what could be interpreted as an attempt at resistance by AH 
(her early response before the previous turn has finished). This is then oriented to by ADAH 
who, instead of allowing AH to have the floor, continues the overlap and then makes a 
request for AH to wait to speak. In this instance, ADAH reasserts her institutional role and 
authority, and AH also orients to this and does not attempt to retake the floor again until ‘her’ 
turn at lines 34-5. 
Another contextual point to be made here is taking this extract in relation to what has 
come previously. This takes place almost three minutes into the cross examination by ADAH. 
Directly before the sequence in which AH is censured for attempting to interject, a similar 
sequence occurs, but unfolds rather differently. 
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Extract 3.5 
 
1 ADAH  when you te↑stified when you talked 
2   (0.2) u:m↓ (0.4) on direct when you testified 
3   before this jury (0.5) earlier today 
4   you said it took a <really really 
5   long time> 
6   (0.7) 
7 AH  yes ma'am it [seem-] 
8 ADAH     [how- ] (0.2) >i'm sorry 
9   (.) go ahead< 
10 AH  it seemed like it took forever (.) 
11   yes ma'am it sure did 
12    (0.7) 
 
Placing the previous extract into sequence, AH has already been allowed the floor; however; 
the structure of this holds several distinct differences. When AH is allowed the floor, she is 
orienting to the previous turn as seeking confirmation, whereas ADAH begins an elaboration 
in the form of a direct question at line 8 (‘how’). ADAH stops and gives the floor to AH at 
lines 8-9 (‘I’m sorry, go ahead’), allowing a full response before moving on. It could then be 
surmised that the censure in the following turn stems somewhat from how the floor is being 
managed. AH was allowed to interject previously, but is censured for doing so now. That 
being said, in extract 3.4 the question has not been fully asked, nor could it be inferred to 
have been so (in contrast to extract 3.5). 
 In both of these extracts, the authority of the lawyer is evidenced and adhered to. 
Whilst this might seem like common sense in the first instance, given the institutional roles 
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ascribed within these settings, there is more to be said regarding how these interactions 
unfold and the innate complexities within the entanglement of discourses. From a linguistic 
perspective, the disruption of the question and answer pattern is observable as being at the 
discretion of the lawyer, who determines whether or not the defendant can interject. In extract 
3.5, it can be seen that there is an acknowledgement of how the preceding turn at lines 1-5 
could be construed as seeking confirmation, particularly as there is a 0.7 second pause 
following this. This point is implicitly acceded when ADAH grants AH the floor and 
encourages her to finish her response. This contrasts with the censure at the initial extract, as 
the question is clearly unfinished, there is no preceding pause, and the overlap occurs in 
conjunction with the description of how the victim’s remains are believed to have been 
disposed of. 
 In furthering this analysis, several aspects of the interaction can be analysed through 
the Foucaultian lens. Firstly, the assertion or reassertion of institutional norms is taking place 
at the discretion of ADAH through the role of the questioning lawyer. There is no apparent 
deviation perceived in her behaviour from the lack of interjection either by opposing counsel 
or the judge. It can be argued here that although AH both agrees and disagrees in her 
responses to questions, there remains an innate resistance throughout. This comes in several 
contextual forms that cannot truly be removed from interpreting the interaction. The agenda 
of the defendant is (obviously) different to that of the prosecution; thus even in matters where 
there is agreement (such as Amanda Hayes’ presence in the boat) there is still resistance in 
how that ‘fact’ is interpreted. For the narrative espoused by AH, there is fear and uncertainty. 
For the narrative of the prosecution, there is her presence in the boat as support for being a 
willing participant in the disposal of Laura Ackerson’s body3. 
                                                          
3 a more detailed discussion of narrative in this case can be found in Chapter 4. 
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This undercurrent cannot be divorced from interpreting the interactions as they 
unfold. The power relationship also fulfils the criteria as laid out by Foucault (1982). There is 
resistance and power existing simultaneously in both participants, and the presence of one is 
the prerequisite for the presence of the other. This both embodies and displays the power 
relationship between the defendant and the prosecution. Building on this, the state is 
embodied in the role of the prosecution in a particular form utilising particular discourses – 
these discourses not only inform the narrative of the prosecution in this case, but also how the 
institutional role itself is performed (Thornborrow, 2002). 
This discussion supports and builds on Thornborrow (2002) and Atkinson and Drew 
(1979), though in slightly different ways. In accordance with Thornborrow 2002), this 
displays a negotiated interaction that is in keeping with the Foucaultian concept of power 
relations outlined above (for a more detailed discussion see 1.4). It also shows an attempt at 
gaining discursive power by the defendant in extract 3.4, which is overruled by the 
institutional authority that is recognised within the role of the questioning and prosecuting 
attorney. This is subsequently oriented to by the defendant, rather than a further attempt to 
pre-empt the question and to resist the order of the question and answer format as applied 
within the courtroom. For Atkinson and Drew (1979), this also supports their findings 
regarding the order of proceedings and the turn-taking system utilised in courtroom settings. 
They also discussed how attempts to pre-empt the line of questioning can then be 
unsuccessful and difficult to implement, particularly as witnesses under cross-examination 
can be restricted in how they may respond (as can be seen in the above extract, the question is 
closed and does not invite a narrative response). 
Attempting to resist the question or providing an answer that can be considered non-
responsive is an aspect of interaction a witness can find themselves faced with in the 
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courtroom. This links with the next extract, below, in which the questioning attorney orients 
to the defendant’s response as inadequate. 
At this point in the cross-examination, Assistant District Attorney Holt is questioning 
the defendant about whether and in what way she asked a family member for help in the 
disposal of the victim’s remains after the Hayes’ had arrived in Texas. 
 
Extract 3.6 
 
89  ADAH  and (.) what did you ask her↓ 
90    (0.3) 
91  AH  u:m (0.5) basically what you've heard 
92    here (.) already↓ (.) just= 
93  ADAH  =no >what↑ did↑ you↑< ask↑ her↓= 
94  AH  =just it- w-we needed- i needed help 
95    (0.9) 
96  ADAH  °okay° (1.2) did you ask her (0.3) how do 
97    we get rid of a bo↑dy↓ 
98    (1.0) 
99  AH  u:m (.) i don't remember exactly the 
100    terminology↑ but basically↓= 
101   ADAH  =°okay°= 
102   AH  =that's the general 
103    (0.7) 
104    ADAH   and what did she tell you 
 
In this extract, the prosecuting attorney directly rejects a response given by Amanda Hayes. 
This is oriented to as a non-conforming response as the summary ‘basically what you’ve 
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heard already’ is not seen as adequately addressing the question ‘what did you ask’. As 
mentioned above, at this point, Amanda Hayes is being questioned regarding a conversation 
with a family member that she, Grant Hayes and the three children were visiting. In this 
conversation it is alleged that Amanda Hayes asked the family member questions regarding 
possible ways to dispose of human remains. Amanda Hayes’ could be argued to be hedging 
in this response as she does not provide a verbatim quotation; however, motivations behind 
this cannot be concluded. 
 AH’s attempt to summarise her response as ‘what you’ve already heard here’ (lines 
91-2) is met with a direct rejection (‘no’) and a direct repetition of the question from ADAH. 
The sequence from lines 92-4 is rather swift with latching (no discernible space) between the 
turns. ADAH’s repetition of the question is more emphasised in intonation, but delivered at a 
faster pace. This is something of a contrast with extract 3.4, where the question was expanded 
and elaborated during the repetition; however, this could be attributed to a potentially 
differing strategic function and the positioning of this question in the overall sequence. 
At line 94 AH performs a self-initiated self-repair in the form of ‘we needed- I needed 
help’, with the word ‘help’ emphasised. This response is not subject to censure and seems to 
be treated as adequate with the quiet ‘okay’ from ADAH. It should be noted that this 
response, although not directly oriented to as non-responsive or inadequate is subject to a 
follow-up closed question (lines 96-7). AH’s ability to resist answering the question or 
mitigate the potential damage that might be caused by answering is demonstrably limited in 
this extract. There is evidence of continued hedging in lines 99-102 by AH with ‘I don’t 
remember exactly the terminology, but basically’ and ‘that’s the general…’. This could be 
argued to be creating a distance between AH and the question, as there is no recycling of or 
engagement with terminology used by ADAH. 
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That being said, the assertion of institutional norms on the structure of the interaction 
is apparent, as is the epistemic positioning of ADAH in her role as having the ability to 
accept or reject an answer from the witness and determine whether or not it is adequate. The 
evidence of Foucaultian power relations as evidenced in these sequences maintains the 
accepted norm of the questioning lawyer as being in an institutional position of higher (legal) 
authority as sanctioned by the state. Though there is evidence of some limited resistance from 
AH, the floor is yielded to ADAH who has the accepted role of questioner (the role that also 
allows her to direct the topic and manage which answers are considered adequate). 
This section has focused on the assertion and reassertion of the norms of courtroom 
interaction. The selected extracts show that the expected pattern, previously established in 
courtroom interactions remains valid and current (Atkinson and Drew, 1979); however, as 
outlined above, this is not always the case, or uniform. The concept of resistance, in a more 
active form than has been shown in these extracts from the defendant and the circumstances 
in which this occurs, will be the main focus of the following section. 
 
 
3.3.3 Retaining the floor and resisting the question 
 
The focus of the previous section was on the maintenance and reinforcement of institutional 
norms in courtroom interactions. Specifically, extracts were shown that demonstrated the 
epistemic positioning of the lawyer as being able to determine the level of resistance that was 
acceptable and what responses could be censured as noncompliant with the question and 
answer format. This section will focus on instances where Amanda Hayes demonstrated 
resistance to a question (to varying degrees of ‘success’) and where she retained the floor. 
This is in line with Thornborrow’s (2002) theory regarding the discursive ability of an 
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interviewee to resist the institutional role of the interviewer. This section will also show how 
the defendant actively takes the floor from the cross-examining lawyer and is not necessarily 
censured or forced to desist from speaking (as was shown above in extract 3.4). Not only that, 
but there are also instances in which AH requests the floor and asks a question or makes a 
request of ADAH. This ‘flipped’ sequence, though infrequently occurring, creates an 
interesting shift in the dynamics of the interaction, as will also be explored throughout this 
section. 
 In the extract below, Amanda Hayes is being questioned regarding the disposal of 
Laura Ackerson’s remains in a creek in Texas. It was alleged that she was in the boat with 
Grant Hayes at the time and was working with him to conceal Laura Ackerson’s murder. 
  
Extract 3.7 
  
(Part of longer turn by AH) 
27  AH  that [is correct ] 
28 ADAH   [tell this jury] <right now> (0.4) what 
29    he was doing↓ 
30  AH  a- i'm pretty sure that they just heard me 
31    i a- i [knew what he was doing] 
32  ADAH     [i didn't hear you what] was he doing 
33    (1.9) 
34  AH  he was throw- he was getting rid of laura's 
35       bo↑dy↓ 
 
Firstly, this extract could easily be said to demonstrate the features outlined above 
regarding the reinforcement of institutional roles regarding ADAH; however, this extract also 
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shows direct resistance from AH in her response. To unpack this further, ADAH does not 
actually ask a question using a standard (question and answer) format (as has been previously 
established as the norm of interactions in this setting). Instead, a demand is made of the 
witness using direct and forcefully produced language. ‘Tell this jury’ is not a request or a 
question and the production of ‘right now’ is both slower in pace and stress occurs on each 
word. The 0.4 second pause adds emphasis to the turn, the latter half of which provides the 
context for the ‘telling’. This is an interesting extract as both sides could be argued to deviate 
(albeit briefly) from the established interactional norm. AH does not comply with this 
demand and produces resistance in attempting to undermine the need for it. No descriptive or 
narrative response is openly forthcoming. Lines 30-1 instead include two clauses, one of 
which attempts to negate the need for compliance and the second which produces a response 
to a different question. Looking at these two lines in more detail, the initial resistance to the 
demand comes in the form of ‘I’m pretty sure they just heard me’, thus implying that 
repetition is unnecessary as the ‘question’ has already been answered. This could also be 
viewed as an implicit criticism, as if the question has been answered, further repetition would 
arguably be redundant. The second half simultaneously produces both distance from the act 
(of disposing of the victim’s remains) and addresses a slightly different point, the defendant’s 
knowledge of the act. Though this is the same topic, the question being answered produces 
almost a ‘stepwise’ shift (Jefferson, 1984) in terms of perspective ‘I knew what he was 
doing’. The act of disposal is consequently indirectly addressed whilst simultaneously being 
treated as both removed from the defendant and as a matter having already been covered 
(thus negating the need to discuss it further). In terms of nonverbal aspects that are relevant to 
this analysis, it should be noted that throughout this extract AH is the only person visible in 
the camera angle (with ADAH being off screen, and the jury never being filmed throughout 
the trial). From other views of the courtroom layout and awareness of where people are 
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positioned, however, it is worth noting that during this response where the jury are directly 
referred to in lines 30-1 (‘they’) AH moves her gaze between ADAH and the jury. Her gaze 
has shifted to the jury as she states ‘I knew what’, but moves back to ADAH as she finishes 
the statement (‘he was doing’). This nonverbal interaction can also be viewed as indicative of 
the continued awareness of the importance of the jury in these proceedings and as overtly 
including them in the her response – even if it does not directly conform with the demand 
made by ADAH. 
The positioning of this resistance is interesting in that it also follows from the 
prosecution breaking the question and answer pattern. In terms of sequencing, the lawyer-
witness pattern is not disrupted, but the overall pattern of question and response is. The 
prosecution orients to this resistance by reproducing the original demand in the form of a 
WH- question at line 32. This also overlaps with AH’s second clause regarding knowing 
‘what he was doing’. The production of this question also includes what could be argued to 
be an implicit reinforcement regarding the relevance of the question (‘I didn’t hear you’). 
This repositions the intended ‘hearer’ from the jury to ADAH, since the original focus was 
‘tell this jury right now’, even though the jury will still hear the response and are arguably 
who the response will be designed for. The rephrasing of the demand into a WH- question 
also reasserts the normative pattern of the interaction – a question requires a response. This 
re-establishment of the question-answer sequence (and reassertion of relevance) is oriented to 
by the defendant, though this takes place after a somewhat pronounced 1.9 second pause. 
The following ‘answer’ no longer contains resistance to the question, but comes in the 
form of ‘he was throw- he was getting rid of Laura’s body’ at lines 34-5. It is important to 
note here that this response also contains a self-initiated self-repair. The word ‘throw-’ could 
be heard to be an incomplete form of ‘throwing’. It cannot be said with certainty what would 
have followed, but it can be reasonably surmised from the context of the interaction and the 
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compliant response to the question at this point that there would have been a reference to the 
victim’s remains being placed into the creek. The change occurs midway through ‘throwing’ 
and repairs to ‘getting rid of’. This could be argued to display an awareness by the defendant 
of perceptions surrounding certain words. For example, ‘throwing’ someone’s remains 
anywhere could resonate rather poorly with the jury, whether or not there is a distance created 
through the description of the act as being committed by a non-present third party (‘he’ being 
Grant Hayes in this sequence). An additional interpretation of this repair could also refer to 
the position being taken by the defendant in the wider context as not having seen what was 
happening. To use the verb ‘throw’ could lead to an inference that the action itself was 
viewed, but to be aware of something being ‘[gotten] rid of’ could arguably imply knowledge 
without the potential for a simultaneous implication of having witnessed the act. 
Also of note is that this small sequence is orienting to the alleged acts of Grant Hayes 
and not those of the defendant, including the turn which precedes AH’s resistance. The 
defendant re-establishes her knowledge of ‘what he was doing’, but produces both resistance 
and distance when pressed to verbalise this. This leads to an implication of image 
management and the overt relevance of the jury as the final arbiters in assessing the guilt of 
the defendant. 
The importance of the jury and their role in proceedings is also overt and explicit in 
this sequence. They are made directly relevant in the proceedings despite having no 
reciprocal role in the interaction. They are not directly addressed, but are made relevant 
through the language used. For example, as outlined above, the demand states ‘tell this jury’ 
(line 28). The response to the demand in lines 30-1 is addressed to ADAH but again is 
arguably designed for the jury (‘they’), as well as the restatement regarding AH’s knowledge 
of events. The response in lines 34-5 once the demand has been rephrased into a question is 
again made to ADAH but is arguably designed for the jury, including the repair outlined 
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above in line 34. The shift in line 32 from the jury to ADAH (‘I’) provides a contextually 
reinforced relevance for the question, but does not detract from the importance or role of the 
silent participants, the jury. In having the jury overtly mentioned, it could be argued that there 
is an implication of a three-party interaction, even though only two of the participants engage 
verbally and overtly. The participants themselves make the jury relevant by orienting to their 
place within the interaction and their institutional role as decision-makers regarding Amanda 
Hayes’ guilt or otherwise. 
 Though a short extract, this sequence below shows the complexities of resistance, 
sequencing, and image management through word choice. The following extract will again 
have a focus on resistance, but will also examine the concept of ‘holding the floor’ (Goffman, 
1981) and its influence on the sequence and overall segment of interaction. 
 
Extract 3.8 
 
20 ADAH >but your testimony is that you were 
21  the one that was the↑re↓ (0.3) all after- 
22  all all these days (0.2) 
23  [during the day (you said you were there)<] 
24 AH [i- i was gone thursday] 
25  i don't know if they came↑ (0.4) honestly 
26  it just neve:r we never had i- (0.4) 
27  conversation about it again↓ so↓ 
28 ADAH °okay°  [the (maintenance) ] 
29 AH   [WHIle i↑ was there:] the 
30  maintenance people did not come= 
31  =that is correct↓ 
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In this extract, the topic under discussion is the amount of time Amanda Hayes was 
present in the apartment during the week of Laura’s demise and (subsequent) 
‘disappearance’. The issue under dispute is the bathroom that is claimed to have been out of 
use and that Amanda alleges she did not enter (it being primarily used by Grant and his two 
sons while she used a separate bathroom). The relevance of this bathroom is that it is implied 
to be a location where the victim’s body was at least stored. It should be noted that in the 
course of both trials the exact details of what occurred in the apartment remain circumstantial 
and thus am matter of conjecture, with the only established fact from both defendants being 
that somehow Laura died there. The bathroom needed repairs from maintenance staff and 
there is an attempt to establish whether they came to the apartment. Amanda claims that they 
did not come to the best of her knowledge. The prosecution is attempting to challenge this 
based on her prior testimony. 
During this sequence an overlap occurs at lines 23 and 24. This comes after a 0.2 
second pause that could be viewed as a point where the question turn was perceived to have 
finished and AH began the response. AH is not censured for the overlap (which is something 
that has been shown to have occurred during her cross examination) and retains the floor to 
finish her response. Her response is acknowledged (‘okay’) at line 28, but at this point 
another overlap occurs. ADAH begins her next turn in the sequence after giving this receipt 
token, and although AH ends on the word ‘so’ in her previous turn, this is oriented to by 
ADAH as a full response to the previous turn. The intonation in the use of ‘so’ here is 
marked, as volume decreases along with a downwards intonation. Though the use of ‘so’ 
itself could indicate a potentially unfinished turn, these prosodic features are identified as 
indicators of turn completion even where grammatical completion is absent, which is the way 
in which the talk is then oriented to by ADAH, with the previously indicated receipt token 
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(‘okay’) (Liddicoat, 2011; Walker, 2013).  The overlap at 28 shows ADAH begin a new turn, 
whereas AH in 29 re-enters with a loud and emphasised elaboration of her previous turn’s 
content (‘while I was there’). Interestingly, ADAH yields the floor to AH and allows her to 
continue, rather than asserting the speakership rights of her institutional role. It should be 
noted that although this study does not wish to make claims beyond those which can be 
illustrated through the data, the ability of ADAH to choose whether or not to exercise the 
‘rules’ of interaction in this setting does present a complicated relationship between the 
sequencing of the interaction and the choices that are made by AH and ADAH in whether or 
not to take, allow the other to take, or attempt to maintain the floor and balancing these with 
the overall narrative each side wishes to present regarding the events surrounding Laura 
Ackerson’s death. 
In lines 29-31 AH establishes her testimony as being ‘while I was there the 
maintenance people did not come’. This allows for the time she was present in the apartment, 
but also incorporates her testimony on line 24 (‘I was gone Thursday’) whereby she asserts 
that she was not always present in the apartment on ‘all these days’. The latching between 
lines 30 and 31 is relevant as there is no natural pause between the statement and the phrase 
‘that is correct’. This implies a response to the question, but AH has discursively reframed 
the question in her response so as to incorporate any absences from the apartment. 
This demonstrates a discursive capacity by AH to exert a certain (albeit limited) 
amount of independence in presenting her version of the events without conforming to the 
narrative put forward by the prosecution or being viewed as nonresponsive. 
Another example of this discursive capacity can be seen in the following extract. 
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Extract 3.9 
 
102 ADAH  and that was prior to: you getting 
103   any discovery or any information 
104   prior to the police↑ department even 
105   knowing about the saw↓ 
106   (0.9) 
107 AH  um (0.4) i-i- (0.5) yes it was before i: got 
108   any discovery that's correct↓ 
 
 This (very short) sequence also exemplifies an instance where the reformulation of the 
previous turn is not made by the prosecution, but by the defendant. The question put forward 
by ADAH is that AH had knowledge regarding the saw that is believed to have been used to 
dismember Laura Ackerson’s body before either discovery (where information is shared 
between the prosecution and the defence) or before the police department knew about it. 
 AH only addresses one of the clauses in this question, that of discovery, but does not 
include or acknowledge the reference to the police department. In line 108 there is again the 
use of ‘that is correct’, which could be argued to explicitly state compliance with the question 
and formulates agreement; however, this is conditional agreement at a discursive level. The 
issue of discovery is explicitly referred to and the issue of the police department is not 
included, yet the use of ‘that’s correct’ displays AH as conforming to the norms of interaction 
(responding to the question) and yet also includes a certain amount of mitigation (it is not 
established whether or not this was before the police department knew about the saw). Also 
of note is that this is not oriented to as inadequate or nonresponsive by ADAH. 
 The use of agreement whilst still forming responses that are selective in the aspects of 
the question they address leads to the final extract of this section, below, which shows both 
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the use of agreement (potentially indicative of compliance) and a disruption in the question 
and answer format that has been reviewed to this point. 
 
Extract 3.10 
 
62  ADAH  and you asked for her help 
63    to help get rid of laura's remains↓ 
64    (1.0) 
65  AH   u:m yes ma'am=can i explain↑ 
66    (1.1) 
67  ADAH  sure↑ 
68  AH   um i was doing that because (0.5) grant 
69    (0.6) told me to tell her that↓ (.) it 
70    was not my idea to tell her↑ it 
71    was his idea for me to tell her and 
72    WHat to tell her .hh because um 
73    he felt like that was that was the 
74    only way she was going to help us 
75    .hh and at that point that was the 
76        only (0.5) solution he had↓ 
 
 In this extract the prosecution is questioning the defendant about a request she is 
alleged to have made to a family member concerning the disposal of Laura Ackerson’s 
remains. Contextually, this is the same family member referred to in extract 3.6. 
 It can be seen that the word ‘help’ is stressed by ADAH on line 62 and is repeated 
during the formulation of this question. This question is (again) closed and invites a 
confirmation (or denial). There is a 1-second pause before AH answers, which could be 
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indicative of a dispreferred response (especially given that the response is a confirmation). 
What is particularly worthy of note here, is that the agreement is latched to a request (‘can I 
explain’ in line 65). The use of ‘latching’ here has been utilised to describe this turn as there 
is no observable space between the ‘yes ma’am’ and request, with the response and follow-up 
request being spoken together as part of a single sequence. This disrupts the question and 
answer pattern that has been established and reinforced through the institutional setting, as 
AH is making a request of the prosecution. This is followed by a 1.1 second pause. It should 
be noted that this could lend itself to potentially being over-interpreted by the researcher, as 
there are various possible reasons as to why this delay occurred (for example, it could 
indicate a dispreferred response, surprise or both inter alia). If we examine the following 
response in line 67 (‘sure’), the word is stressed and has a rising intonation. This could be 
interpreted as an indication of surprise or that the response was unexpected. That being said, 
the request is also allowed. 
 The following turn shown in the above extract from lines 68-76 is an explanation by 
AH regarding why she asked a family member for help. The turn itself is rather long and 
contains a number of interesting clauses. The way AH positions herself within this turn is to 
place herself in contrast to Grant Hayes. This is done directly (‘I was doing that because 
Grant told me to tell her that’) and phrased in more than one way (‘it was not my idea to tell 
her, it was his idea for me to tell her and what to tell her’). Though AH admits that she did 
make the request, she uses the following turn (allowed at the discretion of the prosecution) to 
elaborate on the context of the request. Grant Hayes’ (GH) role is oriented to and made 
relevant in this turn, though it should also be pointed out that this takes the form of a (rather 
brief) narrative, where the implications of the question (AH asking for help in disposing of a 
body) are countered by a fuller description and reasoning from AH’s version of events. AH 
also provides a rationale for why she claims GH had her make the request, as can be seen at 
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lines 73-76 (‘... he felt like that was the only way she was going to help us… that was the 
only solution he had’). It is interesting to note that AH uses the word ‘he’ at line 76, rather 
than ‘we’, thus creating further distance between herself and the events under discussion. 
 Though reasons as to why the family member might not have been willing to help 
Grant Hayes have been mentioned previously at various points in the trial, they are not 
explicitly oriented to in this extract. 
 This leads to the summarising discussion for this section, before progressing to a 
detailed analysis of the final 2.5 minutes of Amanda Hayes’ cross examination. 
 
3.3.4 Section summary 
 
This section has examined AH’s ability to resist the question and retain the floor. Throughout 
this it has been shown that the witness has the ability to retain the floor and reframe the 
question despite being in a restrictive interactional setting. Although AH remained in a 
position where there was the risk of censure for noncompliance with institutional norms, she 
demonstrated an ability to, both linguistically and epistemically, adjust her position during 
questioning. The impact of success of this is not measured by this study, but the extent to 
which it was employed and the devices used are of primary import to the aims of this 
analysis. 
 As shown above in 3.3.2, the institutional norms of courtroom interaction conformed 
to the general image of trial proceedings whereby a question is asked by the lawyer and the 
witness answers. This implicit concept within this is that power is ‘held’ by the questioner 
and the witness is in a weaker position to assert their views and form their responses. This 
was shown through the active censure that AH received when the institutional norms were 
reasserted; however, the inconsistency within this was also highlighted in extract 3.10, where 
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it was shown that the ability to interject was allowed. AH was permitted to continue talking 
in a recent prior turn, but was actively censured for a similar infraction shortly afterwards. 
This arguably falls under perception regarding the question and answer process (as outlined 
above), nevertheless, the ability to allow or restrict the turns of the witness remains with the 
role of the prosecution. 
 Despite these findings regarding the assertion of institutional norms, this section 
highlighted three main strategies that were employed in resisting the question or gaining the 
floor. 
Firstly: 
 the ability of the defendant to hold the floor. 
This was demonstrated using extracts 3.8 and 3.9. These showed that although the defendant 
was overlapping with the prosecution and was not necessarily in an institutional position to 
take the floor, she continued to elaborate on her answers and the prosecution gave way. That 
being said, although she resisted the demand made in Extract 3.7, she did still have to answer 
the question in a more detailed manner (as will be addressed below in more detail). 
 Secondly: 
 AH demonstrated an ability to reframe her responses in that they were not addressed 
as being noncompliant, but did not necessarily answer the entire question. 
The use of ‘that’s correct’ could be inferred to have also had a limited impact on follow-up 
questions, particularly regarding extract 3.9, where only one aspect of this question was 
addressed, but this omission was not actively pursued. 
 Finally: 
 the use of questions by the defendant was demonstrated. 
Though again limited in frequency, this is of particular importance given its reversal of the 
interactional norms of this environment. By requesting the opportunity to expand upon an 
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answer, AH is volunteering to give additional information. As a defendant, this could be 
viewed as something of a risk given the limitations of witnesses to refute reformulations by 
the opposing counsel. That the request was unexpected can be surmised from the response of 
ADAH. The concept if image management and the presence of the jury have also been 
highlighted as factors within this interaction, and will be expanded upon below in Sections 
3.4 and 3.5. 
 Having outlined the three core findings within this section, these link with the 
following examination, which provides a detailed analysis of a longer section from Amanda 
Hayes’ cross examination. 
 
 
3.4 A detailed analysis of the final stages of re-cross examination 
 
Although aspects of this have been discussed above, this final sequence of Amanda Hayes’ 
cross examination will now be discussed as a discrete section. Several overarching themes 
have been discussed in detail from throughout this cross examination, however, the final 
aspects of the defendant’s time in the stand are important to unpack in detail as they not only 
contain elements previously outlined, but are also representative of the final minutes that the 
jury saw the defendant speak on her own behalf (for the full, uninterrupted transcript of this 
section, please see Appendix A). 
Relating this back to the concept of the state and the individual, in this the attorney is 
an interlocutor acting on behalf of the ‘state’ (whilst still acknowledging the inherent 
complexities of this term) and the individual is in the form of the defendant, who is 
witnessing on her own behalf. Within this, one will also see the both the co-construction of 
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conflicting narratives within the questions and answer sequences below, as well as the 
epistemic positions taken by the participants within their turns at talk. 
 In the final two and a half minutes, Amanda Hayes and ADA Holt are in the process 
of re-cross examination. In terms of the broader process this means that Amanda Hayes was 
on the stand over the course of two days and has been questioned by her attorney (direct 
examination; first day), by ADA Holt (cross examination; first day and second day), again by 
her own attorney in response to the cross examination (re-direct; second day), and is now 
being questioned again by ADA Holt (re-cross examination; second day). The judge has 
placed limitations on the re-cross examination, in that ADA Holt has been instructed to only 
ask questions based on the re-direct (that day), and not based on the previous day’s direct 
examination testimony. 
 ADA Holt is questioning Amanda Hayes again regarding the night Laura Ackerson’s 
remains were disposed of in Oyster Creek, Texas.  
 
Extract 3.11 
 
1 ADAH  mr gaskins just ask you about↓ (1.1) 
2   the bo:at↓ (1.0) and that night on the boat 
3   and what you testified when he asked 
4   you this time (0.6) was that i knew what 
5   grant was do:ing↓ 
6 AH  that's correct 
7 ADAH  °okay° that's not what you said (0.6) on cross 
8   examination yesterday↓ 
9 AH  no ma'[am    ] 
10 ADAH       [yester]day it was you were in 
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11   your own world and you were listening to 
12   the ani↑mals↓ looking towards the back of 
13   the boat (0.3) bailing out having no idea what 
14   was in the boat or what grant hayes was 
15   doing↓ 
16 AH  i never said i had no idea what he was 
17   doing↓ (.) that's incorrect= 
18 ADAH  =>what did you  [tell=] 
19 AH      [i ] 
20 ADAH        =the jury yesterday 
21   about what he was doing< 
22 AH  i said that i was facing the other direction 
23   that i didn't see anything .hh and i did not 
24   touch anything in regards to what he was doing 
25   .hh i didn't say i didn't know what he was 
26   doing i (.) absolutely knew what he was doing (0.3) 
27   that [is correct ] 
28 ADAH    [tell this jury] <right now> (0.4) what he was 
29   doing↓ 
30 AH  a- i'm pretty sure that they just heard me 
31   i a- i  [knew what he was doing] 
32 ADAH    [i didn't hear you what] was he doing 
33   (1.9) 
34 AH  he was throw- he was getting rid of laura's 
35    hbo↑dy↓ 
 
The data in this extract displays a number of engaging interactional features. Firstly, as was 
indicated above, the questioning is limited to what has been discussed that day. ADAH 
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however, discusses the previous day’s testimony but places it in relation to the testimony AH 
has given in her re-direct (lines 1-10). The contrast presents an interesting exchange, as AH 
enters at line 9 with ‘no ma’am’ but the negative appears ambiguous. Clarification is not 
received until line 16, when AH explicitly states that the version of her testimony presented 
by ADAH is ‘incorrect’. The matter under contention is whether or not AH knew that Laura 
Ackerson’s body was being placed in the creek while she was present on the boat with Grant 
Hayes. AH admits that she knew what was happening, but was not taking part in the actual 
disposal. 
 Another feature of this segment is that there is no WH- question until line 18. The 
first three turns from ADAH are oriented to as clarification questions by the defendant, but 
there is no direct invitation for a response until line 21 with the completion of the question 
‘what did you tell the jury yesterday about what he was doing’. AH appears to attempt to gain 
the floor at line 9, but the ‘no ma’am’ remains ambiguous with no additional expansion as 
ADAH orients to that as a complete response in line 10, overlapping with the second half of 
‘ma’am’ and elaborating on her previous statement. The first WH- question in this segment 
occurring at line 18 and is phrased as an open question, inviting the defendant to repeat what 
she told the jury yesterday. In completion of this question-answer pairing, AH is then allowed 
to give a fully elaborated response. This response also links back to the previous discussion 
regarding AH’s positioning of herself as being compliant with the prosecution. The response 
in lines 22-27 sees AH place stress on the senses that were not engaged. She claims to have 
not ‘seen’ or ‘touch[ed]’ anything, but agrees that she knew Laura’s remains were being 
disposed of. This places her in an epistemic position in which she is the authority regarding 
the events of that night. 
AH admits to having been present, but creates a contrasting distinction between her 
actions and involvement in the events of that night versus her knowledge. This segment is 
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concluded with ‘that is correct’, which is overlapped by ADAH. There are two primary 
interpretations of ‘that is correct’. The first can be viewed in terms of positioning theory 
(Benwell and Stokoe, 2006), as AH – having redefined the narrative of that night in terms of 
what she knew, rather than what she was doing – could be viewed as placing herself in 
accordance with the prosecution. Another possible interpretation could be that this statement 
is not placing AH in agreement with the prosecution, but is remarking that this amended 
version of events is correct (in contrast to the version put forward earlier). The act of disposal 
is not articulated by the defendant in this response, but is framed in terms of ‘what he was 
doing’ (this being the alleged actions of Grant Hayes). 
The final section of this segment has been explored in detail previously (see extract 
3.7). In addition to the above remarks on this, it is worth indicating that even when placed in 
situ within the larger interaction, the orientation towards the demand at line 28 and the 
reformulation as a WH- question at line 32 displays not only resistance from the defendant in 
articulating the fate of the victim’s body, but is a question that appears to arise from a lack of 
articulation in lines 22-27. As shall be shown below, this also feeds into a larger chain of 
questions from the prosecution regarding this particular act. 
 
Extract 3.12 
 
32 ADAH    [i didn't hear you what] was he doing 
33   (1.9) 
34 AH  he was throw- he was getting rid of laura's 
35   hbo↑dy↓ 
36 ADAH  okay and how was he doing that↓ 
37 AH  i'm assuming he was putting it in the water 
38 ADAH  °okay° <could you hear the spla:sh as her head 
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39   went into the water↓> 
40   (1.6) 
41 AH  .hh again i heard lots of things i heard (0.7) 
42   splashing noises i heard animals i heard lots 
43   of animals .hh [i was    ] 
44 ADAH       [what kind of ] animals did 
45   you he↑ar↓ 
46 AH  i don't know what kind of animals they were↑ 
47   i was- (.) i (0.5) have no idea 
48 ADAH  so what you↑ recall about that boat trip 
49   (1.3) is that there were splashing noises and 
50   you heard animals and you were bai:ling (0.8)  
51   the boat↓ 
52 AH  that's correct and i was trying to keep the 
53   wa- the boat from going into the grassy areas↓ 
54 ADAH  and why was th↑at↓ 
55 AH  because i didn't know what was in the 
56    grassy areas 
 
 It is worth noting that there is a 1.6 second pause following ADAH’s follow-up 
question at lines 38-9. Again, this could be indicative of a dispreferred response (Raymond, 
2003), and it is also followed by hedging from the defendant with the response remaining 
rather vague and undefined (‘I heard lots of things… I heard lots of animals’). This is in line 
with other research (Matoesian, 2005; 2001) regarding the importance to attorneys of ‘nailing 
down’ a response from witnesses during testimony. Nevertheless, one potential difficulty in 
this (both in more general terms and regarding these proceedings specifically) is the time 
lapse between when events take place and the actual trial, particularly as regards memory. 
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Therefore, whilst in interactional terms this response could be viewed as dispreferred by the 
defendant, the delay and inability to recall specifics could also be linked with the long period 
of time between the act and (the high-stakes environment of) the trial. 
 Further to this, in analysing ADAH’s question at lines 38-9, this is again rather 
detailed and graphic. The specific references to the victim’s head and whether or not it made 
any noise going into the creek are again arguably designed for the jury rather than the 
defendant. The position of AH throughout this testimony has been that she had her back to 
the proceedings, it is therefore unlikely that a response to this question would come in the 
form of a confirmation. At this point, the design of the question and the purpose it serves 
becomes part of a broader overall view of the prosecution’s narrative as well as being a 
linguistically relevant aspect of micro-based interactions. 
Again, this is the last 2.5 minutes of the cross examination, after which AH will leave 
the stand. In discussing this matter, the prosecution has linked the final aspects of cross 
examination with the topic that they opened with at the start of cross examination the 
previous day. An image of resistance to the question could be said to be implied by the 
prosecution as there is a push for specifics, such as ‘what kind of animals’ there were. The 
lack of forthcoming detail is also summarised by ADAH for the jury into three main aspects 
(‘splashing noises’, ‘animals’, and ‘bailing the boat’). As this summary occurs so close to the 
description of Laura Ackerson’s head (within three related questions), it could be inferred 
that AH’s concerns are placed in direct contrast with what is being done to the victim’s 
remains. 
At lines 43-7 AH makes two attempts to formulate a response using ‘I was’. The first 
instance at line 43, this is not completed as it comes in an overlap with ADAH’s question at 
line 44. The second occurrence comes at line 47. ADAH orients to AH’s response at line 43 
as complete with ‘I heard lots of animals’, and overlaps with the first ‘I was’ from AH asking 
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about the animals she heard. When AH responds to this question, she states ‘I don’t know 
what kind of animals they were. I was- (.) I (0.5) have no idea’. This second use of ‘I was’ is 
again aborted and there is no further elaboration given. AH restarts this response (‘I’), but 
pauses for 0.5 seconds before concluding with ‘have no idea’. The conclusion of this 
response also contains no new information and is not an elaboration on previous content, but 
restates the lack of knowledge regarding the specificity of noises made by local wildlife. 
The details of the events on the boat are made relevant by ADAH through her line of 
questioning; however, the questions ADAH asks are formed using the previous responses of 
AH. For example, the ‘splashing’, ‘animals’ and ‘bailing’ were words that ADAH 
reformulated that were taken from AH’s previous testimony. This recycling does not 
necessarily come from a directly previous turn, but does create a link between the responses 
and the chain of following questions. Another example of this can be seen in the following 
extract. 
 
Extract 3.13 
 
54 ADAH  and why was th↑at↓ 
55 AH  because i didn't know what was in the 
56   grassy areas 
57 ADAH  >°okay°< so you: during the time that you're 
58   out in the boat knowing that grant hayes 
59   is (1.0) taki:ng (0.9) laura ackerson's the 
60   pieces of her body and throwing them into the 
61   water >what you're concerned about is your o:wn 
62   safety< and the a:nimals that are in the 
63   water 
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64   (1.1) 
65 AH  i ↑am concerned about my safety i'm 
66   a-afraid he's gonna tip the boat over↑ 
67   we're gonna go ↑in the water i- i'm 
68   afraid of- for lots of things↓ 
69   (4.9) 
70 AH  i- i don't think you can imagine (.) the 
71   kind of fear that i was under↓ (0.5) i i 
72   honestly don't think you can imagine↓ 
73   (1.0) 
74 ADAH  the fear that you were under was that 
75   the boat would tip over= 
76 AH  .hh 
77 ADAH  =and the animal[s would hurt you (   )] 
78 AH       [i had lots and lots of] 
79   fear 
80   (1.7) 
81 ADAH  thank you i don't- °i don't have anything 
82   further↓ 
83   (0.6) 
84 JUD  >anything else< 
85 GAS  no further questions↓= 
86 JUD  =all right thank you↑ (0.2) thank you ma'am 
87   you may stand do↑wn↓ 
88 AH  °thank you° 
 
The use of the word ‘fear’ moves back and forth between ADAH and AH with both recycling 
the term. AH first uses the term on line 71, where is it emphasised as in her self-selected turn 
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(see section 3.2.2). This is then reused in line 74, in ADAH’s reformulation; and then used 
again by AH in line 79. Another interesting point regarding the terminology used is how 
‘concern’ appears to be refocused as being ‘afraid’ or ‘fear’. ADAH first brings in AH’s 
emotional state in this extract with the term ‘concerned’ at line 61. This is recycled by AH in 
line 65, but is supplied as part of her positioning herself in contrast with Grant Hayes (‘he’); 
thereby placing distance between herself and the victim. This is also another example of AH 
framing her response in compliance with ADAH (‘I am concerned about my safety’), but 
elaborating on this in a manner which appears to seek to mitigate the unfavourable 
comparison. This elaboration reframes being ‘concerned’ as being ‘afraid’, as can be seen in 
lines 65-6. This lexical alteration then becomes the reused term regarding AH’s emotional 
state until the end of questioning. 
 There has been some discussion regarding how AH is positioned within her 
responses, yet there is also scope to consider the wider implications of her position as a 
defendant; particularly as one giving testimony as a witness. AH is positioning herself in 
terms of her environment; with references to Grant Hayes and his actions, and to the physical 
environment of being on the creek at night. Conversely, ADAH is positioning AH in 
comparison with Laura Ackerson. As can be seen throughout the last three extracts (Extracts 
# - #), the broader view of this last section of questioning sees Laura Ackerson’s remains and 
their disposal placed in contrast with AH’s alleged fear. ADAH could be argued here to be 
taking an implied morally superior position, whereby the ‘fear’ of Amanda Hayes placed in 
contrast with the fate of Laura Ackerson becomes minimised, thus reducing the mitigation 
being sought through Amanda Hayes’ description of events. 
Amanda Hayes has an epistemic authority through being the person present at the 
time this event occurred, yet despite this she does not hold the floor to the extent seen in 
previous extracts. There is strong evidence of resistance (as has been discussed previously in 
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Section 3.3.3) and the use of self-selection remains of interest (see Section 3.2.2), yet despite 
this, the prosecution appears to maintain a moral standpoint and holds overall epistemic 
authority. The reuse of terms that have originated with Amanda Hayes’ testimony provide a 
lexical platform from which the reformulations of her statements could be argued to retain 
their legitimacy. Nevertheless, this linguistic feature appears to work both ways, in that 
Amanda Hayes also recycles terms that originate with the question from ADAH. She does 
not then provide a closed answer, but uses the elaborations to reframe the narrative (such as 
lines 65-8). In the broader picture, another point of interest is the vague aspect of Amanda 
Hayes’ responses. For example, as part of her defence’s version of events, Amanda Hayes is 
alleged to have been afraid for her safety and the safety of the children under her care. When 
fear is mentioned in the closing sequence of this cross examination, the allusion to what she 
is afraid of remains vague and unsubstantiated (such as lines 78-9, ‘I had lots and lots of 
fear’). This contrasts with the graphic imagery presented by the prosecution (such as the 
direct references to the victim’s head in lines 38-9). 
The position of the prosecution and the power relations being shown in this sequence 
are complicated as the macro and micro positions could be argued to exist simultaneously in 
a fluid and dynamic state. Whilst the prosecution maintains an overall position legal, and thus 
state, authority, AH exerts resistance and demonstrates an ability to disrupt the pattern of 
events, particularly through self-selection. Nevertheless, this contrasts with the vague claims 
made in her statements which are reformulated by the prosecution to present either an 
unfavourable comparison with the victim or an aspect of incredulity, potentially undermining 
the credibility of the statements without necessarily making this explicit. 
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3.5 Discussion 
 
Before embarking on a discussion of findings, the three core research questions that form this 
analysis are restated: 
 
1. In what particular ways do the state and the individual communicate with each other in 
the trials of Grant and Amanda Hayes? 
2. What functions do these patterns serve in these interactions (including the 
(co)construction of narrative and associated strategies)? 
3. How are power relations between the individual and the state established and 
represented in these interactions (including narrative (co)construction, subversion, 
statement interpretation, and (re)direction of subject matter)? 
 
This chapter has explored three aspects of the cross examination of Amanda Hayes. These 
aspects are the use of self-selection by the defendant during testimony; the ability of the 
defendant to retain the floor and resist the questions of the prosecution; and a detailed 
examination of the closing 2.5 minutes of Amanda Hayes time on the stand. This discussion 
seeks to draw these aspects of analysis together and to examine them in line with the three 
research questions that comprise the focus of this study. 
 In determining how the state communicates with individuals, it is necessary to define 
whether these roles are present, who maintains them and how they are enacted within this 
setting. As discussed in 1.2.2, the state is not viewed as an actual ‘thing’, but is a series of 
discourses that come together to form a particular formulation referred to as ‘the state’. 
Within court proceedings, ‘the state’ takes on several mantels. Firstly, the role of the 
prosecution is attributed to the state. Secondly, the state is also the term used to define the 
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geographical region of North Carolina as a state within the USA. Thirdly, the state is also the 
adjudicator in these proceedings through the role of the judge, whose duties include ensuring 
a fair trial and that the procedures of the court are followed in line with the law and prevailing 
legal discourse. In the extracts explored throughout this chapter, the state as prosecutor has 
been embodied in the institutional role of ADA Holt (Thornborrow, 2002). Although an 
individual, she represents the state’s case and throughout her questioning of Amanda Hayes 
inserts the presence of the victim, Laura Ackerson. This also puts forward the case of the 
prosecution as representing the victim, particularly as this is a homicide case and the victim 
has no voice of her own. That being said, this is in line with theories concerning the 
narratives of trials, as in criminal cases it is the prosecution and not the victim who determine 
the overall narrative of the case since the state is the prosecutor (not the victim or their estate) 
(Smith and Natalier, 2005). Consequently, in this particular instance, this study argues that 
even though the state is a series of interlinked discourses in a legal setting, the label of ‘state’ 
can be applied to the institutional role of the prosecutor and that ADA Holt is acting as an 
interlocutor personifying this role. 
 Amanda Hayes is the defendant in this case and is volunteering to testify on her own 
behalf. It should be noted here that she is under no obligation to speak in her own defence, as 
burden of proof rests on the prosecution and she has the ‘right to remain silent’ under 
American law. There can also be no inference of guilt had she chosen not to speak on her 
own behalf (as evidenced by the Grant Hayes case, in which he did not testify but no 
inference as to guilt can be drawn from exercising this right). In terms of Amanda Hayes’ 
role within these proceedings, there are various labels which can be attached to her position. 
She is an individual citizen who stands on trial for murder, this places her institutionally in 
the position of ‘the defendant’. She also testifies as a witness in her own trial (which she was 
not obliged to do), which places her as a witness providing evidence in the form of testimony. 
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In addressing the question of how the state communicates with individuals, it is the opinion 
of this study that although Amanda Hayes is in the dual role of both defendant and witness, 
she remains an individual communicating with the state. The rationale behind this approach is 
that she is not acting as a vehicle for an overarching body, but is speaking as a member of 
society in the witness stand (albeit in her own defence). 
 The question and answer format has been referenced throughout this chapter; 
however, it is significant beyond the micro analytical perspective as it provides constraints on 
how conflicting versions of events are presented to the jury. These overarching narratives 
maintain importance at the macro-level as they become competing discourses for the jury to 
consider. As discussed by Ferguson (1996), juries do not necessarily consider the evidentiary 
value of each individual piece of evidence, but are believed to consider overall narratives and 
how the evidence fits into the most ‘believable’ version of events. Even though the authorial 
voice of the narrative moves between ADA Holt and Amanda Hayes at various points 
throughout the cross examination, how that discourse is managed comes through the 
linguistic format of question and answer. The format within this trial is ultimately controlled 
by the state through the prosecution and legitimised legal process. This is not to say that the 
balance is automatically tilted away from the individual, as the direct examination allowed 
for the defendant to express her version with comparative freedom. Nevertheless, the means 
through which the state communicates with individuals comes through the fixed interactional 
rules of the courtroom as an institutional setting. 
 In determining the patterns of communication evident between the individual and the 
state, it has been shown throughout this chapter that this is not as obvious as might first be 
assumed. Although the question and answer format is the institutional norm, how this is 
implemented and the way in which both prosecutor and defendant interact show a more fluid 
and dynamic interaction. This analysis has shown that there is room within the format of 
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courtroom interactions for the defendant to take the floor and resist the question (and its 
implications). In this cross examination, it has been demonstrated that the defendant had the 
ability to reframe the question. This could be compared to the ability the prosecution has to 
reformulate the responses given by the defendant. Although the scope in which prosecution 
can reformulate a response is admittedly larger, the defendant showed a capacity for 
reframing the question, or her position within the question. This was shown in extract 3.9, 
lines 107-8, where the response only refers to the aspect of discovery and not that of the 
police department. An extension of the capacity to reframe the approach of the prosecution 
can also be seen in the detailed analysis of the final few minutes, as discussed above 
regarding lines 65-8, where being ‘concerned’ is reframed as being ‘afraid’ by the defendant. 
 These devices cast the question-answer format in an interesting light, particularly 
when addressing the Foucaultian concept of power relations. The authority imbued in the 
personification of the state is not fixed. The balance of power-knowledge shifts between the 
prosecution and defendant. This occurs as the defendant (acting as a witness in her own case) 
claims the epistemic authority to recount what occurred having admitted she was present at 
the time. This is evidenced through her denials of accusations concerning her own actions 
and the verbalisation of the very resistance that Foucault posits needs to exist as a 
prerequisite for the negotiation of a power relationship. That being said, one interesting factor 
is that although the defendant takes the position of having first-hand knowledge of events, 
this is not always employed. In fact, some responses are formed around explicitly stating 
what she did not witness. For example, she admits knowledge of Grant Hayes allegedly 
placing the victim’s remains into the creek but denies witnessing this due to her orientation 
and activities in the boat (which she claims do not involve directly handling the remains of 
Laura Ackerson). This could be linked with Matoesian’s (2003; 2001) discussion of the 
defendant taking the role of the expert witness. Although the Kennedy-Smith rape trial 
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proceedings were different in various ways, Matoesian’s discussion of the changes in role are 
highly relevant even when recontextualised. 
 To elucidate, in Matoesian’s examination, the witness was medically trained and 
could draw on that experience when delivering testimony and addressing the injuries of the 
complainant. This placed the lay witness in a position whereby he could deliver testimony 
drawing on knowledge that pertained to having expertise in the necessary field. This study 
puts forward that this principle can be expanded upon in terms of the epistemic positioning of 
the defendant when they take the stand. The defendant claims to have first-hand knowledge 
of certain events and how they unfolded, thereby placing them in the position of ‘expert’ 
regarding how the occurrences under discussion transpired. Therefore, during their testimony, 
the defendant has the ability to contextualise their narrative based on refuting the claims of 
the prosecution. The extent to which attempts to exercise this ability could be viewed as 
‘successful’ is another matter entirely and not within the purview of this research, as no 
claims are being made vis-à-vis how one could measure the ‘success’ of an interaction or 
whether this ability outweighs other factors apropos the trial process. Nevertheless, that the 
defendant can claim this position, even when placed in a restricted interactional event, adds 
further credence to the theory of negotiated interactions in both the assertion of power 
relations and in the implementation of power-knowledge. 
Moving forward with this view, this links with the observation above regarding the 
co-existence of multiple layers of power relations at the micro and macro level. At the macro 
level, the defendant is placed in a particular institutional role. This role comes with 
established norms and rules. In terms of physical positioning, when the defendant takes the 
stand she is also physically closer to the jury and this becomes the one point at which she can 
choose to interact with them – even if this is mediated and directed through her answering 
questioning from an attorney. The concept of involving the jury in testimony both verbally 
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and nonverbally was mentioned briefly above and will be expanded upon at this point. The 
rationale behind this is how the jury’s presence influences the creation and maintenance of 
power relations by both sides and is evidenced through their interactions. 
The prosecution directly invokes the presence of the jury when making the demand of 
the defendant in extract 3.7. Although this was used as a micro-level example of resistance, 
the broader impact of referring to the jury could be argued to produce a more layered impact. 
The setting of the trial and what is at stake (that being the liberty of the defendant) is also 
invoked through reference to this aspect of the courtroom process. In addition, through taking 
the stand all witnesses swear an oath to tell the truth. The impact this has on phrasing and 
lexical choices becomes paramount as part of the larger picture. This study would argue that 
in this instance, part of the invocation of the jury is to try and include them directly in the 
interaction. Through referencing their role, they are no longer being conceptualised as twelve 
individuals, but as a coherent body with a specific task. 
 In concluding this discussion, the roles of each of the participants may appear to be 
fixed, but are in actuality dynamic and shifting. The interactants are not limited to those with 
a verbal role (in this instance the prosecuting attorney and the defendant), but also encompass 
the jury and (although this aspect has not been the focus of this chapter) the wider viewing 
public both in the gallery and watching the trial through broadcast media. The concepts of 
having a rigid interactional structure and with it fixed power dynamics are also called into 
question. The evidence provided supports the idea that although the institutional roles do 
indeed provide constraints, there are linguistic devices that allow for these restrictions to be 
subverted, such as self-selection or the ability to retain the floor. Concepts of micro-analysis 
derived from conversation analysis would only focus on the narrower (language) context 
made evident within each turn; however, in courtroom proceedings this would not necessarily 
provide an informed analysis. The dual layer of courtroom proceedings has been shown to 
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reside in both the micro-level interaction, but also importantly, how these micro-level 
proceedings add to the larger image being constructed. If the larger agenda of the interactants 
is not incorporated into the analysis of the micro-level exchanges, then the full context in 
which events unfold could be missed within the analysis process. Although this study 
supports the concept of findings being data driven and does not intend to ascribe top-down 
approaches, within the courtroom context the ‘big picture’ is something that cannot be 
divorced from the micro-analysis, as, to borrow from the Foucaultian approach to power and 
resistance, both the big and smaller narratives are arguably necessary prerequisites for the 
existence of the other. 
 
 
3.6 Chapter summary 
 
To summarise, there are three main findings within this section: 
 
 Firstly, the use of self-selection by the defendant in an established question and 
answer setting. 
 Secondly, that the defendant takes and maintains the floor during her testimony; 
evidencing resistance to the question and using questions herself in order to expand 
on her own testimony. 
 Finally, that the defendant’s lexical decisions allow scope for reframing the question 
in terms of the defence narrative, even though this may not be a linguistic approach 
that has been previously trained. 
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As shown throughout this chapter and the discussion, these points address the research 
questions through: 
 showing the means through which the state and the individual communicate 
(primarily the use of the questions and answer format); 
 the patterns that are evident in these interactions (as highlighted above); 
 and dynamic nature of power relations in terms of the defendant’s ability to hold 
the floor and the circumstances under which this occurs (particularly that the role 
of power-knowledge becomes an intrinsic part of the proceedings and both the 
prosecution and the witness have the ability to reframe and reformulate the 
allegations being made). 
 
This chapter contributes to research in this field through the application of both micro- and 
macro- analysis using qualitative methods, in a homicide trial where the defendant has taken 
the stand. The methodological contribution is the continued expansion and exploration of 
mixed methods without finding that the two approaches contradict one another or are 
intrinsically incompatible. The use of a bottom-up, data-driven approach has evidenced 
linguistic features in this interaction of import – particularly when challenging the lay view of 
courtroom proceedings. These have, in turn, validated the sociological underpinnings of 
much criminological research, both in the field of forensic linguistics and within the broader 
spectrum of interdisciplinary criminological and legal research (Thornborrow, 2002; 
Matoesian, 2003; 2001; 1993, inter alia). 
Leading on from this and furthering this contribution, the following chapter shall 
discuss the opening statements used in both the trials of Grant and Amanda Hayes. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Opening Statements 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This section introduces the use of narrative in the opening statements of the trials of Grant 
and Amanda Hayes. In analysing the openings of both trials, the application of a seemingly 
coherent narrative structure is applied to the cases prior to the delivery of any evidence. 
However, by analysing these more closely, it is found that the narratives are not fixed and 
develop across both trials (for a methodological overview of narrative and its application in 
this process, see Section 4.1.1). In particular, the case of the state, whilst remaining similar 
throughout both trials, evolves and shifts with variation for each defendant and variations 
between each of the opening and closing remarks. 
 In analysing the opening and closing statements and how the narratives are used, it is 
important to fully understand the meaning of the criminal charges and their legal definitions; 
as these present the criteria to be fulfilled or refuted by the parties involved. In the trials of 
Grant and Amanda Hayes the primary charge by the state was first degree murder. In North 
Carolina, the criteria for first degree murder are outlined in State’s General Statues, Chapter 
14, subchapter III, Offenses against the person, §14-17. The main aspects to be considered 
here can be found in the following extract: 
 
§ 14-17.  Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment. 
(a) A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of a nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapon of mass destruction as defined in G.S. 14-288.21, poison, lying in wait, 
imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted 
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perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or 
other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be 
deemed to be murder in the first degree, a Class A felony, and any person who 
commits such murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment in the State's 
prison for life without parole as the court shall determine pursuant to G.S. 15A-
2000, except that any such person who was under 18 years of age at the time of the 
murder shall be punished in accordance with Part 2A of Article 81B of Chapter 
15A of the General Statutes. 
 
(Emphasis added) 
 
In committing an act of murder in the first degree one core element is that of premeditation, 
whereby the person committing the act planned to do so prior to the act taking place. The 
segments in bold-type are particularly salient when examining the narratives of the Hayes’ 
trials. Though more complex within the legal framework, for the purposes of outlining the 
contextual backdrop of these narratives and their associated interactions, the core criteria for 
first degree murder in these cases could be summarised as: 
 
 Whether (or not) the act was planned 
 Whether (or not) the act was intentional 
 By what means the act took place (were the act to have taken place as outlined in the 
narratives) 
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In reviewing these criteria, it will be shown in the analysis how these emerge as themes 
within the narratives and how the narratives are made to fulfil or reject the criteria and the 
context they create. 
 Another factor within the analysis is that of the role of the interactants and who or 
what they represent. As has been drawn out throughout this thesis, the role of the state, 
though referred to as an embodied single entity is far more complex and disparate, and 
arguably never more so than at this level of exploration. The state possesses at least a duality 
of representation in the courtroom that presents what could initially be viewed as a conflict. 
Though appointed by the state, the judge has the role of impartial adjudicator, guiding the 
jury through their role and making judgements based on what is legal, reasonable and 
acceptable within a case to ensure a fair trial. The second discourse for the state is through the 
role of the prosecution, as the victim is not the ‘adversary’ of the defendant (given that the 
system utilised in the United States of America is the adversarial system – as in the United 
Kingdom – rather than the inquisitorial system found in some parts of Europe). In the context 
of the USA, this is further compounded as the distinction between the state in a Foucauldian 
sense, and the State (as in the embodiment of the state of North Carolina in and of itself). 
Though this use of the term ‘state’ does overlap to some extent, it is the discourses that are 
drawn out through the use and embodiment of the term that present different nuances in its 
use. 
 The role of the prosecution is the embodiment of the state as a representation of the 
community. As has been outlined previously, criminal justice is considered of public interest 
as the crime against the victim is an infraction against the community (Smith and Natalier, 
2005). Consequently, it is a representation of the community as part of the public sphere, but 
is also an extension of the civil sphere (as discussed in 1.5), where the private and the public 
overlap. The distinction between the discourse of the state as an impartial adjudicator and as 
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the ‘accuser’ against the accused is delineated in a number of ways, not least of which is the 
physical format of the courtroom and the ritualistic practices undertaken as part of the 
institution framework of conducting a trial. 
 Discussing the legal aspects of the charges and the framework for the state within the 
courtroom is relevant to this analysis as trial narratives do not occur in isolation. They occur 
as part of a wider criminal justice system within a recognised node of power/knowledge that 
has a legitimised status within its society. In understanding these practices, the interactions 
and ritual undertakings that participants within trial settings orient to are made clearer. In this 
instance, one risks undermining an analysis of trial data by rejecting influences that might not 
be overtly oriented to by participants, but implied within the interactions. 
The opening statements of a trial are monologues that have been prepared by speakers 
allocated the floor at a specific point within the trial for a specific purpose. The prosecution 
provides their opening statements, first, at the beginning of the trial. This is linked with their 
providing their case first, as the defence can choose to defer their opening statements until 
after the prosecution has finished presenting their evidence. In both the Hayes’ trials, the 
defence delivered opening statements directly after the prosecution and before the 
presentation of evidence. 
The overall narratives for each of the trials will be outlined in the following 
subsections, followed by an analysis of the opening statements. 
 
4.1.1 Restating the theoretical framework 
 
At this point it is worth restating the theoretical framework of this study as discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, and revisiting the conceptual model with the three interconnected sections 
of the agenda, the macro-level narratives, and the micro-level interactions. In this chapter, the 
171 
 
focus is placed on the macro-level narratives as represented in the opening and closing 
statements of the attorneys in both trials. 
 In approaching a narrative analysis, it is necessary to outline what is meant by the use 
of ‘narrative’ in this context and how such an analysis has been utilised in this study. 
Narrative in this context is used to describe the overall version of events presented by a party 
to the jury. It has been interchangeably used with the term ‘story’, though the use of this term 
has been somewhat restricted due to the connotations of a story as being the events that occur 
within a narrative, whereas a narrative tells the story through the actions of the characters 
involved (Berger, 1997: 66-7). It should be noted that whilst references within this analysis 
will refer to literary terms (characters, plot, etc.) this is not a means of trivialising the severity 
of the case under analysis by reducing it to a form often associated with entertainment. 
Rather, the purpose in this is to show how something so severe as the loss of human life and 
the potential loss of liberty for those placed on trial can and is reduced to a narrative form that 
is deemed accessible for the jury and is used to frame and present a coherent structure to 
otherwise potentially disparate events. 
 In analysing narrative, it is important to remember that many aspects of how life is 
understood and in imparting of events (be it fairytales or scientific experiments), there is a 
tendency towards a form of storytelling (Ibid, 9-11). This can, however, be viewed as overly 
broad with some scholars, such as Labov, viewing narrative as ‘discrete units with clear 
beginnings and endings’ that are ‘detachable from the surrounding discourse rather than 
situated events’ (Riessman, 1993: 17). Labov’s six-part structure of abstract, orientation, 
complicating action, evaluation, resolution and coda is paradigmatic and well known 
throughout narrative and linguistic analysis, however; this paradigm, whilst a useful means of 
situating a narrative, does not encapsulate the intricacies within the narrative of the opening 
172 
 
statement. Consequently, though there can be references made to Labov’s model, this thesis 
does not conform to this viewpoint in the given context of opening statements. 
The context in which the narrative is being received removes the position of the 
opening statement as being detachable and discrete from its surroundings. The need, then, to 
take the situational factors into account removes the ability to apply Labov’s model at the 
critical level to the opening statement, as it affixes a static, universal, a priori structure that 
does not allow for institutionally bounded setting of the courtroom or the manner in which 
narrative is situated as part of the larger structure of the trial and its place within the concept 
of the agenda, narrative, and interpersonal interactions. 
Although the opening statement is presenting a narrative, including implications of a 
beginning and an ending, the theoretical underpinnings in how the narrative unfolds lends 
itself to Ricoeur’s approach to narrative time (Ricoeur, 1980), in which the past becomes part 
of the ‘making-present’ and knowledge of the ending allows for the coherent formulation of 
the beginning and the middle. Another aspect is that the narrative of the opening statement 
does not ‘end’ per se, but enters into the present with the case reaching the point of trial. This 
then projects into the future, indicating that the narrative is not yet finished as the jury will be 
asked to formulate a judgement at the end of the trial based on what they have heard and what 
they (in that moment) have yet to hear (time as a theme is discussed below, see 4.2.3.1). 
In addition, the Labovian model also highlights the issue of interaction within 
narrative. In appraising Labov’s structure, there is the criticism that it did not incorporate the 
position of narratives as co-constructed interactions (De Fina and Georgakopoulou, 2012: 34-
6). This may seem to be less applicable to this study, as the opening statements are delivered 
as monologues to a captive audience that is bound by institutional rules of interaction not to 
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speak (namely, the jury)4. Nevertheless, this study argues that regardless of a vocalised role 
(or lack thereof), the narrative is being enacted and presented to an audience, the process of 
which implies an interaction through the very act of the jury being required to receive the 
presentation.  
Accordingly, the approach to narrative taken in this thesis draws heavily on the fields 
of literature and sociology. Narrative within opening statements is not simply a means of 
sequentially connecting a series of events, but encapsulates a number of different aspects. 
Narrative has been purported as a way in which meaning is given to human experience (De 
Fina and Georgakopoulou, 2012: 16). There are criticisms regarding the extent to which 
narrative should be privileged as regards its necessity to lead a full and meaning life (Ibid: 
21-2), but these are not the focus of this thesis, in which the application of narrative theory is 
limited to the context created though the act of the opening statement. This, in turn, conforms 
with the approach to narrative analysis as a continuum in which the ‘what’ (content), the 
‘how’ (structure) and the performance of the narrative (as delivered outwith a text-based 
medium), are incorporated to varying extents and are not viewed as separate, dichotomised 
studies (Ibid: 23-25). 
In analysing these narratives, it is important to draw on underlying discourses that are 
linked to wider societal dialogues, as these are evidenced within the creation of these 
narratives and are utilised as a resource by the interlocutors towards their audience (the jury) 
in creating a dialogue that is designed to engender their support for that specific version of 
events using shared cultural knowledge. Consequently, this chapter draws on discourses of 
gender, the body, representations of the state, power, and race inter alia, when analysing the 
                                                          
4 There is scope for objections from the opposing attorneys during opening statements, but as this was not 
part of the dataset, this was not explored other than to acknowledge its potential as a variable in analysing 
other opening statements. 
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themes presented within the statements as well as how these are linguistically and 
discursively constructed. 
These themes have not been enforced by predetermined design, but have emerged 
based on analysis of the data. This may seem at odds with the concept of an holistic approach 
to analysis (after all, researchers are not completely objective without a filter through which 
they view the world), however; the format of opening statements is that of a monologue 
which presents a version of events. Through this act, ipso facto, the narrative for each case 
emerges. Given the purpose of the opening statement as an opportunity to present a ‘story’ 
and an argument, the coding process used did make reference to a narrative coding taxonomy 
for guidance (Saldaña, 2013: 135). Codes that emerged from this process, however, were not 
restricted to the taxonomy alone, allowing for alternative codes to emerge from the data 
should they be visible. Themes that emerged from the data and are presented in this thesis 
were selected based on their prevalence within the data and for their contribution to this field 
of analysis. The themes represented are not necessarily representative of all themes that 
emerged from the data, but are germane to the study and are oriented to as relevant by 
participants within the data. 
This process was applied after the micro-level analysis of the first three minutes had 
taken place (see 4.2 and 4.2.1 for a rationale) had taken place, allowing for an analysis that 
draws together both a narrow and broader view of the opening statements. 
 
4.1.2 The case of the state 
 
In both trials, it is made clear that the state, through the vehicle of the prosecution, contends 
that both Grant and Amanda Hayes killed Laura Ackerson while she was at the Hayes’ 
apartment during the evening of Wednesday 13th July, 2011. The overarching glue in the 
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prosecution’s case is that they both acted in concert and with premeditation. The two 
narratives for Grant and Amanda Hayes vary slightly both in terms of emphasis and nuance, 
providing narratives that are parallel to one another, yet also have details and theories posited 
to explain evidence that vary somewhat. 
 The prosecution’s narrative for the Grant Hayes trial contended the following (this is 
a summary provided by the author based on the trial footage unless otherwise stipulated). 
Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson had a vitriolic relationship and were going through a 
difficult and expensive custody battle. Following the release of a court-ordered psychological 
evaluation, Laura Ackerson believed she was in a strong position to gain full custody of the 
children. This, along with other improvements Laura had been making to her life, made it 
unlikely that she would agree to exchange her parental rights for money. Grant Hayes was a 
controlling person and had behaved in such a manner towards Laura Ackerson that she feared 
for her personal safety and voiced that concern to others. Grant Hayes hated Laura Ackerson 
and wanted her removed from his life and the lives of his wife and their children. The 
prosecution put forward that this was fuelled by the custody dispute, as he was unable to 
cross state lines with the children which he blamed for his struggling music career. He and 
Amanda Hayes were in financial difficulties and were being evicted from their apartment. As 
a consequence of these factors and the increasing anger Grant Hayes is said to have had 
towards Laura Ackerson, the prosecution asserted that Grant Hayes lured Laura Ackerson to 
his apartment with the promise of her seeing the children midweek (she only had the children 
at weekends) and to discuss her taking full custody. Once in the apartment, the prosecution 
argues that Grant and Amanda Hayes both worked in concert to murder Laura Ackerson and 
then dispose of her body. That both Grant and Amanda were responsible for the murder of 
Laura Ackerson is central to both trials. 
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 This narrative is largely similar for Amanda Hayes’ trial, though there are some 
differences. The emphasis in this trial is placed on Amanda Hayes’ role as an active and 
voluntary participant in the crime. This is primarily brought forward using Amanda Hayes’ 
behaviour following the death of Laura Ackerson. The journey to Texas and Amanda Hayes’ 
family to dispose of the body is emphasised along with the quote ‘I hurt her. I hurt her bad. 
She’s dead.’, which is presented to the jury as a confession by Amanda Hayes to her older 
sister. The narrative also highlights Amanda’s role in the purchase of items after Laura 
Ackerson’s death that the prosecution believes were used in the dismemberment, clean-up 
and disposal of the remains. Finally, the narrative also focusses on Amanda Hayes as also 
having a contentious relationship with Laura Ackerson and wanting the victim out of the lives 
of her and her family. 
 This presents a contextual overview of the general narratives of the prosecution in 
both trials and is followed by the outlines of both Grant and Amanda Hayes’ defence 
narratives. 
 
4.1.3 The case of Grant Hayes 
 
Grant Hayes’ defence primarily focusses on the claim that Amanda Hayes committed the 
murder and that he helped dispose of the body in an attempt to protect his wife and family. 
The defence asserted that Amanda Hayes had an altercation with Laura Ackerson and this 
resulted in the accidental death of the victim. Following this, Grant Hayes’ defence then 
admits to his helping to dispose of the remains (a lesser charge), but denies murder. 
 The custody dispute is normalised (downgraded in the characterisation of its severity 
as an emotional and negative relationship in comparison with the prosecution’s version of 
events) with the contention that Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson argued as was normal with 
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separated couples, and that these arguments were not a precursor to a more violent 
disposition or act. The journey to Amanda Hayes’ family in Texas (section 2.1.1.2) when 
disposing of the remains is cited as evidence that Amanda Hayes was the person responsible 
and who took charge of the situation after Laura Ackerson’s demise. 
 
4.1.4 The case of Amanda Hayes 
 
By contrast, Amanda Hayes’ defence focusses on Grant Hayes as the person who killed 
Laura Ackerson. The narrative presented in this instance is that of Grant Hayes as a 
controlling sociopath and of two victims – Laura Ackerson and Amanda Hayes. Grant Hayes 
is described as suffering from a personality disorder and of being a person who manipulated, 
controlled and threatened both women. It is claimed that Amanda Hayes was not aware of 
Laura Ackerson’s death until after the family had arrived at Amanda Hayes’ sister’s house in 
Texas. Evidence from Grant Hayes’ previous trial, witness testimony, and Amanda’s own 
account are used to support the contention that Amanda was coerced and threatened into 
assisting Grant with the disposal of the remains. State witnesses such as the victim’s closest 
friend also become part of this narrative through negative character testimony they have 
made in the previous trial against Grant Hayes. 
 This narrative puts forward that Amanda Hayes was upset over an arrangement she 
saw being made whereby Grant Hayes would give Laura Ackerson $25,000 in exchange for 
full physical custody of their two young children. Laura Ackerson attempted to touch 
Amanda Hayes’ baby daughter (then a couple of months old) and Amanda turned away 
calling for Grant and leaving the room. Amanda Hayes claimed to have neither heard nor 
seen how Laura Ackerson died and that she returned to the bedroom to sit with the children. 
It is then claimed that Grant Hayes told Amanda to take all the children out as Laura had hit 
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her head and he did not want the children to see medical personnel attending to her. Amanda 
claims that by the time she returned to the apartment Grant told her that Laura had returned 
home. While in Texas, Grant Hayes is then said to have revealed that Laura Ackerson was 
dead and threatened to harm Amanda Hayes and the children (including Amanda’s older 
daughter from a previous marriage) unless she helped him. It is this threat which is claimed to 
have prevented Amanda Hayes from contacting the relevant authorities or raising an alarm. 
 
4.1.5 Final remarks on narrative overviews 
 
The ‘story’ of Amanda Hayes’ version can be presented in more detail through the additional 
testimony provided by the defendant. Nevertheless, the two contrasting versions of what took 
place within the apartment also interweave with aspects of the state’s case. 
The opening statements for each case will be analysed in the following sections. The 
rationale for analysing these even though they are not evidence is that they present a 
summary of the evidence before the prosecution and defence cases have been made. This 
synthesis then places the evidence into the chosen contextual frame of each delineated party, 
whereby disparate pieces of testimony, photos and physical evidence are then used to create 
multiple coherent and linear stories (Cotterill, 2003; Heffer, 2010; Ricouer, 1980). Though 
much work has been done on closing statements in courtroom proceedings, the focus here on 
opening statements has been selected as it provides the lens through which the subsequent 
evidence is then viewed by the opposing ‘sides’. This initial contextualisation is salient 
throughout the entirety of the trial as it presents the recurring themes that are utilised and 
referenced for the jury in support of their own version of events (and in undermining the 
opposition’s stance). Whilst this does not in any way remove or undermine the importance of 
research into closing statements (as the last final version of the narrative the jury will hear), 
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an analysis of opening statements is important as trials are an holistic event in and of 
themselves where what has gone before remains permanently relevant. To this end, though 
aspects of Conversation Analysis (CA) in terms of micro-analytic procedures and 
transcription norms have been drawn upon in this chapter, the tenets of CA in terms of 
removing the wider social context have not; as to ignore the wider context of the narrative is 
to remove the very contextual foundation upon which future interactions within the trial are 
based. 
 
4.2 Analysis of the opening statements 
 
An initial analysis of the first three minutes of the opening statements has been 
selected as a sample in order to highlight the differences in approach and style across the four 
opening statements. The rationale in this sample selection was based on the premise that the 
opening statements provide the narrative context in which each side is framing the evidence 
and the need to impress their version of events on the jury. This selection was made to 
provide a comparison as to how each case was initially introduced to the jury and what was 
made relevant by the attorneys in situ during that first opening sequence and first impression 
of the trial5. The choice of three minutes was based on the average amount of time the 
speakers took to shift frames from their opening sequence to the main body of their speech. 
Subsequent to this is an holistic thematic analysis across all four opening statements 
incorporating both micro- and macro-level approaches. The themes that will be discussed are: 
time and location; agency and responsibility; reframing evidence and the voice of the victim; 
the characterisation of law enforcement and the judicial process; and epistemic positioning 
                                                          
5 The use of the phrase ‘first impression’ is used in the context of this being the first official introduction of the 
parties’ narratives in the trial itself, though the author remains aware that the jury may well have been 
exposed to the attorneys and some aspects of the cases as part of the jury selection process. 
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and claims to knowledge. These were selected as they emerged as having salience across the 
opening statements as points of comparison or (in the case of the opening statement of 
Amanda Hayes’ defence) marked contrast (where extreme opposing views on the same theme 
emerged, such as Amanda Hayes’ complicity versus her coercion in 4.2.3.2). Tables of 
emergent themes in the opening statements are provided in Appendix B and are referred to as 
required. 
 
 
4.2.1 Introducing the narrative: analysis of the introductory three minutes of all opening 
statements 
 
4.2.1.1 The openings of the prosecution 
 
The first three minutes of both the prosecution’s opening statements demonstrate the shift in 
focus between defendants, whilst maintaining consistency across the presented timeline and 
the key aspects of the narrative linked with evidence and testimony. 
 The statement for Grant Hayes’ trial opens with an introduction of the defendant and 
the victim, the date and the place. 
 
Extract 4.1: Prosectution opening GH 
 
1 ADAZ  ladies and gentlemen of the jury↓ (0.6) 
2   as the sun rose of kinston north 
3   carolina (0.4) on july: thirteenth of 
4   twenty eleven (0.5) laura ackerson woke 
5   up exci↑ted↓ (1.0) for ↑once things were 
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6   going her way↓ (0.7) yu=see the 
7   twenty seven >year old< mother 
8   of two little bo:ys↑ (.) little grant 
9   and gentle (0.3) and she (shared/carried) 
10   custody of them with this man 
11   grant hayes↓ 
What is visible here is the framing of each of the participants and the discourses that this 
draws on. Opening statements are prepared in advance, so lexical decisions can be argued to 
be deliberate and designed to have an impact on the jury. In line 1, the role of jury is re-
emphasised through the initial address. This is followed by the introduction of the place and 
time, which are not simply stated but presented in amongst a narrative and prose-style 
description of Laura Ackerson’s morning. Lines 2-6 set the scene for the victim’s final day 
and make claims to knowledge regarding her state of mind (lines 4-5 ‘woke up excited’); 
thus, representing her as excited and optimistic. This already forms a contrast to the jury’s 
shared knowledge of the end of this story – her death. 
 This is then followed (lines 7-10) by framing Laura Ackerson within selected 
discourses. Laura Ackerson is represented as both a young woman (whose life has ended 
prematurely) and a mother with two small children, placing her in the role of caregiver. 
Within this comes the named introduction of the children, whose lives are also impacted by 
the loss of their mother. The contrast is emphasised with the introduction of the defendant 
(lines 10-12), ‘this man grant hayes↓’, who is placed in relation to the victim as the person 
with whom she shared custody of the children. The emphasis here is on the victim, her life 
and her loss. The children are referred to by name and their stage of development is also 
highlighted (line 8 ‘two little bo:ys’). This contrasts with Grant Hayes introduction as ‘this 
man’, which is accompanied by the prosecuting attorney turning to point where he seated at 
the defence table. 
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 Though the same attorney is speaking, this beginning is markedly different to that 
used in the case of Amanda Hayes. 
 
Extract 4.2 Prosecution opening AH 
 
1 ADAZ  i hurt her (1.0) i hurt her ba:d (0.9) 
2   she's dead 
3   (1.3) 
4   those are the words of amanda hayes↓ 
5   (0.5) to her own sister (1.1) those are 
6   the words of amanda hayes↓ (0.2) 
7   six da:ys (0.2) after laura ackerson 
8*   came over to the apartment that she 
10   shared with grant hayes↓ (1.0) °um° 
11   those are (.) the words of amanda 
12   hayes HOUrs (0.9) before she (0.2) and 
13   grant hayes (0.4) deposited laura's bo↑dy↓ 
14   in a texas creek 
15   (1.3) 
16   those were the words of amanda hayes 
17   (0.7) ↑six da↑ys↓ (0.5) before lar-laura 
18   ackerson's severed to↑rso↓ (.) would be↑ 
19   found↓ (1.0) <i hurt her (0.5) i hurt her 
20   bad (0.5) she's dead↓> 
 
In this introduction, the emphasis remains firmly on Amanda Hayes. Lines 1-2 are making 
use of direct speech which is claimed to be a statement the defendant made to her sister. The 
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use of pauses here is of particular note as the direct speech is broken into three distinct parts, 
each building on the former in terms of severity (‘i hurt her (1.0) i hurt her ba:d (0.9) she’s 
dead). The word stress also shifts across the three segments, moving from ‘hurt’ to ‘bad’ 
before finally reaching ‘dead’, building up to the culmination of the alleged quotation, which 
also amounts to a confession. There is also a 1.3 second pause before the speaker continues to 
elucidate on the salience of those words and their context. The distinction between this and 
the introduction used in Grant Hayes trial is particularly notable through the framing of the 
victim in comparison to the defendant. The focus remains firmly on the defendant throughout 
this stretch of talk, with Laura Ackerson being referred to in terms of her death and how her 
remains were treated rather than her life as a young mother and frame of mind. 
 The ‘those are the words of Amanda Hayes’ is repeated four times throughout this 
section (lines, 4, 5-6, 11-12 and 16). In each instance, Amanda Hayes’ full name is used, 
whereas Laura Ackerson is referred to once by her full name (line 7); once by her first name 
in conjunction with the fate of her body (line 13); and once again by her full name but still in 
relation to the condition of her remains (lines 18-19). Grant Hayes (who has been convicted 
of the first-degree murder of Laura Ackerson at the time this statement is made) is mentioned 
twice as a co-participant with Amanda Hayes (lines 8-9, 12-13). 
 Though this sequence does introduce both the defendant, the victim and – in this 
instance – the alleged co-participant, the characterisation of the participants is distinct from 
the previous introduction. Laura Ackerson is related solely to the discourse of the victim, and 
Grant Hayes is mentioned only in the role of co-habitant and co-participant in Laura 
Ackerson’s murder. The details of time and place are also distinct as the chronological 
starting point for the opening statement is after the murder has taken place. The alleged 
confession becomes temporally significant as it is around this statement all other activities are 
referenced. When Laura Ackerson came to the apartment is not referenced here as the 13th 
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July, 2011, but as being ‘six da:ys (0.2) after laura ackerson came over the apartment’ (lines 
7-8). The disposal of the victim’s remains is also placed in relation to this statement as being 
hours prior (lines 12-14). The final temporal reference in this sequence comes at lines 17-18, 
where the focus is then placed on the time the victim’s remains were found, which also 
provides a form of numerical symmetry in that it is described as being six days after the 
statement. 
In placing the focus on the alleged confession, the place of reference also shifts. 
Though the apartment is mentioned in line 8 (which will be outlined as where the crime took 
place), its significance remains implied at this point in the opening statement. The only direct 
reference to a named geographical location is that of Texas, where the remains were disposed 
of subsequent to the initial crime taking place. 
 
Extract 4.3 Prosecution opening GH 
 
13   (1.7) 
14   y'll hear tht- (0.4) that mo:rning: (0.3) 
15   laura got her things an >an< started 
16   to walk out the doo:r and walked past 
17   (0.5) uh her refrigera↑tor↓ covered with 
18   pictures of her little boys↓ 
19   (0.8) 
20   little did she know that (0.8) those 
21   little boys would only know their 
22   mother for three years↓ 
23   (1.3) 
24   little did she know that (0.3) as she 
25   walked out that doo:r↓ (0.3) that within 
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26   twenty fours hours (.) she would take her 
27   last breath 
28   (0.9) 
29   little did she kno↑w↓ (0.3) that that↑ man↓ 
30   (0.4) the father of her children↓ (0.9) 
31   would be the one responsible (0.4) for her 
32   murder and disappea↑rance↓ 
 
This sequence continues directly from extract 4.1. The use of repetition in both of these 
introductory sequences is apparent in both extracts, from extract 4.2 it was the phrase ‘those 
were the words of Amanda Hayes’, whereas in extract 4.3 it is ‘little did she know’, which 
occurs three times in lines 20, 24 and 29. In this extract Laura Ackerson’s optimistic 
disposition from that day is contrasted with her murder. The narrative foreshadows events 
through the claims of the victim’s lack of epistemic knowledge (‘little did she know’), whilst 
simultaneously acknowledging that the jury have this shared knowledge of the victim’s death 
and already know the end of the story. This links with Dershowitz (1996), who notes that 
narratives within courtroom settings must begin at the end, as the ending of the narrative is in 
and of itself the reason for the trial. 
 Within this sequence there is also the continued emphasis on the victim (continuing to 
contrast with the introductory sequence in extract 4.2). Lines 14-18 begin with ‘you’ll hear 
that’, potentially placing the opening statement in the position of ‘Abstract’ within a 
Labovian framework, warning the listener of what is going to be said (Benwell and Stokoe, 
2006). This section then describes Laura Ackerson’s movements that morning, continuing to 
draw on known discourses in framing how the jury is to perceive the victim. These known 
discourses include those of family and Laura Ackerson’s role as a devoted mother. The 
implication of this addendum to her position as a mother is implied through the description of 
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the refrigerator ‘covered with pictures of her little boys’ (lines 17-18). The age range of the 
children is also introduced at lines 20-22, placing the two children at three years old and 
under. 
The perspective from which this information is presented is noteworthy in that is not a 
narrative delivered from the point of view of the victim, but from an outside future 
perspective that is looking backwards to what the victim did not know. This form of 
foreshadowing is not an uncommon storytelling device, however; the temporal positioning of 
the teller in relation to the events will then be contrasted with the difference between the 
narrative as being removed from depictions of a ‘story’ as the events were real (see extract 
4.4, lines 49-50). 
  
 These three extracts encompass the introductory segments of the opening statements. 
The analytical reasoning behind this division is the topic shift which occurs as a parallel in 
each statement. This also maps onto Labov’s (Ibid.) narrative structure with the introductory 
sequence providing the Abstract, followed by the Orientation. The Orientation sequence in 
both opening statements covers three main topics: the introduction of the case of prosecuting 
attorneys; an explanation as to the purpose of an opening statement in the trial process; and 
the chronological beginning of the prosecution narrative. 
 
Extract 4.4 Prosecution opening GH 
 
33   (1.4) 
34   my name's boz zellinger and (.) along with 
35   becky holt we'll be ray- (.) representing 
36   the state of north caroli↑na↓ in this 
37   tri↑al↓ (0.4) >an as you<heard↑ from judge 
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38   stephens (0.5) this is just a forecast of 
39   what the evidence is↓ an- (0.3) so 
40   nothing that i: sa:y or nothing that 
41   the defence attorneys sa:y at this 
42   opening (0.4) is evidence↓ (0.2) 
43   all that evidence is gonna come from 
44   this witness↓ stand↓ and it's gonna 
45   come from (0.7) people invo:lved in 
46   laura's life n invesitgators 
47   n they're gonna get up here and 
48   tell you the truth about what hap↑pened↓ 
49   (0.6) and it's not a story it's a 
50     reality (0.8) and you'll hear that 
51   that morning on july thirteenth= 
 
In the trial of Grant Hayes, the introduction of the attorneys comes first (see extract 
4.4, lines 34-7), whereas in the trial of Amanda Hayes, it comes slightly later (see extract 4.5, 
lines 30-4). In Amanda Hayes’ trial, there is a transitionary sequence that acknowledges a 
prior significant aspect of the trial process – jury selection. The jury selection process is not 
mentioned during the opening statements of Grant Hayes’ trial by either the prosecuting or 
defence attorneys, highlighting it as being oriented to as a more significant factor in the 
second trial than the first (given the public attention the first trial received). Following this 
comes a brief sequence that orients to and restates prior talk from the judge regarding the 
purpose of the opening statements (see extract 4.5, lines 22-7). The word ‘forecast’ is stressed 
in both descriptions of the opening statements (extract 4.4, line 38; extract 4.5, line 26). The 
jury selection process is again referenced in the Amanda Hayes trial with the introduction of 
the prosecution, orienting to a previously shared event. In the Grant Hayes trial, this sequence 
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not only occurs first, but aside from the reference to jury selection is very similar. The 
introduction from the Amanda Hayes trial is similar (extract 4.5, lines 30-4) to that of the 
Grant Hayes trial (extract 4.4, lines 34-7). There is a potential implication that this 
introduction of the attorneys may be delivered in a similar manner in opening statements by 
this attorney, though more data would need to be gathered to confirm this (or potentially 
whether this was a template-like aspect for introducing prosecuting attorneys more 
generally). 
 
Extract 4.5 Prosecution opening AH 
 
21   (1.1) 
22   now i wanna thank you for for sitting 
23   through that arduous (0.4) <jury 
24   selection process> and as the judge 
25   to:ld you (0.2) this an opening statement↓ 
26   this is a forecast of what the 
27   evidence will be °n° (0.4) u:m↓ (.) i got- 
28   had the opportunity to talk to 
29   some of you during jury selection= 
30   =my name is boz zellinger (0.2) n 
31   i'm an assisant district attorney 
32   here in wake county along with becky 
33   holt (0.3) we represent the state 
34   of north caroli↑na↓ 
35   (0.6) 
36   >now i ↑want you to ↓take< (0.3) pay close 
37   attention to the fact that what 
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38   the judge told you is that the 
39   evidence will come from this witness 
40   stand↓ (0.7) >and people are gonna< come 
41   up here and swear to tell you the 
42   truth↓ (0.6) and they're gonna tell 
43   you about what they saw and what 
44   they heard (0.6) and from that story 
45   you're gonna learn that on <july 
46   thirteenth of twenty eleven↓> (0.5) 
47   laura ackerson woke up excited 
49   she was a twenty seven year old 
50   mother of two of little boys 
51    (0.5) gentle and grant the fourth 
52    (0.5) and she shared custody of 
53    those two little boys with (0.3) 
54    amanda hayeses husband grant hayes↓ 
 
 The description of the opening statements in Grant Hayes’ trial references the judge 
and emphasises that nothing any of the attorneys say (including the defence) is evidence. The 
presence and importance of the witness stand is emphasised both lexically and physically. 
This is paralleled closely in Amanda Hayes’ trial, even though the introduction of the 
attorneys occurs within the explanation of the opening statements. Again, the physical 
presence of the witness stand is emphasised along with the role it will play in the trial. This is 
particularly interesting as it is the direction of attention towards the witness stand that shifts 
the topic from the opening statement (as a forecast of evidence) to the forecast itself. From 
the witness stand, both opening statements shift to the witnesses who will tell the ‘truth’ 
(extract 4.4, line 48, extract 4.5, line 42). Though both opening statements have initially 
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contrasted from the outset, by this point the differences are now more nuanced. In the first 
trial (Grant Hayes) there is an emphasis that this is ‘not a story’ but a ‘reality’ (extract 4.4, 
lines 49-50), however; in the second trial (Amanda Hayes) this distinction is not made (‘from 
that story you’re gonna learn’, extract 4.5, lines 44-5). Nevertheless, in both instances the 
topic shift from the witness stand to the witnesses is then followed by the narrative of the 
state’s case. 
 In the first trial, the date is reintroduced but not the year, and the narrative continues 
from Laura Ackerson’s departure from her apartment (which was related in the introductory 
sequence). In the second trial, the narrative is introduced from the very beginning, as the 
introductory sequence begins with the reported confession and the disposal of the victim’s 
remains. At this point in the second trial, two statements from the first trial are reused 
verbatim. These include ‘on July thirteenth of twenty eleven (0.5) Laura Ackerson woke up 
excited’ (extract 4.1, lines 3-5; extract 4.5 lines 45-7); ‘the twenty seven year old mother of 
two little boys’ (extract 4.1, lines 6-8; extract 4.5, lines 49-50). There are also other parallel 
phrases, but these re-present the information from the first trial to allow for the differences of 
the second courtesy of the change in defendant. For example, in the second trial custody was 
shared between Laura Ackerson and Amanda Hayes’ husband, Grant Hayes, whereas in the 
first trial this was with Grant Hayes directly (extract 4.1, lines 10-12; extract 4.5, lines 52-4). 
 Again, deviations occur with these opening statements, with Grant Hayes’ trial 
focusing on the victim, and Amanda Hayes’ trial focusing on the defendant and her 
relationship with Grant Hayes. 
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Extract 4.6 Prosecution opening GH 
 
52   =a wednesday mor↑ning↓ (0.5) as laura 
53   headed out the door to her (.) white 
54   ford focus it was a two thousand 
55   six ford focus (0.5) she had a 
56   couple of business meetings on (taff) 
57   that day↓ 
58   (0.9) 
59   and you'll hear that (.) laura 
60   along with one of her good friends 
61   chevon ma↑thes↓ (0.6) u:m had a- a 
62   business called go fish and she also 
63   had another (0.4) u:m business called fork 
64   and spoon (0.6) and (.) primarily what 
65   laura and chevon would do is (0.4) u:m↓ 
66   bri:ng restaurants menus for the 
67   restaurants↓ and they're the types that 
68   have the advertising down the sides 
69   n (0.4) laura and chevon would sell 
70   that advertising n (0.4) so laura 
71   had a couple of business meetings 
72   that da:y (0.3) u:m throughout her area 
73   throughout kinston and wilson↓ 
74   (0.6) 
75   um (.) you'll hear that laura had 
76   family up in michiga:n and that 
77   she had a brother lived in 
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78   wake forest but that she wasn't 
79   especially close to them 
 
In these two extracts (4.6 and 4.7), there is clear evidence of deviation in what is 
considered salient information, despite the overarching similarities within both cases. In the 
first trial (extract 4.6), the focus remains on the victim. Laura Ackerson’s day is returned to 
as a fixed temporal frame of reference (she leaves the apartment, she heads to her car to go to 
business meetings). This then provides a stepwise topic shift (extract 4.6, lines 57-9) where 
the Laura going to business meetings provides an opening for the explanation of who Laura 
worked with and the businesses she was involved in. The introduction of Chevon Mathes at 
this point (extract 4.6, line 61) also begins the process of naming and forecasting some of the 
state’s witnesses. Chevon Mathes is the first witness named in this opening statement and is 
also the first witness to take the stand. Line 73 also reiterates Laura Ackerson’s position 
geographically in that ‘her area’ was Kinston and Wilson. This begins to foreshadow a 
contrast between her usual movements and her trip to Raleigh. Laura Ackerson’s family and 
their locations are also introduced, providing additional information regarding the victim and 
implying a lack of a familial support system (‘she wasn’t especially close to them’, extract 
4.6, lines 78-9). 
 
Extract 4.7 Prosecution opening AH 
 
55   (0.9) 
56   you'll hear that (0.3) grant (0.4) hayes 
57   and laura ackerson had been in a  
58   relationship↑ together↓ (0.3) >an 
59   that< these two boys had been bo:rn↓ 
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60   and then grant hayes (0.2) LEft laura 
61   for aman↑da hayes↓ (0.3) an actress 
62   (0.4) that she met <that grant met> in 
63   the you-es virign is↑lands↓ 
64   (1.0) 
 
 This section of the opening statement is not echoed at this point in the second trial. In 
Amanda Hayes’ trial, this section does not focus on the victim’s movements on the 13th July 
or describe her business arrangements, but expands on the victim in relation to the defendant 
and Grant Hayes, providing additional context as to how Amanda Hayes and Laura Ackerson 
are linked within the narrative. The segue comes through the prior sequence (extract 4.5, lines 
53-4), where Laura Ackerson is described in terms of sharing custody of the children with 
Grant Hayes. At this point, the topic then shifts to the relationships within the narrative (that 
Grant had children with Laura, and that he ‘left Laura for Amanda Hayes’, extract 4.7, lines 
60-1). It is also at this point that Amanda Hayes’ background in acting is first oriented to as 
relevant (extract 4.7, line 61). Though these segments are not similar in length, in terms of 
their sequencing within the overall statement and how the first three minutes are constructed, 
their positioning provides an interesting mixture of paralleled and contrasting foci. In the 
final section of this micro analysis, it can be seen that the two opening statements return to a 
similar topic with the discussion of the custody arrangements. 
 
Extract 4.8 Prosecution opening GH 
 
80   (0.6) 
81   you'll hear that she was living 
82   in kin↑ston↓ (0.4) um↓ and sharing custody 
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83   of those two little boys with 
84   grant hayes >an that (0.3) grant 
85   hayes had custody of the bo:ys↓ 
86   monday through friday (0.3) and that 
87   laura got em for the weekend 
88   and tht- (.) they would meet at 
89   a sheets in wilson which was half 
90   way between where grant lived in 
91   ra↑leigh↓ (0.3) and where laura lived (0.4) 
92   um in kin↑ston↓ 
93   (0.6) 
94   tch n you'll also↓ hea:r tht (0.9) a lot 
95   about this this <bitter custody 
96   dispute> that was going↑ o↑n↓ (0.6) 
97   u:m 
98   (0.5) 
99   you'll ↑hear (.) during that day↓ 
100   that (0.5) uh from these restaurant 
101   uh owners that laura met with at 
102   two o'clock=you'll hear that she 
103   met with (0.4) u:↑m↓ sean tudor from 
104   wilson amusements↓ so you'll (.) >hear 
105   about that meeting<=↑pay ↑close 
106   ↑attention↓ to how (0.4) sean descri:bes 
107   her↓(0.5) >(     )  
108   she goes on in that day< to four 
109   o'clock meets with randy jenkins 
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Both of these segments (4.8 and 4.9) discuss the custody arrangements. In the first 
trial, the description of the overall custody dispute as ‘bitter’ occurs after the temporal and 
geographical aspects have been outlined (extract 4.8, line 95), whereas in the second trial this 
occurs beforehand (extract 4.9, line 66). Rather than ‘bitter’, used in the first trial, the dispute 
is characterised as ‘contentious’ in the second. 
 
Extract 4.9 Prosecution opening AH 
 
64   (1.0) 
65   >but you< hear↑ that (.) there 
66   was a (.) pretty contentious↓ (0.4) 
67   custody dispute↓ between (0.4) um amanda 
68   and grant and lau↑ra↓ (0.5) and you'll 
69   hear a lot about that dispute n 
70   you'll hear how there was a (0.3) a  
71   <custody schedule> set up where (0.3) 
72   grant and amanda had custody of these 
73   two little boys from <monday through 
74   friday> (0.7) and that (0.3) they would 
75   meet laura at a ↑sheets gas station 
76   in ↑wilson north carolina >which 
77   was< (0.3) pretty close to where grant 
78   and amanda lived in raleigh↓ (0.3) 
79   and laura lived in- i:n uh kin↑ston north 
80   carolina↓ 
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Throughout the first three minutes of both opening statements, the phrase ‘you’ll 
hear’ (and similar variations) is repeated. In Grant Hayes’ trial it occurs seven times and in 
Amanda Hayes’ trial it occurs three times. This maintains the ‘forecast’ position of the 
opening statement overall as an overview of the evidence. The phrase ‘you will’ does not 
leave ambiguity but implies the narrative (and thereby the state’s case overall) has certainty 
and legitimation through evidence. 
The first three minutes of both opening statements made by the prosecution highlight 
a number of interesting features. Though there are many parallels within these sequences, 
there are more differences than might have initially been expected. The focus in Amanda 
Hayes’ trial is not as heavily placed on the victim as it was in Grant Hayes’ trial, with more 
focus being placed on Amanda Hayes and the narrative of her involvement. The initial 
openings show the contrast clearly. Parallels in terms of the introduction of the attorneys and 
the introduction of the witness stand as a means of moving onto other aspects of the narrative 
are both evident in the structure of these three minutes. Despite the shifts in topic lacking a 
linear chronology, the use of temporal features throughout these extracts seems to imply a 
chronological coherence to the narrative, tying events together. In Grant Hayes’ trial the fixed 
point of the 13th July, 2011 and Laura Ackerson’s movements on that day provide the 
temporal reference around which other events are framed. For Amanda Hayes’ trial, there are 
two points used to provide a timeframe. The first of these is the reported confession, which is 
said to have occurred six days after Laura Ackerson’s murder, the day her remains were 
disposed of and six days before those remains were discovered. The second of these is also 
the 13th July, 2011, which again introduces Laura Ackerson’s state of mind. 
The interesting point in both opening statements is that the topic shift occurs when a 
linked topic is referenced rather than based on the chronology of the case. This allows for the 
introduction of the parties’ backgrounds and other relevant information that has a bearing on 
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the overall narrative but occurred prior to the case itself. The case is grounded by the death of 
the victim (which could be argued as the basis for why this is used as the primary temporal 
referent), but the overall narrative is more disparate. 
The discourses referred to throughout both opening statements also overlap to an 
extent. This is particularly evident regarding the description of the victim and the discourses 
of youth and motherhood, as discussed above. 
 
4.2.2 The openings of the defence 
 
Before analysing the opening statements of the defence, it is important to be aware of a 
procedural choice that is made prior to these statements being delivered. In both trials, the 
defence has been given the choice to present their opening statements either directly after the 
state has made theirs, or to defer it until the state’s case has concluded (and the option for the 
defence to present their own evidence is given). In both trials, the opening statements for the 
defence were made after the opening statements for the prosecution. 
It is salient to note that whilst there are obvious overlaps in the prosecution opening 
statements as a consequence of not only the case material itself, but that the presenting 
attorney is also the same, for both the defence attorneys there is little overlap and two very 
different approaches are used. The conclusion of Grant Hayes’ trial and its verdict is salient 
to the narrative of the defence in the trial of Amanda Hayes. There is no overlap between 
defence attorneys or other such potential points for direct comparison as could be found in 
the opening statements of the prosecution. Consequently, rather than the comparative 
approach used above, the two defence opening statements will be analysed separately. 
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4.2.2.1 The opening statement for the defence in the trial of Grant Hayes 
 
Extract 4.10 Defence opening GH 
 
1 DEFD  this case is about a man↓ (0.3) 
2   covering↑ up (0.2) his wife's °actions↓° 
3   (1.6) 
4   on july thirteenth (0.3) amanda hayes 
5   killed laura ackerson↓ (.) during 
6   a fight (1.2) it wasn't something that 
7   was planned↓ (1.8) (it was just) something 
8   that happened 
10   (1.7) 
11   now i'm gonna talk more about that 
12   but <i'd like to tell you first> 
13   a little bit about (.) the party's 
14   background↓ 
 
The opening statement made by one of the defence attorneys for Grant Hayes opens with a 
single turn summary of the case (lines 1-2). The use of language here is interesting insofar as 
it introduces Grant Hayes as a ‘man’ and places Amanda Hayes (at this point unnamed) in the 
societal role of ‘wife’. This establishes both Grant Hayes’ role within the household and 
implies an obligation of a ‘man’ to protect his ‘wife’, drawing on discourses of gender and 
stereotypes of a patriarchal system in which the male head of the household is responsible for 
the actions of the spouse (Rothman, 1994). 
 This is followed by a 1.6 second pause, before some supporting explanation is given 
(lines 3-8). In this section the alleged guilt of Amanda Hayes is directly stated (‘amanda 
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hayes killed laura ackerson↓’), providing the jury with an alternative perpetrator and already 
attempting to provide a claim for ‘reasonable doubt’, on which the defendant could be 
acquitted. Another point of interest is the downgrading of the crime itself from premeditated 
murder to ‘something that happened’. This simultaneously does a number of things. It places 
Amanda Hayes in the position of ‘guilty’ whilst also reducing the severity of the crime, 
implying that it was not intentional on her part either. The narrative of an unplanned 
accidental death as the result of a fight between two other women also prepares the listener 
for the justification of whatever role Grant Hayes is said to have played in this scenario. 
However, having prepared the listener for Grant Hayes’ role in covering up a crime that he 
was not part of, the defence moves onto expanding on the defendant’s background. Whereas 
Grant Hayes has been characterised in the previous extracts from the initial three minutes of 
the prosecution’s opening in terms of ‘that man’, a ‘father’, and as being ‘responsible for 
[Laura Ackerson’s] murder’, this provides a platform to introduce the defendant as a person, 
rather than a brief construct of societal roles. 
 
Extract 4.11 Defence opening GH 
 
15   (1.4) 
16   uh mr hayes is a local musi↑cian↓ 
17   (0.8) °an° he's also an artist (0.6) 
18   people you know may have seen him  
19   (.) playing in local restaurants 
20   and bars↓ he also (0.5) u:m (0.5) does 
21   por↑traiture work↓ (0.5) u:m an some 
22   of his art he was in the process 
23   when↓- when all this all this 
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24   hap↑pened↓ (0.4) u:h un- putting 
25   some of his art on eye-phone 
26   cases↓ (0.4) as part of a deal to 
27   sell eye↑-phones↓ (0.3) that's kinda 
28   what he does (0.2) °um (0.5) 
29   professionally↓° 
30   (0.5) 
 
In the above extract, Grant Hayes’ professional character is presented. This is similar to the 
opening statement of the prosecution in this trial, which attested to Laura Ackerson’s 
business accomplishments. Grant Hayes’ talents as an artist and a musician are described, 
however; they are so in a manner which personalises him to the jury. For example, the use of 
‘local’ (lines 16 and 19), placing the defendant as an active member of the community. The 
use of ‘people you may know’ also implies a level of potential familiarity between the jurors 
and the defendant. The reference to having his art placed on iPhone cases also provides 
professional links that can be associated with a known and respected brand, even if the 
manufacturer of the phones themselves is in no way connected to this artistic endeavour. The 
discussion of Grant Hayes as a local performer and artist not only entrenches his position 
within the community, but also implies that he is talented and respectable through the value 
of linking his reputation with that of a ‘trusted’ brand (Kotha et al, 2001). 
 Having established Grant Hayes as an individual outside the remit of the case and the 
institutional title of ‘defendant’, the defence then shifts the topic to Grant’s relationship with 
both the victim and Amanda Hayes, providing a temporal framework for the conclusion of 
Grant Hayes’ relationship with Laura Ackerson and his marriage to Amanda Hayes, as shown 
below. 
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Extract 4.12 Defence opening GH 
 
31   an from two↑ thousand seven 
32   to two thousand ni:ne↓ (0.7) uh 
33   mr hayes↓ and mstr- miss ackerson↓ 
34   (0.6) had a kinda <on↑ aga↑in↓ off aga↑in↓> 
35   (0.4) °relationship↓°=they lived 
36   together for a whi:le they 
37   separated for a whi:le .hh >and 
38   from that relationship< m as 
39   the state said↓ they had (.) two 
40   boys↓ (0.8) first they had little 
41   grant↑ (0.7) and then they had↓ (.) 
42   °gentle hayes↓° (0.5) n that was 
43   around two thousand eig↑ht↓ °and 
44   two thousand nine↓° 
45   (0.9) 
46   an then late↑ two thousand ni:ne (.) 
47   nuh that relationship (0.2) finally 
48   ended (0.9) uh=n=at that↑ time grant 
49   was living in: the virgin is↑lands↓ 
50   (0.3) he was playin' music↑ there °uh° 
51   <at different> (0.7) °uh° (0.2) resorts↑ 
52   (0.4) an he was sending money <back to> (.) 
53   laura↓ who was living in kin↑ston↑ 
54   (1.6) 
55   and THEre (0.3) <grant met> (0.6) amanda↓ 
56   hayes an they fell in love↑ (0.8) 
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57   an:d (0.6) °u:h° shortly after that↓ 
58   a:↓round january of two thousand 
59   ten they mo:ved together↓ (0.3) from 
60   the virgin↑ islands↓ to:↓ new=york  
61   city (0.6) an they lived together 
62   as a family=grant amanda an 
63   amanda's teenage ss- dau↑ghter↓ 
64   (0.2) sha (shay) elmer↓ .hh (0.3) an 
65   that was kind of their life an 
66   in new york grant u:mm (1.0) tk ran a 
67   variety show at a local ba:r↓ 
68   °um° that's kind of- was his 
69   major source of inco:me↓ (0.5) u:m 
70   (0.5) a:n (.) amanda was in school↓ 
 
The relationship between Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson is also downgraded throughout 
this extract. Although they have two children together (lines 39-40), the defendant and the 
victim are described as having been in an ‘on again off again’ relationship (line 35), which is 
further characterised in the delivery through the rising and falling intonation and the slower 
pace used for this section of speech. This is expanded through lines 35-7, where their living 
arrangements are highlighted as being together and separated ‘for a while’, displaying 
instability. The state is mentioned with reference to having introduced the two children 
previously in their opening statement – linking the facts together coherently, whilst altering 
the context and implications. The births of the children are placed within a timeframe, outside 
of which Grant Hayes’ and Laura Ackerson’s relationship is said to have ended. This also 
adheres to establishing a heteronormative societal standard in which Grant Hayes did not 
‘cheat’ on Laura (Green, 2013), but the two had parted ways and then Grant Hayes met and 
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married Amanda Hayes (lines 46-59). Also included is Grant Hayes’ role as a responsible 
father after the separation insofar as he continued to contribute to the financial wellbeing of 
the children by ‘sending money back to Laura’ in Kinston, despite being geographically 
removed in the US Virgin Islands. The final segment of this extract (lines 57-70) also 
encompasses Grant Hayes’ movements and provides a brief overview of his new relationship 
with Amanda Hayes. In this narrative, the focus on family and Grant fulfilling a male 
patriarchal role within this construct is drawn on extensively. In lines 60-4, Grant Hayes’ life 
with Amanda Hayes and her teenage daughter is characterised as ‘a family’, with that being 
their ‘life in New York’. Grant Hayes’ income through a running a variety show in New 
York, also demonstrates a work ethic that has positive societal implications regarding his 
character. His producing income is also juxtaposed with Amanda Hayes being ‘in school’, 
which though not presented negatively also feeds into the imagery of the patriarchal 
household. 
 
Extract 4.13 Defence opening GH 
 
71   (1.4) 
72   an then in february of two 
73   thousand ten (1.0) during a visit 
74   (1.0) grant an laura had some 
75   conversations decided (.) to have 
76   little↑ grant (0.5) come back up 
77   °with (0.6) with big grant (0.5) 
78   to: new york city° (0.5) u:m (1.5) 
79   what- (.) what's goin' o:n was 
80   gentle↑ (.) had some health needs 
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81   (0.3) °u:m° he was also (0.5) °um° (0.7) 
82   still a very young infant (0.5) 
83   °uh° an (0.3) >little grant had some 
84   behaviour problems an it was 
85   just a lot↑< (.) for (0.2) °laura  
86   ackerson↓° (0.5) so grant stepped 
87   in an took (0.2) uhh (0.4) little grant 
88   back with him to new york↓ (0.3) 
89   an shortly after they decided 
90   tht (0.3) it would be best for↓ (0.2) 
91   li↑ttle gra↑nt↓ just to stay there↓ 
92   at least for (.) °a while longer↓° 
93   (0.3) uh=aman↑da↑ (0.2) dropped out of 
94   school↓ (0.5) uh so that she could 
95   be more of a full time mo:m 
96   to: little grant .hh um she 
97   >she< still had a teenage daughter 
98   but there wasn't the kind of day 
99   to day (0.3) uh require↑ments↓ as uh 
100   a young child↓ 
 
 
The final extract in this three minute excerpt continues to highlight the approach of the 
defence in establishing the defendant as a person of good character and standing within the 
community, whilst characterising a version of his interactions with the victim whereby 
discussion, conflict and compromise were normal parts of being ex-partners negotiating what 
was best for the children. The narrative surrounding Grant Hayes having physical custody of 
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his eldest son is presented as Grant Hayes stepping in to help Laura Ackerson, who was 
struggling. This introduces the custody dispute, while at the same time normalises the 
defendant’s behaviour. There is also an emphasis on mutual accord between Grant Hayes and 
Laura Ackerson at this point (‘they decided’, line 89) regarding custody. 
 Amanda Hayes’ role here is also introduced. She is characterised as leaving school to 
become a full-time mother to Grant’s eldest son (lines 93-6). The terminology and 
associations of the word ‘mom’ also present a potential source of friction between Amanda 
Hayes and Laura Ackerson for the jury, whilst continuing to expand on the imagery of a 
shared societal standard for familial roles. 
 It has already been established within courtroom research that attorneys draw upon 
references and discourses they believe the jury to be familiar with and to connect with 
through shared common knowledge (Dershowitz, 1996). Although this micro-analysis goes 
beyond contextual principles of conversation analysis, the use of terms and imagery is not 
accidental in a pre-prepared speech for court and is therefore of value to a full analysis of the 
narrative macro-level of the trial procedure. 
 The character of Grant Hayes is established in the narrative through presenting a 
person who earns an income and is invested in the wellbeing of his family. One particular 
point of note is that in none of these three minute excerpts is the race of the defendant, his 
wife or the victim oriented to as relevant. At this point, discourses surrounding family and 
gender are focussed on by participants as being more salient to the trial. 
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4.2.2.2 The opening statement for the defence in the trial of Amanda Hayes 
 
Extract 4.14 Defence opening AH 
 
1 GAS  good afternoon↓ ladies 
2   an gentlemen↑ 
3   (1.6) 
4   i had to confess to you 
5   that (0.3) (after) doin' 
6   this for thirty five years↑ 
7   that (1.4) i (0.4) >have 
8   spoken to many jurors↑< (0.8) an 
9   i have always begun (0.2) in 
10   exactly the same way↑ 
11   (1.0) 
12   very↑ nervous↓ 
The introductory statement from the defence in the second trial contrasts vividly in 
comparison with the three other excerpts examined thus far. The defence attorney speaking 
on behalf of Amanda Hayes opens with a salutary phrase followed by a description of the 
attorney himself. This is the only extract in which the narrative for that party is not 
established at the initial stages. The experience of the attorney and his general practice form 
the introduction of his statement. The use of the term ‘confess’ and establishing his state of 
mind as ‘very nervous’ stand out as being salient terms. The opening statement of the 
prosecution is discussing an alleged confession of his client, which potentially creates a 
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lexical parallel insofar as the defence attorney is ‘confessing’, though to nerves rather than 
murder. 
 
Extract 4.15 Defence opening AH 
 
13   (2.2) 
14   i have a very (0.4) important 
15   (1.0) <role to play> at 
16   this moment↑ (0.8) an i recog↑nise 
17   that role↓ 
18   (2.6) 
19   my job (0.5) at this point↓ (0.9) 
20   <is to> (1.2) help you to understand 
21   (1.0) what it is↓ that you 
22   are (0.7) about to hear in this 
23   case↓ 
24   (2.1) 
25   you have heard us speak (0.9) 
26   in↓ (0.7) <general terms↓> about 
27   what the evidence w- (0.8) 
28   would show (0.2) during jury 
29   selection (1.1) but (1.0) <those 
30   general> terms were only for 
31   the purpose of- (0.5) determining 
32   whether you were (.) appropriate 
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33   jurors to serve >in this case<↓ 
34   (1.1) NOW (0.4) it's my responsibility 
35   (0.7) to (0.8) talk↑ to you in more↑ 
36   detail↓ (0.5) about >what the 
37   evidence in this case will< (.) 
38   in- (0.2) fact- (0.4) actually show↓ 
 
There are two initial observations in this extract that stand out. Firstly, the speaker’s pacing is 
markedly slower than any of the previous speakers analysed to this point. Though each 
speaker does make use of pauses and they are frequent in all the opening statements, it can be 
seen that the duration of the pause lengths is generally longer within turns. In the first three 
minutes of the defence opening statement for Grant Hayes, the longest pause is 1.7 seconds 
and this length of pause does not occur within an incomplete turn. Likewise, in the first three 
minutes of the prosecutions opening for Grant Hayes’ trial, the longest pause is also 1.7 
seconds and in Amanda Hayes’ trial is 1.6 seconds, again, these do not occur within an 
incomplete phrase. This contrasts with the current extract, as pause lengths can already be 
seen to be longer, with pause lengths of 2.2 and 2.6 seconds (lines 13 and 18), with frequent 
longer pauses within incomplete phrases (such as the 1.2 second pause in line 20 and the 1.1 
and 1.0 second pauses in line 29, inter alia). This provides a stark contrast both in terms of 
the style of the speaker and disrupts the fluidity of the statement in comparison with other 
speakers, particularly as the frequent long pauses are not always indicative of turn completion 
or topic shift, and are open to interpretation as self-repair or encountering an issue during the 
presentation of the statement. The concept of pause length will be revisited in the summary 
discussion below (4.2.2.3). 
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 The second observation is that of content. In this extract, the speaker still has not 
begun discussing the case, contrasting again with the previous three introductions to opening 
statements. Instead, the role of the defence attorney is introduced. The process of jury 
selection is again directly referenced, as it was in extract 4.5, lines 22-4 by the prosecution, 
but is utilised in a different manner. Whereas this was a means of the prosecutor connecting 
with the jury (use of thanks and an acknowledgment of a long jury selection process with 
‘arduous’ [extract 4.5, line 23]), the usage here provides a ‘then and now’ comparison. There 
is a reinforcement that whatever evidence the jury heard in selection is an incomplete picture 
with the use of ‘general terms’ (lines 26 and 30). This is then contrasts with the use of ‘more 
detail’ (lines 35-6), which occurs after a temporal shift with ‘now’ (line 34). The shift in 
timeframe is also marked through increased volume. 
 This explanation of the role of the defence is then linked with the purpose of the 
opening statements, as continued below. 
 
Extract 4.16 Defence opening AH 
 
39   (2.1) 
40   it's somewhat (0.6) like (1.1) 
41   givin' you: a: (0.5) guide (0.8) 
42   for (.) >what you are about to 
43   hear↓< (1.6) PLEAse remem↑ber↓ (0.6) 
44   u-u-um i (think) mister bozley↑ 
45   (0.4) uh mr zellinger↓ (0.8) uh (0.9) 
46   also told you (0.3) tht (.) what 
47   you hear↓ (1.5) °from° (.) this podium↓ 
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48   (0.6) is not evidence in this 
49   case (0.7) the ev↑idence in this 
50   case is gonna be what you  
51   hear from the wit↑ness↓ stand↓ 
52   (1.0) so: (0.4) if- (0.9) i tell you: 
53   to expECT to hear something 
54   that is different (0.6) than what  
55   you actually hear >then it's< 
56   (.) uh: then you should rely 
57   on what you hear from the 
58   witnesses and not (0.6) °from 
59   what uh you've heard me↑ say↓° 
 
Again, this extract continues to discuss the purpose of an opening statement, which provides 
a comparison with the opening statement of the prosecution in this trial. The first point of 
note is the way in which the instructions regarding opening statements not being testimony 
are reiterated. In lines 52-9 the defence attorney tells the jury to rely on what they hear from 
the witnesses and not him. This is worth particular attention, as it could be argued that the 
attorney has emphasised that the jury can disregard what he is saying, whilst still having yet 
to establish a narrative for the defence. This contrasts vividly with the prosecution’s use of 
these instructions, which frames their argument in terms of what the evidence will show. This 
is explicit and unequivocal, with a strong statement of what the witnesses ‘will’ tell the jury 
and what they are ‘gonna learn’; thus, embedding their narrative within the instructions of the 
opening statement (see extract 4.5, lines 37-47). The defence attorney for Grant Hayes’ trial 
does not reiterate these instructions in the first three minutes of the opening statement. 
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The prosecution and defence both use examples to describe the purpose of an opening 
statement. In the case of the prosecution this is the term ‘forecast’ (extract 4.5, line 26), 
whereas the defence uses the simile of a ‘guide’ (extract 4.16, line 41). This simile not only 
provides a function insofar as it explains a legal proceeding in terms of shared cultural 
knowledge one assumes the jurors to have, but it also places the attorney in an epistemic 
place of authority, as he is the person who is in a position to ‘guide’ the jurors through the 
evidence and (potentially) unfamiliar legal territory. Nevertheless, there is an interesting link 
to be made here between the initial claim to knowledge through the use of ‘guide’ and its 
then being juxtaposed with the reiteration of the judge’s instructions that the jury should rely 
on their own understanding of the evidence and not what the attorneys claim during their 
openings. This could potentially be viewed as undermining the initial claim to authority by 
empowering the jury, but moving beyond this point would merely be speculation. 
One final point in this extract is the acknowledgement of the prosecution’s previous 
opening statement. Lines 43-47 bring attention to and foreshadow an overlap between the 
prosecution’s reiteration of the opening statements’ purpose and that of the defence. In this 
one can see in line 43 there is a 1.6 second pause before the emphasis on ‘PLEAse 
remem↑ber↓’, which is then followed by a 0.6 second pause. After this pause comes a sub-
clause in which acknowledgement is made of a repetition of information. This shift, however, 
also includes a self-repair of the prosecutor’s name (lines 44-5) and frequent pauses on line 
45 (0.4; 0.8; and 0.9 respectively). This produces a somewhat disjointed shift before the main 
thread returns from line 46 onwards (‘tht (.) what you hear↓’). 
 The conclusion of this extract also marks a shift from roles and procedure to the 
narrative itself. This is the only instance across all four openings where the case does not 
receive an initial overview and deviates from the Labovian structure highlighted in both of 
the prosecution opening statements. 
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Extract 4.17 Defence opening AH 
 
60   .hh (0.8) 
61   this case (.) ladies and 
62   gentlemen↓ (0.8) is (1.0) essentially 
63   about (1.8) tu- three (0.8) primary 
64   individuals↓=there're a 
65   lot of other individuals 
66   involved=the children for 
67   example .hh but (0.5) essentially 
68   (0.2) we (0.3) are talkin' about 
69   (0.5) three (1.1) primary (1.1) 
70   participants↓ 
 
At this stage, the case is finally introduced. The topic shift is marked by the intake of breath 
and pause (line 60) followed by the emphasis on the words ‘this case’ (line 61). This extract 
draws attention to the pacing of the speech through use of latching and pauses. The 
introduction of the ‘three primary individuals’ at lines 63-4 introduces the theme of the 
defence narrative, in which an emphasis is placed on the individuals outwith the temporal 
framework utilised in the previous opening statements. This immediately followed by the 
dependant clause, which is latched without a pause to the previous clause, and within this the 
acknowledgement of other individuals within the narrative is accepted. This is followed by an 
intake of breath and the use of ‘but’ and a 0.5 second pause before the main clause is 
reiterated (lines 68), thus forming a hypotactic clause combination (Halliday and Matthiesen, 
2014: 437). 
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 The ‘three primary individuals’ form the main basis for the defences narrative in this 
case and marked pauses are utilised in the repetition of this stance of 1.1 seconds in between 
the words of this phrase (lines 69-70). The children and other alluded to individuals are 
placed in the dependant clause and are of lesser importance to the argument both implicitly 
and explicitly, despite the admission of their presence within the overall narrative. By 
reducing the number of participants in the case to three, the defence could been seen as 
having attempted to reduce the potential complexity of the narrative, as well as placing the 
focus on the participants involved rather than adhering to a chronological sequence of events. 
This contrasts with the defence opening for Grant Hayes’ trial, in which a timeline of events 
prior to the death of Laura Ackerson was established. However, this does compare with the 
defence opening for Grant Hayes’ in which a similar strategy of simplification was used (‘this 
case is about a man covering up his wife’s actions’; extract 4.10, lines 1-2). There are subtle 
differences in how these strategies are utilised, however; in the trial of Grant Hayes’ this 
occurs as the first turn and provides a one-line summary of the defence’s narrative; in the trial 
of Amanda Hayes’ this occurs as the introduction to the case (that is not positioned at the 
start of the statement) and does not provide a simplified form of the narrative argument. 
Instead, the jury are presented with the key persons involved. This is expanded upon below in 
the final extract of this three minute sequence. 
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Extract 4.18 Defence opening AH 
 
71   (1.7) 
72   the first of those is grant↑ 
73   hayes↓ (1.0) grant↑ hayes↓ (0.7) is 
74   the classic (0.3) sociopath↓ 
75   (3.0) 
76   on the one↑ hand↓ (1.0) he is very 
77   (0.9) talented↑ (0.6) he's a 
78   talented musi↑cian↓ 
79   (1.3) 
80   he is very charmin'↑ 
81   (1.0) 
82   he is very witty↑ 
83   (0.9) 
84   he is very charismatic↑ 
85   (2.0) 
86   he is very intelligent↑ 
87   (3.0) 
88   but on the other↑ hand↓ 
89   (1.9) 
90   he is also very controlling↑ 
91   (1.5) 
92   he is very maNIpulative↑ 
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93   (1.4) 
94   he is very deceitful↑ 
95   (1.1) 
96   he is very dishonest 
97   (1.5) 
98   and most of all 
99   (0.6) 
100   he is very (0.4) dangerous↓ 
 
Continuing from the previous point of the introduction of ‘three primary individuals’, rather 
than introducing the case for the defence outright, there is an introduction of the dramatis 
personae. In this the three primary individuals are introduced, though the timeframe 
examined only extends to the description given of Grant Hayes. The main theme of the 
narrative, which has only previously been alluded to in extract 4.17, begins to build into a 
clearer picture. Grant Hayes is introduced first in explicit and direct terms as a ‘classic 
sociopath’ (line 74). It would be narrow to assume that this term was not chosen deliberately 
and in part because of the shared cultural knowledge it is assumed the jury will have 
regarding negative connotations surrounding a term linked with those believed to have an 
antisocial personality disorder (Blackburn, 1988). 
 That Grant Hayes is introduced first is also worth noting, as in the opening statement 
by Grant Hayes’ defence team, the defendant himself was the first person to be described and 
introduced to the jury as the sequence of ‘a man covering up his wife’s actions’ leads to a 
description of the defendant as a person. Amanda Hayes has yet to be introduced to the jury 
as a person at this point, which also places an interesting point of comparison as in this case 
the prosecution opened with an introduction of Amanda Hayes as a person who was not only 
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guilty of murder, but who had also confessed this fact to a close family member. In the case 
of the defence for Amanda Hayes, Grant Hayes is introduced first as the ‘villain’, reinforced 
by the accusation of being a ‘classic sociopath’. This in turn foreshadowed Amanda in the 
role of another ‘victim’, though who she was as a person had yet to be established. This also 
creates an implication of a power dynamic, whereby someone with the attributes outlined by 
the defence was in a clearer position to cause some form of harm and have another person act 
contrary to their own wishes or desires (such as the attributes of being both charismatic and 
manipulative). 
This sets the scene for introducing Amanda Hayes as a woman who has suffered 
abuse at the hands of her spouse (be it physical or mental). In beginning to introduce Grant 
Hayes as a dangerous and mentally unstable individual, the defence concurrently lays the 
foundation for their overall contention – that Amanda Hayes was coerced to act contrary to 
her own will under fear and duress. It is not an overextrapolation to make this claim of scene 
setting, nor is it beneficial to any analysis to exclude the wider social context of domestic 
abuse and that the jury will already hold some awareness and opinion of this issue. Though it 
could be viewed that there is a continued delay in the introduction of the defendant in 
comparison to the three other opening statements reviewed thus far, there is also a greater 
amount of scene setting and foundational work being done in preparation for the 
underpinning argument of the defence narrative. Consequently, the introduction of Grant 
Hayes has taken precedence in order to provide the means through which Amanda Hayes can 
be presented as a second victim alongside that of Laura Ackerson. Furthermore, in 
establishing Amanda Hayes as a second victim, the criteria for a conviction of murder or the 
separate charge of accessory after the fact are not met, as a person cannot be found guilty if 
they were not acting of their own free will and under threat. 
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The sequencing of this extract is of note, as it makes the most deliberate and prevalent 
use of pauses within this opening statement. The attorney also employs the use of listing 
attributes generating a rhythm to the statement. The pacing is slow and each attribute is 
emphasised through word stress. There is also strong repetition with the phrasing and the 
constant use of ‘he is very’. The listing of attributes (lines 76-100) can be divided into two 
halves. The first half (lines 76-87) outlines five potentially positive characteristics (talented; 
charming; witty; charismatic; and intelligent). This is then contrasted with five negative 
characteristics (controlling; manipulative; deceitful; dishonest; and dangerous) (lines 88-100). 
There is also an implication of alliteration within the final three negative attributes as all 
begin with ‘d’ and are placed in a list of three building up to the ‘most’ negative of them all 
with ‘dangerous’. This is an engaging use of literary devices within the opening statement, 
but the extended pause lengths (ranging from 0.6 to 3.0 seconds throughout lines 76-100) and 
list of ten items, makes the sequence rather long with a fairly slow pace. The use of repetition 
is in line with Tannen (1989) who discusses repetition as part of connection and 
comprehension. The use of this as oratory or ‘public oral poetry’ can be linked with this use 
of repetition and the assertive use of ‘he is’ as a focal point for the listener (Tannen, 1989: 
82-7). Nevertheless, this contrasts vividly with the styles employed by the other interlocutors 
as the pacing and manner in which the statement is delivered is less animated. 
Rather than a direct introduction to the case of the defence, a different sequence has 
begun to emerge. Throughout the extracts for Amanda Hayes’ defence, the sequential shifts 
have been from an introduction of the attorney himself, to the purpose of the opening 
statement, to the persons of interest in the narrative. This provides a build up to the defence’s 
core argument – that of Grant Hayes’ as the main perpetrator and of Amanda Hayes as 
another victim alongside Laura Ackerson. This build up has, however, resulted in an 
extended introductory sequence over the first three minutes of the statement, whereby those 
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listening were not made aware of the core arguments of the defence from the outset. There is 
no way of claiming whether or not this had any impact on the decision-making process of the 
jury from the data, but the difference in styles and the different application of literary and 
narrative devices displays that despite the similarities within opening statements and their 
function, the use of rhetoric within these sequences can vary greatly. 
 
4.2.2.3 Discussion 
 
Having dissected the opening three minutes of all four opening statements, it behoves us to 
provide an analytical summary that is not merely a list of independent observances, but 
brings together a comparison as to what the attorneys themselves oriented to in terms of 
presenting a first impression to the jury and how that occurred. After all, in communicating 
their case, the opening statements are the first means through which each narrative is fully 
presented to the jury and directs the context in which each party seeks to frame the 
testimonial and physical evidence. 
 The issue of performativity and how the material is delivered is of undeniable 
importance, as the narrative is a presentation delivered as a form of monologue or soliloquy. 
From this presentation, the jury are not only introduced to the narrative of the parties 
involved, but also to at least one interlocutor per side who will be ‘guiding’ them through the 
evidence throughout the trial. Common belief is that juries do allow emotion and trust to 
impact on the decision-making process (Dershowitz, 1996) (whether intentional or 
otherwise), consequently, legal literature espouses that the manner in which first impressions 
are made has an impact on how the trial unfolds. 
 This leads to the stark contrast between the defence opening of Amanda Hayes and 
both other speakers. The volume, pacing and gestures were all markedly different in 
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comparison with the other three opening statements. The use of pause length is often 
considered a device within professional communication (Molloy, 2009), with research 
outlining how effective communication allows time for the listener to digest what is being 
said. However, the point at which a pause can be considered too long or their occurrence too 
frequent can null this effect and instead lead to implications of hesitancy, lack of faith in what 
is being said, or poor preparation (as described by Barge et al [1989] regarding the effects of 
nonverbal communication in opening statements on impression formation). Whether or not 
this had any impact on the jury or was in fact interpreted in such a way is beyond the scope of 
this analysis. That being said, it is interesting to note that the other two interlocutors both 
took a more active role in their opening statements. For example, the podium was used by the 
defence attorney for Amanda Hayes, but not the prosecutor or Grant Hayes defence attorney. 
The physical demonstrations, such as interacting with the witness stand, also present a more 
interactive means of introducing the narrative. 
 The topics that each attorney oriented to also provide an interesting view of what was 
selected as having primacy when talking to the jury. As has been mentioned previously, 
opening statements do not occur spontaneously, but are, by their very purpose, predetermined 
and (we hope carefully) planned introductions to each version of the case. Consequently, it is 
interesting to note that three out of the four initial openings provide a brief summary of the 
narrative in a manner not dissimilar to a prologue, two of which (the prosecution’s opening 
for Amanda Hayes’ trial and the defence opening for Grant Hayes’ trial) begin with single 
sentence declarations designed to be impactful and memorable. In the prosecution’s opening 
for Amanda Hayes’ this is the recitation of her alleged confession to her sister: ‘I hurt her. I 
hurt her bad. She’s dead.’; whereas for the defence of Grant Hayes, this was a single sentence 
summary: ‘this case is about a man covering up his wife’s actions.’. 
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 In the defence of Amanda Hayes, the initial topic is more procedural and focusses on 
the attorney himself and his role, rather than introducing his client or outlining a summary of 
the narrative. This divergence from the other three opening statements is not a sign that this 
strategy is less successful (such conclusions could not be drawn from such a small dataset), 
but is indicative of how, in that interaction, the attorney begins with an attempt to humanise 
himself (as someone capable of being nervous) and create a rapport with the jury. The 
position of empowering the jury could arguably remain somewhat ambiguous (see 4.2.3.4), 
however, the continued delay in introducing his client is something of a contrast with the 
prosecution opening, whereby the guilt of the defendant is set out in what is claimed to be a 
direct quote. That this perception remains unchallenged for that length of time is also a 
marked contrast to the approach taken in the defence of Grant Hayes. 
 In analysing the first three minutes of each opening statement, it is apparent that each 
attorney prioritises differently and that this in turn highlights differences in both personal 
style and trial strategy (as the concept of strategy cannot be removed from courtroom 
interactions). For the prosecution, both cases are similar, but the introductions to these cases 
contrast. The jury is not introduced to the victim first, as they are in the defence of Grant 
Hayes, but to the defendant. Establishing the guilt of the defendant, in this instance, 
supersedes the humanisation of the victim in terms of topic order. By the same token, the 
defence of Amanda Hayes places a priority on framing Grant Hayes as the person responsible 
in order to provide a foundation for the claims regarding Amanda Hayes own victimhood. 
This groundwork then supplants the introduction of the client in favour of producing a 
framework in which she can be recast in a role incongruous with that of ‘doing being’ a 
murder suspect. 
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 This leads us to a more holistic analysis of the opening statements overall, whereby 
the themes that have emerged overall are identified and discussed within the narrative 
framework as outlined in Section 4.1.1. 
 
4.2.3 Comparative analysis of the four opening statements 
 
All four opening statements (summaries in Appendix B, Tables 1-4) present an interesting 
use of chronology and theme. In comparing these four openings, one can also observe the 
different implications and meanings attached to the same evidence and ‘facts’ presented in 
each case. The opening statements for the prosecution were approximately 26 minutes each, 
while the defence openings for Grant and Amanda Hayes were approximately 19 and 40 
minutes each, respectively. 
 
 
4.2.3.1 Down the rabbit hole: the importance of time and location 
 
In discussing the importance of chronology as applied in the opening statements, it is first 
worth exploring the notion of time and its application to narrative. This thesis employs the 
notion of time within narrative as discussed by Ricoeur. In order to fully grasp this notion of 
time, it is important to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of chronology as a more 
complicated notion than that of one event following another. 
 For Ricoeur, sequences of events do not necessarily construct a narrative. An 
emphasis is placed on the ‘plot’, which ‘construes significant wholes out of scattered events’ 
(Ricoeur, 1980: 178). Another core aspect is that of the ending of a story. For Ricoeur, stories 
are constructed through their ending, as this provides understanding to the events that have 
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proceeded it, giving the beginning and the middle. This maps onto our conceptualisation of 
time within opening statements. The end of the ‘story’ is already known and therefore, the 
plot begins at the end and makes relevant those events which preceded it. Similarly, the 
‘conclusion must be acceptable’, meaning that with the ability to look backwards from the 
end, the events that have gone before created the means through which this ending was 
reached. This is described by Ricoeur as the ‘paradox of contingency’, characterising the 
comprehension of the story (Ibid, 174). 
 This can be applied to our understanding of temporality in the opening narratives. 
Time itself is not simply something that sequences events, but is made relevant in the telling. 
The ‘now’ becomes the being within-time, in which time is reckoned with; whilst in the 
telling, the narrative is also recollected and therefore transitions to historicality (Ibid). 
This also introduces the concept of life stories, in which one’s present situation 
influences and is influenced by what has gone before. It is the ability to reflect between the 
then and the now that allows the narrative of one’s life to gain coherence, with the end 
informing the beginning and middle, whilst the beginning and the middle are the events 
which have led to the end (or present ending) (Mishler, 2006). The ‘within-time-ness’ of the 
telling, in which time is made relevant through our preoccupations as Dasein (German for 
‘being’), is situated through the act of ‘making-present’ (Ricoeur, 1980). 
This conceptualisation of time is relevant to a temporal analysis of the narratives of 
the opening statements as it is through this spiral of end-to-beginning that law narratives are 
told, repeated and realised. Far from simply being a sequence of events, the plot of the 
opening narrative is one that links the end to the beginning and back again, and adds 
coherence to evidence that is otherwise ‘scattered’. 
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In comparing the structure of both the prosecution’s opening statements, there is some 
divergence in presentation as well as focus. The shift of focus is clearly the shift from Grant 
Hayes to Amanda Hayes as the defendant in the trial, however; the shift in presenting the 
evidence is subtler as it is displays a somewhat more refined version of the chronology of 
events. The timeline is more focussed and the ‘scene’ shifts spatially between Texas and 
North Carolina; and from Grant and Amanda Hayes movements to the actions of Laura 
Ackerson’s friends and the police. This occurs whilst keeping the days as a fixed point of 
reference (for example, the use of ‘meanwhile’ to move from Texas to North Carolina). 
Though the timeframe of events underpins the structure of these two openings, it is 
worth noting how the crime is framed differently for both defendants. In the case of Grant 
Hayes (Appendix B, Table 1) the use of the rhetorical question ‘where is Laura?’ is put 
forward as a question that people were asking from her friends to complete strangers as her 
disappearance became protracted. This device is not used the prosecution’s later opening 
statement for the trial of Amanda Hayes (Appendix B, Table 2), in which this appears to have 
been substituted by focussing on the time Amanda Hayes is believed to have been in the 
apartment without Grant Hayes’ presence and ‘presumably with Laura’s body’. This shift in 
emphasis invokes a different strategy in implicating the guilt of the defendant. 
In Grant Hayes’ trial, the rhetorical question of ‘where is Laura?’ is not asking for a 
direct response but is instead a device through which the jury can emotionally connect with 
the case. As Dershowitz (1996) outlined, stories within law begin at the end with the jury 
already aware of how the story concludes. The narrative, therefore, provides the story leading 
up to the ending. However, in Amanda Hayes’ trial, the focus is on Amanda Hayes’ alleged 
complicity in the death of Laura Ackerson. This is implied through an emphasis on inaction 
rather than action in topic 5 (Table 2) and throughout the trial, whereby Amanda Hayes did 
not attempt to get help despite being alone. In turn, this could be designed to undermine a 
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defence of duress as it presents the opportunity for the defendant to have done so. There 
could also be the potential for attempting to provoke a sense of incredulity as the question 
could then be posited; how could someone not know there is a dead body in the bathroom of 
their apartment? 
The emphasis on establishing a firm chronological timeframe also allows for a more 
direct contrast between the actions of those concerned for Laura Ackerson’s safety and 
whereabouts with those attempting to conceal a crime. Whereas in Table 1 the timeframe is 
used as an anchor point to refer back to while describing events, it appears to be more marked 
in the Table 2. 
Nevertheless, one can also be more critical within the analysis of time. Days are used 
as an anchor point, but the days are only relevant insofar as they are made relevant within the 
narrative. For example, revisiting Extract 4.2, the preoccupation at the beginning of the 
prosecution’s opening statement in the trial of Amanda Hayes, could be argued to be that of 
the alleged confession. All other events within that initial opening sequence are then 
positioned temporally around this reported statement and not within a strictly linear concept 
of time as the confession links both further back within the narrative (such as Laura 
Ackerson’s arrival at the apartment – lines 7-10) and projects forward to events that are in the 
past but are made into the past-as-future (such as the discovery of Laura Ackerson’s remains 
– lines 17-19). 
Within the prosecution’s opening statement in the trial of Grant Hayes, the 
chronological referencing appears to present a linear chronology of events, but that same use 
of time references interactions which are then tangential in their introduction of further 
information regarding the victim’s life. To elucidate, the 13th July 2011 is the second fact 
introduced within this opening statement (the first being the location of Kinston, North 
Carolina) (extract 4.1, lines 1-4). The introductory sequence of this opening statement then 
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takes the jury through a narrative of Laura Ackerson’s movements on that day (extracts 4.1; 
4.3). However, with each time referent comes a linked piece of information used to refer to 
the victim’s past as it is relevant to her movements within the ‘now’ of the narrative. All of 
which are then part of the overarching plot leading the listener to the already known 
conclusion of the story. For example, Laura Ackerson ‘had a couple of business meetings that 
day’ (extract 4.6, lines 56-7), this leads to an introduction of Laura Ackerson’s business 
partner and what the victim’s business endeavours were. This then leads to an explanation of 
her relationship with her family; the arrangements of the custody dispute (and its 
characterisation as ‘bitter’); before reorienting back to the meetings themselves and through 
the positioning of the first meeting at two o’clock. 
Thus, the chronology of events seems linear, but is actually subject to the 
preoccupations of the overall narrative as defined by the evidence being foreshadowed. 
Ricoeur refers to two dimensions within narrative in ‘various proportions, one chronological 
and the other nonchronological’ (Ricoeur, 1980: 178). These are the: 
 
 episodic dimension: ‘which characterises the story as made out of events’; 
 configurational dimension: whereby the plot constructs the whole out of ‘scattered 
events’. 
 
The introduction of topics outwith the chronological framework and yet related to the events 
referenced therein is contended by this study to be an aspect of the configurational 
dimension. Within this, additional aspects are reflected upon as relevant to the plot and draw 
together both sequence and pattern. Taking this a step further, through the sequence of events 
and the reflections contained within these, a pattern is then established which relates directly 
to the plot, leading the listener (who in this specific instance is aware of the story’s climax) to 
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join together a pattern of behaviour which supports the overall narrative conclusion – the 
point at which the story ends and (in this instance) in so ending becomes the present, with the 
act of the trial. 
 This same link between pattern and sequence can be seen in the opening statement of 
Grant Hayes’ defence. The chronological approach to Grant Hayes’ history with the victim is 
also used to include references to pattern, in this case that pattern being his behaviour as a 
father and husband (see Section 4.2.3.2). The defence of Amanda Hayes, however, does not 
immediately orient to the chronological framework of placing events temporally, but instead 
places preoccupation with the psychological state of Grant Hayes. That is not to say that this 
opening statement is without a temporal framework (quite the reverse), but that the footing of 
narrative within time is not as immediately apparent. 
What is interesting here is that the past-present-future of the narrative is linked 
through various means, not least of which is the standard use of date and time. To illustrate, 
in putting forward Grant Hayes as the person responsible for the death of Laura Ackerson, 
various devices are used. The voice of the victim is invoked (see Section 4.2.3.3) through the 
reading of extracts from the parenting history survey. This is a document produced in the past 
that was written in the ‘now’ and is linked with the past-as-future, whereby Laura Ackerson’s 
concerns regarding Grant Hayes are implied to have been realised through the act of her 
death. This in turn applies to the ‘made-present’ of the narrative, whereby this event is linked 
with the pattern of the plot and therefore supports the claim of Amanda Hayes as innocent. 
 
One final point regarding time, and bringing another facet into its use within the narrative of 
an opening statement, is the need to pull back slightly from the abstract and reinsert some of 
the practical issues regarding ‘time’ in court (although it is contended that, in doing so, the 
concept of time as discussed above is in no way invalidated). Another reason to establish a 
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timeline is both the physical evidence and the specifics of outlining a case. Though perhaps a 
rather crude representation, the core aspects of Cluedo are who, where and how – one is less 
concerned with ‘when’ Dr Black met his demise in the ballroom with the candlestick and 
Miss Scarlett rarely makes it to trial – this, however, presents a potential weakness in an 
actual trial, hypothetically speaking, as under what circumstances can the presence of the 
accused be proven if there is no timeframe in which to have it established (particularly with 
the burden of proof being the responsibility of the prosecution and not the defence)? 
 
The second aspect of import here is that of location. As has been discussed, time is a more 
critical aspect of narrative than simply a means of sequencing events. In turn, the importance 
attached to geographic positioning within the opening statements also emerges as a point of 
interest. Events are not only footed in time, but in a physical space. This does not simply 
encompass Laura Ackerson’s movements between Kinston and Raleigh on the 13th July 2011, 
or indeed the movements of Grant and Amanda Hayes between North Carolina and Texas, 
but follows the history of the defendants and victim over a combined period of several years 
from the US Virgin Islands to New York and so on. 
 The location of persons of interest within the narrative becomes an intrinsic part of 
establishing events. Whilst it could be argued that the spatial positioning is simply a function 
of establishing the narrative in respect of the facts of the case, where can be treated in as 
critical a manner as when. Not only is the location a part of establishing the ‘facts of the 
case’, it also provides a contextual means of understanding other related issues and 
implications. For example, Laura Ackerson’s residing in Kinston while Grant and Amanda 
Hayes lived in Raleigh is not only relevant in terms of placing the victim in the defendants’ 
apartment on the night of the 13th July 2011; it is also relevant as part of the (‘bitter’) custody 
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dispute, which in turn forms a contextual backdrop upon which the prosecution frames the 
turbulent relationship of the three primary persons. 
Location is also relevant inasmuch as it can be a form of spatial identity. For example, 
the trip to Texas is used by Grant Hayes’ defence to indicate that Amanda Hayes was the 
driving force behind the disposal of Laura Ackerson’s remains (as well as the person 
responsible for her death). Grant Hayes’ lack of ties (familial or otherwise) and Amanda 
Hayes’ links with that area through her family are cited as indications of Grant Hayes’ lack of 
agency (see Section 4.2.3.2). Thus, Amanda Hayes is attributed as having an identity linked 
with Texas, thereby reinforcing the narrative that she was responsible above Grant Hayes. 
In the opening statement of Amanda Hayes’ defence, the use of this geographic 
location is switched to imply that Grant Hayes was deliberately using a location associated 
with his then wife as a means of covering his own actions and implicating her (as part of the 
narrative concerning Grant Hayes having coerced and manipulated Amanda Hayes). Location 
is also key in this defence as it is used as a means of supporting a narrative of isolation, which 
includes physical space – while Grant Hayes was away spending Amanda Hayes’ money, she 
was at home, alone, with his children (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006). 
Location, therefore, becomes a multifaceted tool rather than simply a ‘fact’ or a 
means of allowing the jury to picture the scene. Location, as with time, is not merely about 
listing a sequence of events, but becomes a part of a larger framework in which where 
something took place has as much significance in terms of identity and state of mind as it 
does in terms of affixing a map co-ordinates (as during testimony aerial views of areas of 
interest were shown to the jury). Consequently, the question of where something took place is 
not an issue answered in isolation, but, this thesis contends, is intrinsically linked with the 
wider concept of ‘why that there?’6. 
                                                          
6 to borrow from the Conversation Analysis question of ‘why that now?’ (Prevignano and Thibault, 2003; 69). 
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4.2.3.2 The Talented Mr Ripley and his Stepford Wives: agency and responsibility in 
gendered societal roles 
 
The themes within the opening statements also provide a rhetorical comparison. Both 
defence openings refer to fear as a driving force behind the actions of their client, though the 
framing of this theme takes two different forms. For Amanda Hayes’ opening statement the 
fear is that of Grant Hayes, whereas the fear described in the latter’s opening statement is that 
of fear for his family and of not being believed regarding Laura Ackerson’s death as 
accidental (though these two things are admittedly interlinked). 
The theme of fear within the opening statement of Amanda Hayes is also interlinked with 
the concepts of manipulation and coercion. These two additional concepts are listed as 
separate entities as manipulation and coercion are arguably distinct from one another in 
practice, though members of the same continuum (Perloff, 2014). To illustrate, one could 
argue that, based on the opening statement of her defence, Amanda Hayes was manipulated 
into agreeing to travel to Texas and visit her family, and coerced into helping dispose of the 
remains. Another aspect within this is the reduction of agency attributed to Amanda Hayes by 
her defence. Amanda Hayes is portrayed as someone who was isolated by her spouse and lost 
control over her own life. Her actions, therefore, become an extension of Grant Hayes’ as 
opposed to the acts of an autonomous individual. Through this reduction of individual 
agency, Amanda Hayes is portrayed as lacking responsibility for her actions in tandem with 
complying under duress. 
The rhetoric for Grant Hayes has a somewhat more nuanced approach towards agency 
and responsibility. Though also alleging that the act of disposing of the victim was one of 
fear, the theme of family with Grant Hayes ‘covering up his wife’s actions’ places him in a 
role of responsibility for committing a lesser crime. This is then interlinked with his taking a 
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more passive role in the decision-making process for the disposal with the claims that he was 
doing as Amanda Hayes directed. This is supported by the trip to Texas with Amanda’s 
family and connections, not those of Grant Hayes, and through the confession she is claimed 
to have made to her sister taking responsibility for Laura Ackerson’s death. This places Grant 
Hayes in a position of reduced responsibility whilst still maintaining an acceptance of some 
limited agency over his actions and decisions. 
Both defence statements also present their client as a person separate from the crime with 
which they are charged. This, however, occurs in different ways. With Grant Hayes, this is 
one of the first topics introduced by his attorney (Table 3, Topic 27), however, with Amanda 
Hayes this occurs much later (Table 4, Topic 4). As outlined above, in situating Grant Hayes 
within the community, it provides a means of humanising the defendant outside of the label 
attached courtesy of courtroom procedure. By contrast Amanda Hayes could be argued to be 
humanised through her introduction, though this is almost exclusively in conjunction with 
describing her as a second victim. Therefore, rather than giving her an independent identity 
within the context of her being an individual, she is victimised and positioned only in 
association with Grant Hayes’ alleged descriptions of her (describing her as an ‘investor’ and 
a ‘Stepford wife’ – Table 4, Topics 4 and 5). As such, Amanda Hayes personality becomes a 
construct that exists only inasmuch as it provides evidence of Grant Hayes as controlling and 
manipulative. That she was an affluent widow with an older daughter are relevant as her loss 
of financial status and role as carer for the younger children are integral to the narrative. 
Consequently, whilst Grant Hayes is positioned not only within the family unit but also the 
wider community, Amanda Hayes is positioned to a lesser extent with a greater focus placed 
on who she was in relation to Grant Hayes. 
                                                          
7 Please note, as mentioned previously, that all tables for this chapter are located in Appendix B. 
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Both prosecution opening statements make use of the same evidence and chain 
events, however; the layering of events so as to indicate the guilt of Amanda Hayes draws on 
different social inferences. As mentioned previously, the inference of guilt is layered with 
inaction as well as action. The prosecution provides the assumption that the defendant had 
knowledge of the crime and thereby was complicit whilst in the apartment and failing to raise 
an alarm. This provides an interesting link with perceived versus reported behaviour. If the 
attempt is to undermine a defence of duress (prior, at this juncture, to its having been made), 
then research on domestic violence and rape could provide a means through which this 
argument could be analysed. 
In cases of domestic violence, it is not always straightforward for police to prosecute 
due to the reluctance of the victim to enter into the legal process (Mirchandani, 2006). 
Similarly, rape cases are increasingly claimed to be underreported and research shows a 
disparity between the believed behaviours of a victim versus those reported. These ‘rape 
myths’ include behaviours such as fighting with one’s attacker, inter alia, whereas reported 
behaviours include a level of compliance and negotiation between attacker and victim in an 
attempt to reduce the harm inflicted (Woodhams et al, 2012). Similarly, those who have been 
victims of domestic violence do not necessarily report abuse to the police, nor do they raise 
an alarm when alone (Smith and Natalier, 2005). This discussion is not for the purposes of 
inferring either the guilt or innocence of Amanda Hayes (such is the remit of the jury alone), 
nevertheless, for the purposes of analysing the narratives and themes situated within the 
opening statement, the societal issues that appear to be pre-emptively undermined could be 
argued to be based on ‘popular’ perceptions of behaviour rather than those increasingly 
reported through psychological and related research. This, in turn, perpetuates those same 
myths to the benefit of one case (convicting someone for homicide), whilst perpetuating the 
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means through which other cases may struggle to contend with what is only perceived to be 
‘normal’ behaviour. 
By contrast, the themes within the opening statement for the prosecution of Grant 
Hayes focus very much on his relationship with the victim and the custody dispute, without 
the additional inferences outlined above. The custody evaluation of the actions of Grant 
Hayes, particularly the evidence connecting him with various purchases, places the narrative 
in a framework that appears to draw fewer inferences from external theories. However, that is 
not to say that these are entirely removed. As discussed in the initial analysis of this opening 
statement (Section 5.2.1), themes such as the family and inferences made as to the acceptable 
actions of a father towards the mother of his children are also explicitly referred to. 
The opening statement for the defence in the trial of Grant Hayes makes use of similar 
themes found in the prosecution’s opening for this case. The theme of family and of the role 
of the father are threaded throughout the defence’s opening, though with different 
implications. The shift here can be marked by the subtle alignment with Grant Hayes as a 
husband acting to protect his wife, which contrasts with the prosecution’s inferences of the 
actions a father took against the actions of the mother of his children. Both arguments invoke 
the concept of family and allude to societal expectations of a man within the family unit, but 
reframe what form that family takes. This does not provide evidence towards guilt or 
innocence, but does highlight the nuanced rhetorical shift that can take place within the same 
theme. 
 The custody dispute is also mitigated throughout the defence’s opening. The conflict 
is placed in terms of ‘normal’ behaviour and the witness (Dr Ginger Calloway) is invoked as 
a person who can support the claim that arguments and the contentions within the custody 
dispute were not unusual (Table 3, Topic 6). Furthermore, this also implies that if the 
arguments within the custody dispute were ‘normal’ then they should not be viewed as a 
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precursor to premeditated murder. There is also an emphasis placed on the alleged mutual 
agreements between Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson regarding the custodial arrangements 
of the children. This introduces the concept of Laura Ackerson as a mother who is struggling. 
Contrasting with the prosecution’s narrative of the victim as a devoted parent determined to 
gain full custody over the children, the defence gradually introduces a narrative whereby 
Laura Ackerson struggled to have both children full-time initially and reiterates this through 
the two-week period where she is claimed to have had the children while Amanda Hayes was 
giving birth. 
A final point regarding this extract is the description of Grant Hayes in lines 29-32. 
The defendant is referred to as ‘that man’ in line 29, which could be argued to be a 
reformulation of ‘this man’ (extract 4.1, line 11). Grant Hayes is then described as ‘the father 
of her children’ before being named the person responsible for Laura Ackerson’s murder. In a 
manner not dissimilar to the use of the direct speech from extract 4.2, this also shows a three 
part shift in towards a negative and rather dramatic conclusion to the segment. Initially the 
defendant is described as ‘that man’. This not only highlights the defendant and his physical 
presence in court (along with the accompanying pointing gesture), but also provides no 
additional information regarding him as a person. This then becomes a ‘father’, which can be 
argued to draw on shared societal norms as to what the role of a ‘father’ should be. Finally, 
this becomes ‘the one responsible for her murder and disappearance’, providing a 
juxtaposition to the role of ‘father’ and the implications of one murdering the mother of their 
own children. As with extract 4.2, there are words that are stressed; ‘that’, ‘father’, 
‘responsible’ and ‘murder’. The culmination of this segment is the claim of the defendant’s 
guilt, which indicates an end to the introductory sequence before the topic shifts to the 
introductions of the prosecuting attorneys. 
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Prosecution opening GH 
 
10   and gentle (0.3) and she (shared/carried) 
11   custody of them with this man 
12   grant hayes↓ 
 
Prosecution opening GH 
 
29   little did she kno↑w↓ (0.3) that that↑ man↓ 
30   (0.4) the father of her children↓ (0.9) 
31   would be the one responsible (0.4) for her 
32   murder and disappea↑rance↓ 
 
This creates a gendered disparity between a presupposed shared societal norm regarding how 
a ‘father’ should act and the alleged actions of the defendant. 
 
4.2.3.3 Reframing evidence and invoking the voice of the victim 
 
Each of the four openings includes the following aspects: the events of the 13th July and their 
aftermath; the cleaning supplies; the co-produced letter giving Grant Hayes full custody of 
the children; the custody evaluation and the testimony of Dr Calloway; the disposal of the 
remains in Oyster Creek. 
This inference of evidence can also be seen in the other similar aspects mentioned above 
such as the ‘boat ride’ and the custody evaluation. The testimony of Dr Calloway becomes a 
recurring theme across all four openings. For the prosecution, her evidence situates the 
custody dispute as contentious and Laura Ackerson as a hardworking mother, with Grant and 
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Amanda Hayes by contrast as a couple who wanted her removed from their lives; thereby 
providing a foundation for the claim of premeditated murder. For the defence of Grant Hayes, 
the claim in the opening statement was that should would show that arguments in custody 
disputes were normal; mitigating the claims of the prosecution. For the defence of Amanda 
Hayes, her evaluation of Grant Hayes would support the claims of his negative personality 
characteristics and bolster the view that he was a dangerous individual. The references to Dr 
Calloway’s testimony are also accompanied by the custody evaluation and the parenting 
history surveys that Grant Hayes and Laura Ackerson both had to complete as part of the 
ongoing custody case. This foreshadows the intertextuality of the evidence in that it is not one 
piece of evidence or testimony in isolation that creates the claim to knowledge, but also the 
documents created that surround that testimony, thus giving a physical (documented) 
credence to statements made. It is also worth noting that despite the professional standing of 
Dr Calloway, she does not testify as an expert witness as her testimony is based on her 
‘personal observations’ of the defendants and victim and not based on her ‘specialized (sic) 
training’ (Matoesian, 1999: 491); though all the opening statements make use of her title and 
position of authority as a professional within the custody case, thus giving additional weight 
to the power-knowledge dynamic of the conflicting claims each opening statement makes 
regarding her (yet to be heard) testimony. 
Both opening statements for the defence also invoke the voice of the victim. Laura 
Ackerson’s diary, parenting history survey, recordings of custody exchanges, emails etc. are 
made relevant in the all the opening statements, but the active portrayal of the victim’s voice 
is particularly noteworthy in both the defence statements. In the defence of Grant Hayes, 
reference is made to Laura having written online how much better her situation was 
compared to others. This remark is brief but represents a use of the victim’s voice as support 
for the defendant’s claim to innocence. By contrast, in the defence of Amanda Hayes, the 
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defence reads out aspects of Laura’s parenting history survey for the custody evaluator which 
describes Grant Hayes as a sociopath and introduces the comparison of Grant Hayes to the 
movies Six Degrees of Separation and The Talented Mr Ripley. Interestingly, this use of the 
victim’s voice also adds the reported speech of Grant Hayes, as the claim within the report by 
Laura is that Grant Hayes made the comparison between himself and The Talented Mr 
Ripley. The invocation of the victim’s voice occurs to support the perspective of the defence 
by citing the victim’s own reported writings as a means of reproducing her state of mind. 
Consequently, Laura Ackerson writing that her situation was better than others supports the 
claim that whilst she and Grant Hayes argued, this was normal behaviour in the context of a 
custody dispute. On the other hand, the claims from the report read out by Amanda Hayes’ 
defence go towards the accusation of Grant Hayes as a controlling and dangerous individual. 
Consequently, the uses of the victim’s voice become re-contextualised outwith the form of 
the original utterance. 
The defence also addresses evidence that has previously been framed as damaging in the 
prosecution’s opening. Evidence such as the cleaning supplies are presented as the actions of 
a frightened man making a bad decision to attempt to help his wife. The cleaning supplies 
(and the saw) are thereby placed in a light which supports the lesser charge of accessory, but 
does not fulfil the claim of premeditated murder. This same reformulation of the evidence can 
also be seen in the defence opening for Amanda Hayes (Table 4), whereby the cleaning 
supplies are purchased by Grant Hayes and are presented as innocuous to Amanda Hayes 
through her then ignorance of the victim’s demise. Purchases and actions after that are 
attributed to her acting out of fear and coercion. 
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4.2.3.4 Just the facts: the characterisation of law enforcement and the judicial process 
 
The characterisation of law enforcement is another aspect of the narratives displayed 
throughout the opening statements. Though less prevalent in the narrative presented by 
Amanda Hayes’ defence, law enforcement officials are central in both prosecution narratives 
and are also referenced in the narrative presented by Grant Hayes’ defence. 
 As has been discussed previously, time and location are the means through which the 
prosecution narrative is grounded into a coherent and linear story for the jury. As the story 
fissures into two separate locations (those of North Carolina and Texas), two parallel 
plotlines are formulated. Those plotlines diverge not only on the basis of location, but also of 
the participants within those plotlines, primarily Grant and Amanda Hayes as the antagonists 
attempting to get away with murder and law enforcement as the protagonists who are 
working to uncover the truth and find justice for the victim. The role of law enforcement 
described in both prosecution opening statements underpins the conceptualisation of police as 
impartial, hardworking, and trustworthy. This is arguably a necessary presupposition to 
entrench within a jury, as it is evidence presented by the state that was gathered and analysed 
by law enforcement (and other associated and governmentally sanctioned departments) that 
forms the physical, fact-oriented basis upon which the narrative is framed. Any discrepancies 
within the evidence, therefore, could then potentially invalidate the prosecution narrative. 
Though the nuts and bolts of outlining the procedures followed when collecting the evidence 
takes place within the trial, the initial formulation of law enforcement is designed to engender 
a sense of trust that comes from being in a position of legitimised authority. 
 As discussed in 1.4 and 2.4, Foucault posits that disciplines objectify those on whom 
they are enacted without the visible entrapments found in traditional views of sovereignty 
(Foucault, 1977). Consequently, within the role of law enforcement is a characterisation of 
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the knowledge they have gained that pertains to the ‘truth’. This discourse is perpetuated by 
the prosecution, which is an actor legitimised by society. That is not to say that one should 
subsequently distrust anything said by a state authority, but the framing of the persona of law 
enforcement, though implicit, forms a presupposition which is implicitly challenged by the 
defence narrative of Grant Hayes. 
 To illustrate, the work of police officers is exemplified through the process by which 
the conclusion was reached that Grant and Amanda Hayes were persons of interest in the 
case. From the missing persons report made by Chevon Mathes to the Kinston Police 
Department, until the arrest of Grant and Amanda Hayes, the narrative focus for law 
enforcement introduces details deemed pertinent to the prosecution’s story. This includes 
each law enforcement department that contributed to the investigation as they became 
involved, and the order in which evidence was gathered; such as the discovery of the victim’s 
car. This is punctuated by the question ‘where is Laura?’, which is attributed as much to 
investigators as it is to those who personally knew the victim. 
The concept of police as rational actors in an objective role is not new (see Campbell, 
2003; 2004), nevertheless, this presentation of police processes of gathering evidence are 
characterised as impartial fact-finding in such a way as to engender a sense of trust from the 
outset. This is furthered through the unfavourable juxtaposition with the role of the 
defendant(s). Through the parallel chronological description, as the police are looking for 
Laura Ackerson, Grant and Amanda Hayes are disposing of her remains in a creek. The 
contrast is vivid and graphic, serving not only to impress the gravity and severity of the case, 
but also to provide a clear dichotomy between the objective gathering of evidence by those 
working hard to keep society safe, and those who would commit such an abhorrent act of 
violence upon another person. 
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In the opening statement of Grant Hayes’ defence, the characterisation of law 
enforcement is subtly different. The main theme of Grant Hayes’ defence is that he was 
covering up for the actions of Amanda Hayes that had resulted in Laura Ackerson’s death 
(described as something that ‘wasn’t planned’ and an ‘accident’). That Grant Hayes was 
covering up for his wife is cast in the light of a man trying to protect his wife. The role of law 
enforcement is then placed in a position of fallibility; the fear of being wrongfully imprisoned 
for a crime one did not commit. Grant Hayes defence not only casts Amanda Hayes as the 
person responsible for Laura Ackerson’s death and the mastermind behind the plan to dispose 
of her remains, but also places this alongside the fear of not being believed by the police. 
 
Extract 4.19 
 
105   grant and amanda started making 
106   terrible decisions because they 
107   were afraid to call the police 
108   they were afraid that no one was 
109   gonna believe what had-  
110   happened wasn't intentional 
111   wasn't something that meant to 
112   happen ws- that kinda thing 
113   worried about going to prison 
114   and they made terrible decisions 
115   and amanda took charge of the 
116   situation 
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As can be seen in the extract above, the fear of contacting the police is explicit (lines 107-9). 
Law enforcement is not in an authoritative position of trust, but one of fear. Encapsulated 
within this is the entire legal process, as the characterisation of the police as a fallible 
authority is also placed within the wider context of fearing the consequences of being found 
guilty – namely, ‘going to prison’ (line 113). We provided here with a different view of the 
authority of the police, no longer a tireless protector, but an authority with the power to have 
him imprisoned and that the defendant fears that he will not be believed by. 
 One is also presented with the justice system itself as being included within this 
representation of the police. The police not believing the defendant is also one part of a much 
larger subsequent process; that of the trial. This not only places the trial in the context of a 
fear made manifest, but also highlights the role of the jury as those who sit in judgement. If 
the jury, now, also do not believe the narrative of the defendant, then they are realising the 
very fears that are alleged to have driven the actions that he took in disposing of the victim’s 
remains. This is not to say that any of these narratives are the ‘truth’ or otherwise, but the 
setting of a trial and the context of the opening statement as being for the benefit of the jury 
cannot be ignored in teasing apart the narrative presented. 
 This allusion to the role of the jury and the judicial system overall leads to the 
portrayal of the jury itself within the opening statements. The function of the opening 
statement is to introduce how each side views the evidence and what they believe it will 
show. It is an opportunity to introduce a narrative and foreshadow upcoming testimony in the 
trial. However, the role of the jury is also reiterated throughout these opening statements. 
Each opening statement makes reference to the jury as those who will ultimately cast 
judgement upon the defendant. A point of interest in this are the dual implications of 
empowerment and accusation that can be made without being mutually exclusive. In the case 
of Amanda Hayes’ defence, the jury are reminded of their role up to the point of excluding all 
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else but their own recollections and interpretations of the evidence in decision-making and, in 
this sense, are empowered as a part of the judicial process (extract 4.16, lines 49-59). 
However, this contrasts with the somewhat accusatory implications of the jury as part of the 
judicial system sitting in judgement that can be inferred indirectly from the defence of Grant 
Hayes, whereby a guilty verdict makes them part of the very system of which he was afraid 
(and through that logic would be justified in that fear and distrust). By contrast, the 
prosecution empower the jury through the reminders regarding their role and what will be 
asked of them, but do not present their opening statements in such a way as to directly allow 
their dismissal. 
 
 
4.2.3.5 He said, she said: epistemic positioning and claims to knowledge in the defence 
narratives 
 
One of the main differences in the prosecution and defence narratives is that of the rights to 
knowledge. Who owns or has the right to a story is prevalent throughout narrative research 
(Schiffrin, 2006), and narratives within the courtroom form a particular kind of institutional 
interaction. Stories in the courtroom are a mixture of co-constructed (and sometimes 
conflicting) narratives, as well as those based in the style of a monologue; namely through the 
opening and closing statements of the attorneys. 
 In the opening statements of the prosecution for both trials, the actual events that 
occurred within the apartment on the night of Laura Ackerson’s murder remain conjecture. 
This is not subverted away from the jury or implicit, but is explicitly acknowledged. Instead, 
evidence surrounding the victim’s arriving at the apartment and that she was never seen alive 
afterwards is utilised to reconstruct a possible sequence of events that could have occurred 
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within the apartment, regardless of which, the victim did not survive. The actions of the 
defendant(s) after this event – particularly regarding the dismemberment and site of disposal 
of the remains – is cited as support for the act being congruent with the charge of first degree 
murder. 
 In the two prosecution opening statements the variation on these events is slight, 
focussing mainly of the shift from one defendant to another. The re-presentation of this 
evidence in both the defence narratives, however, is distinct. For example, the actual events 
of the 13th July in the prosecution narrative remain vague on the details of what happened 
inside the apartment. Instead, the narrative reflects Laura Ackerson’s movements of that night 
and how the Hayes’ apartment was the last place she went to. There is also the reference to 
the final phone call she made and inferences the prosecution draws as to her state of mind at 
the time. This is followed by the actions of Grant and Amanda Hayes respectively subsequent 
to Laura’s visit to the apartment. The conclusion to be drawn is that Laura Ackerson went 
into the apartment, but did not leave it alive. 
By contrast, the defence narratives both discuss the events of the 13th July 2011 from the 
perspective of the defendants’ having been present at that time and what they claim to have 
observed (or indeed, did not observe in the case of Amanda Hayes). In the opening by Grant 
Hayes’ defence, the narrative provided describes events within the apartment. This provides 
an interesting point as Grant Hayes’ team are placing their client in the epistemic position 
whereby a claim to knowledge is made. That the defendant was in the apartment is 
undisputed, but the prosecution were not and the implication, therefore, is that they cannot 
make a claim to knowledge as to how events unfolded. The version from Grant Hayes’ 
attorney places Amanda Hayes as the person who killed Laura Ackerson while Grant Hayes 
was out of the room. An emphasis is also placed on how this was accidental and not a 
deliberate action on her part, though this is arguably secondary to the claim of Grant Hayes’ 
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innocence. The claim made is that Grant Hayes had no part in a physical altercation with 
Laura Ackerson and only helped to conceal his wife’s guilt. 
This is paralleled somewhat by Amanda Hayes’ defence attorney, where a similar claim is 
made regarding the spouse’s presence at the time Laura’s death took place. In this instance 
Amanda Hayes called for her husband after Laura Ackerson fell into her from behind and 
then Grant Hayes and the victim both fell as she left the room; without observing the events 
that followed. 
There are similarities insofar as Amanda Hayes is claimed to have been displeased with 
the custody document the other two had produced (as the financial settlement was beyond the 
means of the Hayes’), and Laura Ackerson is claimed to have tried to hold Amanda’s baby 
daughter. There is also consistency insofar as both claim that Laura Ackerson wrote the 
custody settlement with Grant Hayes of her own free will (which is contested by the 
prosecution’s case). The divergence comes with the events that follow. Grant Hayes’ defence 
claim he helped conceal a crime committed by his wife, which took place as he left to get the 
children ready; Amanda Hayes’ team claim that she left the room as both Laura Ackerson 
and Grant Hayes fell to the floor and she did not know that Laura Ackerson was dead until 
after they had arrived in Texas. 
This presents two separate claims to knowledge where both defendants are positioned 
above the prosecution in knowing what happened inside the apartment, but both narratives 
present opposing views as to who is guilty. Though this is an obvious difference on the 
surface, the threads on continuity within all four accounts are what make the rhetoric 
sophisticated in its production. The concept of ‘truth’ is then mingled with the production of 
‘facts’. The facts presented are that Laura Ackerson did not leave the apartment of her own 
free will; a document was produced regarding custody (though whether this was by the 
victim’s own volition or not is contested); Grant Hayes purchased cleaning supplies and a 
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saw; and Amanda Hayes took the children out of the apartment that night. The ‘truth’ 
therefore becomes somewhat removed from the adversarial process, as the jury are faced with 
a decision on ‘narrative of best fit’ rather than a solid conclusion as to what actually 
happened to the victim. Thus, it becomes evident that the purpose of the trial is to determine 
whether the defendant is believed to be guilty of the crime, rather than an opportunity for the 
victim to have her ‘day in court’ – even posthumously – as the ‘truth’ remains a product of 
discourse in the relationship between power and knowledge rather than an absolute. 
 
4.3 Chapter summary 
 
In drawing this chapter to a conclusion, there are two final aspects to consider. Firstly, how 
does this analysis link the narrative with the charges (as introduced above)? Secondly, how 
does this analysis directly address the research questions of this project? 
 In answering the first, it is prudent to restate the three criteria of the charge of first 
degree murder as identified above: 
 
 Whether (or not) the act was planned 
 Whether (or not) the act was intentional 
 By what means the act took place (were the act to have taken place as outlined in the 
narratives) 
 
A number of different social themes and issues have been invoked in order to address these. 
The act as premeditated is part of the prosecution narrative through the victim having been 
invited to the apartment in the middle of week, which was not part of normal events. For both 
defences, the invitation is implied to have been an attempt for both parties to improve 
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relations. The evidence itself is that Laura Ackerson did go to the apartment that night. The 
requirements of mens rea and premeditation are not addressed by foreshadowing one piece of 
evidence or testimony alone, but become an ongoing theme throughout the prosecution 
narrative of events leading up to and directly after the death of the victim. The behaviour of 
the victim also becomes relevant, which leads to the importance attached to the letter she is 
believed to have co-written with Grant Hayes that night granting him full custody of the 
children. This is then framed as an act that was out of character for the victim. 
This is the same behaviour that is normalised in the defence of Grant Hayes, whereby 
the victim is described as having struggled to look after the children by herself at various 
points. Amanda Hayes’ defence narrative maintains that she was unaware that the victim was 
deceased until they were in Texas, thus removing her physically from the homicide itself and, 
consequently, removing her from having planned to murder the victim, as well as the act 
itself. 
The issue of agency and responsibility is also important, as this links directly with 
intent. As has been discussed, both defence narratives place agency and responsibility for the 
death of the victim with the other defendant. They both then seek to reduce the level of 
responsibility that can be applied to their own client. For Grant Hayes’ defence, this is framed 
through Amanda Hayes’ taking ‘charge’ and the trip to Texas involving her family. Grant 
Hayes’ defence then admit to a lesser charge of disposing of Laura Ackerson’s remains. 
Whilst there are arguments made against admitting to lesser offences in opening statements 
(as this could be viewed as prejudicial against the client), these arguments do not seem to 
apply to this specific case as one can presume the client was consulted on the narrative (the 
author has found no published evidence to the contrary, including the appeal information) and 
admitting to lesser charges can be used as a trial strategy (Wasik, 1982). The lesser charge of 
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helping to dispose of the body is then contextualised in the frames of responsibility to protect 
one’s family in a patriarchal context, and fear of law enforcement and the justice system. 
The claims concerning the events on the 13th July 2011 become the most conflicted 
and yet focused upon aspects of all four opening statements. The prosecution cannot identify 
exactly what happened to Laura Ackerson, but does emphasise her state of mind prior to 
going to the apartment that night and focuses on the evidence surrounding her disappearance 
and the disposal of her remains. Issues such as the custody dispute are made relevant as the 
prosecution uses these as being indicative of a contentious atmosphere out of which motives 
for murder could (and, in their narrative, did) arise. 
As outlined above, both defences differ greatly in their characterisation of what took 
place in the apartment, not least being their claims that the other person was responsible 
(though intent and levels of responsibility vary). One important part of proceedings to 
reiterate at this point is that, although the two defence opening statements are compared in 
this thesis, they were not produced as part of the same trial. Consequently, in situ, they were 
only in direct contention with the prosecution and not one another. The main aspects of the 
narrative that relate to this criterion for first degree murder, however, remain that the victim 
entered the apartment that evening and was not seen alive again. In all four opening 
statements, that remains as fact. It is the issues of intent and planning that remain in 
contention. 
 
In terms of the research questions (see 2.2), the representations made by the interlocutors of 
the state (both as the abstract legitimation of the accepted authority of the justice system and 
as the representation of the state of North Carolina) and those who represent the defendants 
have provided a means through which the communications between the state and the 
individual in this setting can compared. The opening statements provide a view as to how the 
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attorneys orient their cases, particularly how the evidence supports their own narrative. The 
defence is under no obligation to speak directly after the prosecution, but this has been noted 
as potentially risky, as a prolonged absence for the defence means that the prosecution is the 
only narrative to which the jury is exposed throughout the case of the state (Wells et al, 
1985). The defence in both cases orients to evidence they know to be in the prosecution’s 
possession (and have themselves through discovery). The defence is under no burden of proof 
and does not need to have its case fully prepared in terms of evidence prior to the conclusion 
of the state’s case, therefore, they do not need to refer to defence exhibits in the opening 
statement. This influences how the opening statements are framed, as the communications for 
the defence do include references to evidence and have a time-oriented framework that 
relates to the within-time-ness of events, but also place a focus on humanising their clients 
and contextualising circumstances. This is far from new (Cotterill, 2003), however; in 
comparing the two openings for the defence one could argue that there is the potential for an 
imbalance of power in proceedings simply through the act of one trial preceding another. 
That is not to criticise the act of holding two separate trials or indeed to imply that they 
should somehow have occurred separately in parallel. The implication highlighted here is that 
the trial of Grant Hayes held much of the evidence that was to be used in the trial of Amanda 
Hayes. The trial of Grant Hayes was oriented to as important by the defence of Amanda 
Hayes, using his conviction and testimony regarding his character as a means of providing 
evidence to support the framing of her as a second victim. 
In this instance, the patterns of communication have focused upon the topics attorneys 
have chosen, the themes that have emerged and how these topics have been managed through 
delivery and lexical choices. Opening statements do not occur spontaneously in a context-free 
vacuum, but are the result of planning and consideration (Ahlen, 1995). What can be drawn 
from this analysis regarding patterns of communication is that, although there is overlap 
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within opening statements regarding elements such as timeline, humanisation of the 
defendant/victim, etc., there is continued support for the claim that the act of storytelling in 
and of itself is part of the narrative in that it is how the story is experienced by the jury. 
 
To conclude, the opening statements provide the foundation for the narrative of each party. In 
terms of a three-level structure of agenda, macro-narrative, and micro-interaction, this 
provides the story through which the micro-interactions are managed and the aims of the 
agenda are funnelled. However, the agenda itself could also be viewed as somewhat flexible 
depending on the rigidity of one’s view of guilt and innocence. The agenda of the defence of 
Grant Hayes, for example, can be viewed as more complex than being found ‘not guilty’, it is 
specifically homicide that is under dispute (as evidenced through the admittance of lesser 
crimes). This contrasts with Amanda Hayes’ defence, whereby coercion against one’s will 
can find the accused innocent on all charges including any lesser ones which may have been 
filed, thus having an agenda to be found ‘not guilty’ on all counts. It is important to note here 
that the charge of accessory does not appear to have been part of Grant Hayes’ trial, as it is 
stated that helping to dispose of the body is a crime, but not murder and not the crime for 
which he is on trial. 
 For the prosecution, this provides an interesting shift between both trials, as the lesser 
charges are included for Amanda Hayes’ trial and all charges are disputed by her defence 
team, contrasting with the charges focused on for Grant Hayes’ trial. The agenda, therefore, is 
not as simple as ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ between the defence and the prosecution, but also 
incorporates other influencing factors (many of which are often part of any plea-bargaining 
processes, see Maynard, 1984). It is the contention of this thesis, that through the opening 
statements further support is given for the cyclical nature of courtroom interactions as regards 
the three-level conceptualisation. 
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Chapter 5: In the Absence of the Jury 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Research into courtroom interactions has often had a focus on the interactions that take place 
in the presence of the jury (Cotterill, 2003; Matoesian, 1993; 2001, etc.). In this chapter, the 
focus is placed on those interactions that take place outside of the hearing of the jury, but 
which remain available to the viewing (or, to borrow from Heritage [1985], ‘overhearing’) 
audience. These interactions were filmed by the camera in the courtroom and could be 
viewed by members of the public, but the jury were absent. It is important to note that a 
distinction here is made between those who are able to observe what is happening but have 
no recognised participation in the interaction, and the jury, who have a role within 
proceedings, even if they are largely non-vocal throughout. With this distinction, this thesis 
holds that the term ‘silent participant’ (Carter, 2011) is more aptly suited to the jury, rather 
than a more general application of ‘overhearer’, which is better suited to the viewing public 
outwith the institutional roles of the trial.  
Theoretically, this links back to the discussion of public spheres (see 1.5), whereby 
the public, private and civil spheres can be considered separate, and yet contain a level of 
overlap (much like a Venn diagram). In this instance, the civil sphere represents the level at 
which public and private boundaries can overlap. For example, private matters within a 
family can become matters pertaining to public interest when placed within a courtroom, or 
laws can be passed that influence the private sphere; thereby creating a socio-political space 
between what is commonly denoted as public and private (Sales, 1991; Smith and Natalier, 
2005). Within the context of the criminal trials under scrutiny, the public can be privy to 
information that can be withheld from the jury, particularly when the courtroom is being 
aired to the wider public via video-camera, yet the jury is absent. 
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Placing this in a contextual frame of reference, the interactions that took place in the 
absence of the jury had various functions. Firstly, there were instances of voir dire of 
witnesses, where they gave testimony before the judge and opposing counsel as a form of 
preview. This was usually so a decision could be made as to whether or not the testimony was 
allowed under the rules of evidence. Particular consideration can also be given to the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence versus its probative value (Imwilkeried, 1988)). Second, 
were the interactions that took place where judicial decisions were required outside of the 
hearing of the jury (for example, a ruling regarding an objection in an instance where both 
sides wanted to be heard). Finally, interactions that were administrative and focussed on the 
process of ‘doing court’, such as the attorneys’ charge conference near the closing of the trial 
where the charges and the judge’s instructions to the jury can be discussed. 
Interactions without the presence of the jury can also be viewed as a fundamental 
insight into the workings of the trial system. These discussions provide a means through 
which testimony can be edited or rebuffed before it reaches those who make the final 
judgement regarding the defendant’s guilt or innocence. In this regard, the importance of this 
aspect of court should not be understated. In this role, the judge acts as a gatekeeper, 
reviewing and determining what is permissible under law and the discussions are arguably 
contextualised in a more legalistic framework than an emotional or narrative one. This can be 
seen in the orientation towards ‘relevance’ that takes place within these interactions (as will 
be shown below). 
In analysing the interactions that took place, several points of interest emerged of 
which three have been selected as both relevant and of interest to this thesis. The first of these 
was the vocalisation of what was taking place for the benefit of the record; the second point 
was that of resolving of an issue that was oriented to as being a source of ‘trouble’ or unclear; 
251 
 
and the third was that of voir dire of witnesses prior to their presenting a contested piece of 
testimony. 
 
5.2 ‘If it says so, then it is’: the vocalisation of circumstances 
 
Cotterill (2003) inter alia have discussed the importance of and orientation to the court 
reporter in analysis of courtroom interactions. The importance of the role of the court reporter 
should not be understated, given the weight attached to the documents they produce as the 
‘official’ record of any given courtroom interaction. Proceedings recorded by the court 
reporter can later be reproduced as a written document which becomes an official record of 
what took place in court. This written document can be referred to in potentially important 
circumstances (for example, should a case go to appeal) and therefore has a certain status 
within law that should not be overlooked when analysing how courtroom interactions are 
conducted and oriented to. 
In the two trials presented here, structurally, the judge announces the absence of the 
jury, despite their obvious lack of physical presence, before continuing to outline the matter 
at hand (which is presumed to be for the benefit of ‘the record’). This is not then followed by 
anything that is discernibly formulaic in terms of phrasing or orientation, though the judge 
consistently holds the floor at this point and directs where proceedings go next. This places 
the judge in the position of selecting the next speaker or, indeed, self-selecting and continuing 
to hold the floor. 
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5.2.1 Reason and ruling 
 
Within the institutional context of vocalising matters deemed salient, one pattern 
occurred at various points during these interactions; this was the pairing together of a reason 
and ruling. Either before or after a ruling the judge provided a reasoning for that ruling, 
illustrating why that decision had been taken. Though this was not a universal pattern, it did 
occur several times throughout these interactions and provides a potential area of further 
investigation with a wider corpus of courtroom data. Within the context of this localised 
comparison, it displayed a vocalisation not only of nonverbal features, but also exemplified 
why a decision was taken by the judge. This is arguably with a view to possible future uses of 
these utterances after should a verdict be reached that induces an appeal or the matter 
entering a different court of law. As such, the concept of the silent participant can continue to 
be applied, much as Carter (2011) did with her findings regarding police orientation towards 
the tape recorder in British police interviews, however; in the context of trial proceedings, the 
silent participant could also be argued to encompass the transcript being produced by the 
court reporter. As with the tape recorder, this is not animate, but represents the potential 
future use of the recording (or in this case document) as a representation of interactions 
(Ibid). 
Though this study does not dismiss the court reporter as a person who is also 
participating in the trial process (and the person who determines content of the document 
under production), there is an argument at this point for placing an emphasis on the potential 
document itself. This being that, although the court reporter is not here arbitrarily viewed as a 
passive actor without agency, the court reporter does not have the potential active role in later 
proceedings that the document they produce does. In this regard, it is for the benefit of the 
potential uses of a document that may be required at a later point in time that these utterances 
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are made. Much as a police tape at interview is oriented to, not for its immediate value, but 
for its later potential uses at an undetermined future point within the legal process (Ibid). 
With this being said, the following extracts exemplify this reason-ruling pair in the 
absence of the jury. 
 
 
Extract 5.1 (D10P7Ex1 AH) 
 
81 JUD  .hh that is for the jury to determine↓ 
82   (0.5) u:h (0.5) what those words meant (0.2) 
83   i understand that (1.4) u:hh that there 
84   is sufficient evidence by the law (0.2) 
85   to: to allow the (0.7) that issue 
86   to go the jury based at this↑ point 
87   on s- the evidence before the (.) 
88   court (.) before the jury and therefore 
89   the motion↓ to (.) dismiss °the° (0.8) 
90  → HOMicide charge is denied↓ 
 
This extract occurs at the end of state’s case in Amanda Hayes’ trial and comes after a 
request for charges to be dismissed based on the state having failed to make its case. This 
follows prior talk in which the issue is discussed with the defence stating their argument and 
reasons to the judge. This sequence could be viewed as a form of summary that precedes the 
final decision (thereby closing the topic). Lines 81-88 contain the reason for the decision, 
with the ruling following at lines 88-90. The language used in delivering the ruling is well-
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known and formulaic within the context of legal proceedings, which (although common 
knowledge) allows the ending of the reason and the start of the ruling to be clear and distinct. 
 
Extract 5.2 (D10P7Ex1 AH) 
 
225 JUD  °i understa↑nd↓° (.) u:mm (1.2) at this↑ 
226   point i- i don't i fail to see the relevance 
227   of it i certainly fail to see how 
228   it's competent under the rules of 
229   le- evidence as i understand↓ it↑ (0.6) 
230   a:nd u:m (.) the request to (0.8) u:hh you 
231   can offer it for the record u:h the 
232   request to (.) u:h (.) i-in submission i:s 
233  → u:h (0.9) does the state object↑ 
234 ADA1  [yes  ] 
235 ADA2  [yes sir ] 
236 JUD  °yes° i thought↑ you had↓ u:h the 
237  → objection's u:h sustained uh (0.4) 
238   it will be (.) made a part of the record 
239   but it will not be (0.7) u:h (2.6) it 
240   will not be referred to: (0.2) u:hh (1.2) 
241   until such time as u:h you convince me 
242   later a-d- during your evidence that 
243   it-it's become relevant (0.5) i'll hear 
244   you again↑ if you do↓ (0.5) °all=right° (1.2) 
245   what additional evidence (   ) do 
246   you intend to offer any↑ 
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This occurs at a shift between the state’s case and the opportunity for the defence to present a 
case in response (remembering that the defence does not carry burden of proof and therefore 
is not required to present a case; it can contend that the evidence is lacking and there is no 
case to answer). There are three points that need to be addressed when applying the reason-
ruling pair within this extract. Firstly, there is the orientation to the judge’s understanding as 
the reasons for the ruling (that is to follow) are initially laid out. This, however, is interrupted 
by a question to the prosecution, confirming that there was, indeed, an objection. Only after 
this clarification is the ruling then made, sustaining the objection. This is followed by a form 
of postscript caveat, contextualising the form of the objection and the circumstances under 
which the topic may be revisited. In this instance, the pattern could be argued to have formed 
a reason-ruling-addendum format. 
 
 
Extract 5.3 (D10P5 GH) 
  
16 JUD  .hh (1.0) ↑u::m (2.2) hh the court does 
17   find that the: probative value out (0.5) 
18   weighs any prejudicial effe:ct (3.2) a:nd 
19  → has overruled your (2.6) objection (3.5) 
20   the words in the so:ng and th- and also 
21   the (3.4) °uh° (1.2) t-the way in which 
22   they're used u:h (.) the jury may find 
23   relevant (1.6) uh and therefo:re the 
24  → objection is overruled 
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This extract comes from the trial of Grant Hayes and refers to a song alleged to have been 
written by the defendant and has been under discussion as having a prejudicial effect should 
the jury be given access to it. The reasoning yet again comes first in lines 16-19 (whereby the 
probative value is determined to outweigh the prejudicial effect) and is followed with the 
ruling in line 19 (‘has overruled your objection’). This is then followed by an expansion of 
the initial reason (lines 20-3) with details as to why the evidence has been probative and 
relevant, before being followed with the formulaic ‘objection is overruled’ in line 24. Though 
this does support the reason-ruling pattern, it also shows that this is a more general concept 
that, rather than a strict pattern, is subject to variations on a theme with the two occurring in 
tandem but allowing for variations in their presentation. 
 
Extract 5.4 (D3P4 AH) 
 
33 JUD  with regard to: the: (2.5) request of the 
34   witness to call a number that was listed 
35   <o:n the: u:hh> (1.4) the item of evidence 
36   u:m (2.4) to determine who answered toda:y↑ 
37   (0.9) since mister gaskins has had all that 
38   information throughout the course of this 
39   investigation then- by way of disco↓very↑ 
40   (0.4) and since he had every opportunity to 
41   find out (.) who that number belonged to 
42   (0.6) he certainly could have made that call 
43   or somebody could have made that call on his 
44   behalf and .hh therefore the uh (0.9) u:hh 
45  → the hh (0.9) objection was sustained↓ (0.7) 
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This extract also shows the same format with regards to the presentation of the reasoning and 
then the ruling itself. The context for this is an instance where the jury has been sent out after 
an attempt was made by the defence to have a witness make a phone call as a demonstration 
during testimony (for further details see 5.3.1). 
 
Extract 5.5  (D3P4 AH) 
 
166 JUD  i don't preclude you calling a witness 
167   to demonstrate what you're trying to 
168   sho:w but i'm not willing (0.5) allow you 
169   to conduct a demonstration in this 
170   court↑room↓ (0.4) from the testimony of a 
171   witness who is not familiar with what 
172   you're ↑talking about↓ 
173 DEF1  i understand 
174 JUD → okay (0.9) >all=right< (0.4) objection 
175  → sustained (0.8) without prejudice to the 
176   right to call up- for you to call a 
177   witness to show what it is you're 
178   trying to show (.) okay↑ 
 
This follows a similar pattern outlined above as regards the reason-ruling-addendum format. 
Within this extract, the reason for the specific refusal (the witness’ lack of familiarity with the 
topic under discussion) is separated from the more general issue of eliciting this testimony in 
general. As such, there is a caveat regarding the defence’s position should they provide their 
own witness in lines 166-8 (as this was a witness for the prosecution), but the reasoning for 
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the ruling then follows in lines 168-72 (which is acknowledged by the defence). Only after 
this at 174-5 does the ruling itself occur, with the addendum summarising the caveat outlined 
initially in lines 166-8. 
 
The reason-ruling format has been shown to contain variations on a theme (including 
caveats/addendums) rather than to be a stringent formula, however, this is still indicative of 
the institutional and formulaic concept of speech within a legal context and the manner in 
which these legal requirements vocalised for the record and are met. 
 
5.2.2 Orientation to understanding and knowledge 
 
Another point of interest that emerged from the data was the judge’s orientation to 
understanding and knowledge. Though this is also linked with resolving issues (see section 
3.3), it also performs a vocalisation of the judge’s understanding of the matter at hand. This is 
relevant, as in verbally reiterating and reformulating what is being said, the judge is providing 
a record of the premise on which the reasoning and subsequent ruling will be made. In 
addition, the through demonstrating a lack of understanding, the judge also invites additional 
clarification for the record, which could be argued to reduce potential ambiguities from the 
evidence being presented. 
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Extract 5.6 (D2P7 GH) 
 
1 JUD  u:m the jury↑ is absent↓ (11.2) .hh 
2   uh (3.5) i guess maybe i'm confused okay 
3   so a-and i kinda need to know what's 
4    going o:↑n↓ 
 
The above extract occurs during the questioning of Amanda Hayes’ daughter during the trial 
of Grant Hayes. With the absence of the jury, the judge directly orients to a need for 
clarification, citing that his own understanding is important. In this instance, it is not with a 
view to making a ruling on a point of contention between the state and defence, but a 
clarification of his own understanding of the custody exchanges of the children between the 
defendant and the victim. 
 While this extract refers to the issue of understanding specifics of testimony, the 
following orients towards knowledge of the law. 
 
Extract 5.7 (D10P7Ex1 AH) 
 
197 JUD → (   ) uh i know of no basis 
198  → (.) for it's admis↑sion↓ .hhh (2.8) i-it 
199   uh i'd be glad to hear y' again↑ if 
200   u:h if her state of mind at that time↓ 
201   (1.1) at th-the ti:- at the time you're 
202   ta↑lking↓ about her state of mind at 
203   that↑ time which is what u:m (0.6) 
204   ten days after this (0.4) alleged offence↑ 
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205   or more↑ (0.7) u:hh (0.3) on that date 
206   becomes relevant↑ 
 
In this extract, the judge refers to his knowledge of the rules of law (lines 197-8) as the 
grounds upon which a judgement has been made regarding the admission of a certain piece of 
evidence. Here the defence is making the argument for the admission of evidence and the 
judge can be seen to place his decision within his knowledge of the law, also referring 
directly whether or not the point being made can be considered ‘relevant’ within those rules. 
 
Extract 5.8 (D9P3 GH) 
 
29 JUD  hm (0.7) do you contend that you have 
30   never seen it or (.) don't have access 
31   to it .hh 
32   (0.5) 
33 DEF1  no °=your honour= (.) i wouldn't↓° (0.4) 
34   uh-i- i contend u:m 
35 JUD  i mean yu-you have had access to it↑ 
36 DEF1  yes i have had access to it↓ (0.3) 
... 
55 JUD  so (0.2) um (1.7) what is it that we're 
56   (.) talking about↑ 
 
Lines 37-54 of the above extract have been omitted. This sequence shows the judge’s 
position as seeking clarification as to the point of contention between the defence and the 
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prosecution – which in this instance regards whether or not aspects of a document can be 
included as evidence. Contextually, this occurs at a point in which the evidence is in the 
process of being presented by the prosecution and becomes an objection that is to be resolved 
outside of the jury’s presence. The sequence from lines 29-36 focusses on whether the 
defence had access to a document that is part of the prosecution’s evidence. The need for 
clear understanding by the judge is once again a point of orientation for the jury absence 
sequence, with the judge finally asking, ‘what is it we’re talking about’ in lines 55-6. This 
question does not select the next speaker, but opens the floor for either attorney to provide an 
explanation. The floor is then taken by the prosecution, making this their first turn within this 
specific interaction. 
 
While the absence of the jury appears to provide a discursive space in which elements of the 
trial can be discussed and ruled upon prior to their becoming evidence, it also provides a 
space for clarification. The judge not only probes for further understanding, but then 
summarises and reformulates what has been said in a demonstration of understanding, be this 
the form of seeking agreement for the summary or as part of the reasoning provided for a 
ruling. As this remains part of the court record, it demonstrates a vocalisation of said 
understanding as well as generating a record of what each party said on the subject at hand. 
This provides further evidence towards the importance of the potential future audience of the 
court record, orienting to a listener (or reader) that has yet to be actualised (much as the audio 
recordings in research by Carter [2011]). 
 
Another interesting feature highlighted within this sequence is its bearing on the overall 
defence narrative. The defence of Amanda Hayes is seeking to establish in front of the jury 
that there is doubt about the character of Grant Hayes through the use of the telephone 
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records. In casting aspersions on the character of Grant Hayes, the narrative for the defence 
purports that this supports the claims that Amanda Hayes was also victimised.  
 
Having explored the importance of vocalising circumstances within these interactions, the 
following section will discuss the resolution of issues outwith the jury’s presence. These 
matter for discussion have been described generally as ‘issues’ with the term here 
encompassing any matter which requires discussion and/or resolution by the judge without its 
being exposed to the jury. 
 
5.3 Resolving issues within the legal framework 
 
One of the main themes within the interactions where the jury was absent was that of 
resolving a perceived legal issue. This could involve an issue where the judge’s 
understanding of the current situation is unclear or where there is a motion or objection that 
needs to be discussed prior to the continuation or presentation of testimony. 
 The first sequence has been analysed in its complete form as it provides an holistic 
view of an issue where understanding was oriented to repeatedly as an issue that required 
resolution, even after the topic had been ruled on. Following this, other examples of the 
judicial role in resolving issues will be discussed and contextualised. 
 Within this analysis, the role of the judge in these instances also reinforces the 
Foucaultian concept of power as being legitimised through institutional nodes. In these 
interactions, the judge can claim the floor without reprisal and makes the final decision 
(citing reasons in law for doing so). The judge here invokes both his knowledge and 
understanding of the law and the particular situation being presented when determining what 
course of action to take (as shown in section 5.2). 
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5.3.1 ‘Where are we now?’: the experiment that did not happen 
 
One particular interaction that took place whilst the jury were absent was of note simply by 
the extraordinary nature of the content when placed in the context of the other interactions 
within both trials under exploration. To briefly summarise the context of this interaction, 
directly preceding the jury’s absence the following took place. 
 During the prosecution’s case of Amanda Hayes, the defence were cross-examining a 
police officer. In the course of this cross-examination, the defence attorney was granted 
permission to approach the witness and proffered his own mobile phone for use by the 
witness, with the task being for the officer to call a telephone number deemed relevant by the 
defence for the purpose of identifying to whom the number belonged (allegedly a voicemail 
system). This was interrupted by the prosecution who, rather than calling an objection, 
oriented to the judge noting that the defence attorney would have his phone placed in 
evidence were this to continue. This resulted in the judge sending the jury for a break and 
holding a discussion over this development (see extract 5.9). 
 
 
Extract 5.9 
 
5 DEF1  let's use my phone↓ first 
6 WIT  okay 
7   (1.6) 
8 ADA1  your honour (0.6) i'm afraid that if (0.8) mister 
9   gaskins uses his phone to do it it's gonna 
10   be admitted into evidence↓ 
11 JUD  i'm sorry↑ 
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12 ADA1  i said i-i'm worried that if mister gaskins 
13   uses his phone then it's then gonna be 
14   admitted into evi↑dence↓ 
15   (0.6) 
16 JUD  it certainly i↑s↓ 
17   (2.3) 
18 JUD  u:m 
19 DEF1  can i get it back↑ 
20   (4.1) ((some laughing)) 
21 JUD  ↑tell you what↓ uh we'll have that 
22   conversation while the jury takes a bre↑ak↓ 
23   °okay↑° (0.8) uh >folks you haven't heard it 
 
This exchange invokes a number of interesting features, not least of which is the manner 
whereby the contestation of current events is noted, but not in such a way as to provide 
additional adversarial tension to proceedings. The orientation by the prosecution to the judge 
holds a different tenor to that found in other objections. The judge is addressed, interrupting 
the defence (as is the nature of an objection), but is not followed by a formulaic phrasing. 
Instead the judge is made aware that the defence attorney will lose his phone should the 
interaction continue on its current trajectory. What is of note here is that this is a turn that 
orients to the judge, but is neither an explicit objection nor a direct turn orienting to the 
defence, even though it is Mr Gaskins’ awareness of the possible fate of his mobile phone 
that forms the subject of the utterance. The judge responds with ‘I’m sorry’ (line 11), which 
is then treated as a request for clarification, with the prosecution producing a longer 
explanation regarding the fate of the mobile phone should the experiment take place (lines 
12-14). This rephrasing shifts from ‘I’m afraid’ (line 8) to ‘I’m worried’ (line 12). The use of 
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these phrases expresses a concern for the loss of the mobile phone, yet this is later oriented to 
as an objection (see extract 5.10, line 45). In addition, the response by the defence (line 19) 
produces laughter as a response. While this does not necessarily mean that the utterance is 
being viewed as humorous – as laughter has multiple uses within interactions (Hepburn and 
Bolden, 2013) – it does continue the tenor instigated by the prosecution (line 8) and the judge 
then orients to the defence’s question as a matter requiring attendance outside the hearing of 
the jury. 
 This provides the context in which proceedings then continue after the jury has left. 
One aspect of note within this interaction was the orientation to ‘now’ in the context of a 
sequence that focuses on resolving an issue. 
 
 
Extract 5.10 
 
33 JUD  with regard to: the: (2.5) request of the 
34   witness to call a number that was listed 
35   <o:n the: u:hh> (1.4) the item of evidence 
36   u:m (2.4) to determine who answered toda:y↑ 
37   (0.9) since mister gaskins has had all that 
38   information throughout the course of this 
39   investigation then- by way of disco↓very↑ 
40   (0.4) and since he had every opportunity to 
41   find out (.) who that number belonged to 
42   (0.6) he certainly could have made that call 
43   or somebody could have made that call on his 
44   behalf and .hh therefore the uh (0.9) u:hh 
45  → the hh (0.9) objection was sustained↓ (0.7) 
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46  → u:m (1.0) now (.) tell me mister gaskins what 
47   you're asking (0.3) this witness to do right 
48   now↓ 
49   (2.5) 
 
This extract provides a summary of the judge’s reasoning (lines 33-44), followed by the 
ruling itself (line 45). On the surface this appears to have oriented to the prosecution’s 
interjection as an objection, which has then been sustained, including vocalised reasoning; 
however, at line 46 there appears to be a topic shift towards what the defence attorney is 
asking the witness to do ‘right now’. This orientation to ‘now’ seems to be introducing 
something new, but the request being made of the witness has already been denied through 
lines 33-45. 
 This orientation to ‘now’ is then treated by the defence as something which can be 
resolved through going ‘back’ (see below, extract 5.11, line 49), with the subject then divided 
into more than one issue. 
 
 
Extract 5.11 
 
50 DEF1 → let me go back to the first issue that 
51   i raised about the two-oh↓-one↑ exchange↑ 
52   (1.1) i- [i-] 
53 JUD       [i-]i'm not sure what  [you  ] 
54 DEF1         [(   )] 
55   know who that phone number belo:ngs to: 
56 JUD  >okay<= 
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57 DEF1  =na-i'm want- to find out from hi↑m↓ 
58   (1.0) 
59 JUD  he doesn't know who it belongs↓ to↑ 
60 DEF1  it belongs to a voicemail system↓   
61 JUD  (well) he said he didn't know who it 
62   belonged °to↓ so↓° 
63 DEF1  but if he dialed it the voicemail system 
64   is gonna answer↓ 
65   (1.4) 
66 JUD  well (0.3) u:m .hh (1.8) you can put that 
67   evidence on:↓ (0.3) when you choose (1.0) he 
68  → doesn't kno:w and i'm not gonna have him dial 
69   that (.) in this courtroom↓ today↑ (0.4) okay 
70   (0.9) you can call somebody and have them 
71   dial that number↓ on your own ca↑se↓ (0.9) 
72   >all right↑< 
73 DEF1  °okay° 
 
In going back to orient to the ‘now’, the seemingly resolved issue of making a phone call in 
court is once again the topic, though now contextualised in terms of the purpose it serves to 
the overall case for the defence. This extract is marked through the short exchanges that take 
place between the judge and the defence attorney, with the judge taking the floor regularly 
throughout the explanation of the defence. This can be seen in lines 51-3 with the overlapping 
talk, and the subsequent exchanges in lines 55-64. The reiteration that the phone call is 
denied is made yet again at lines 68-9, but introduces a new caveat in that this phone call is 
not being allowed in regards to this witness, with the defence being told they can provide this 
evidence with their own witness during their case (remembering that this is a cross-
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examination by the defence during the prosecution’s case). This appears to link back to the 
objection that has already been sustained (the phone call is not allowed), but now provides 
additional information for the defence as to a circumstance in which this evidence may be 
allowed. 
 Once again, this appears to close the matter regarding the phone call experiment. 
Immediately after this, the orientation once again returns to ‘where are we now’ (see below, 
Extract 3.4, line 74). This is the second iteration of this question. This time, however, the 
defence orients to the present as opposed to the previous instance where the orientation was 
towards the past. There is no further reference of there being more than one ‘issue’ that needs 
resolving, but rather the topic appears to continue, despite the two clear indications that the 
phone call is not allowed in the present circumstances (lines 45; 68-9). 
 
 
Extract 5.12 
 
74 JUD → so where↑- where are we now↓ 
75 DEF1 → °okay° where (.) we are now (.) is that (.) 
76   he's indicated that he's not familiar with 
77   the- 
78 JUD  and i would say (0.6) h-he doe- (0.4) we 
79   won't kno:w↓ (0.4) u:hh (1.7) (h)what the 
80   respon↑se is↓ (1.8) if he dials the num↑ber↓ 
81   (0.6) 
82 DEF1  he will ↑hear the response↓ 
83   (1.5) 
84 JUD  >well ↑he won't- ↑he won't know anything 
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85   except what he hea↑rs↓< 
86   (2.0) 
87 JUD  that's -at's hearsa:y↑ (1.1) that's coming 
88   in from somewhere else↑ (.) nobody kno↑ws 
89   where it's coming in from↑ (0.7) so (.) °in 
90  → any↑ event the objection's sustai↑ned↓° 
91  → (0.3) n-n so where are now↓ 
92   (3.1) 
 
The judge again claims the floor, interrupting at line 78. This interruption re-establishes the 
topic of the phone call as the point of the conversation for the third time, with the judge 
providing an additional comment to his previous reasoning. The topic is again oriented to as 
unresolved, despite having been denied twice. The interjection by the judge adds an 
additional legal reason as to why the experiment is denied – that of ‘hearsay’. Hearsay is 
defined in North Carolina as ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted’ 
(Smith, 2013: 2). At this point, the reasoning has encapsulated the officer’s lack of 
knowledge regarding the phone number, lack of familiarity with the process being described 
by the defence, and now the hearsay law, in which the information would be coming in from 
outside (also two years after the crime took place) from an unknown source, then being 
repeated by the officer as ‘truth of the matter asserted’. This leads to the second sustainment 
of the objection (line 90) and the third asking of ‘where are we now’ (line 91). 
 At this point, the issue of the telephone call has recurred as an issue in need of 
resolution three times, with both the defence (line 49) and the judge (lines 33 and 78) 
reintroducing the topic; though the third introduction of the topic is somewhat ambiguous, as 
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the defence could have been continuing to orient to the issue at line 76, but this was 
interrupted by the judge with the hearsay reasoning. 
 Throughout these four extracts, there has also been an orientation towards the 
hypothetical, with the predicate act of making the phone call providing the platform for 
potential outcomes and their veracity in court. The divergence between the information to be 
gained should the call be made regarding its being a voicemail system (the defence assertion) 
and the lack of knowledge on the part of the officer regarding the owner of the phone number 
(the judge’s position) presents a schism in understanding that appears to impact on the topic 
recurring. The officer’s knowledge (or lack thereof) is referred to four times across these four 
extracts in lines 59; 61-2; 67-8; and 84-5. The knowledge of those in the courtroom (‘we 
won’t know what the response is’) is also referred to as part of the hearsay reasoning. 
 The defence reasoning behind the experiment is predicated on their claim to 
knowledge that the phone number belongs to a voicemail system. The concept itself is not 
dismissed by the judge (lines 78-80; 87-90), but the means through which that evidence is 
attempted to be elicited is under dispute (the use of the phone by the police officer in the 
courtroom). The hypothetical outcome is first introduced in line 63 (‘but if’), with the officer 
hearing the response oriented to as adequate means through which to introduce the testimony. 
Having the officer use the phone to elicit the testimony that the number is alleged to belong 
to a voicemail system becomes not only a legal issue that requires resolving, but also shows 
the importance of the judge’s understanding. 
 The lack of understanding between the judge and the defence attorney does not end 
with the third denial of the request, but the matter of the phone call experiment continues to 
be discussed with the judge introducing the topic a fourth time (see extract 5.13, below). 
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Extract 5.13 
 
93 DEF1  >that's probably all i have then↓< 
94 JUD  okay↑ are you going to (.) u:hh (1.3) i 
95   sent the jury↑ out u:h (1.5) you wanted him 
96   (0.6) you wanted to show him your pho:ne= 
97  → i wasn't sure exactly what (0.4) the purpose 
98   of that was↓ 
99 DEF1  w-w-w- i-i'll go back to that↓ (0.3) i 
100   don't- i don't want t- i don't want  
101   my phone- lose my ↑TELepho:ne↓ though 
102   (1.3) u:h 
103 JUD  well i mean i- if anybody else wants to lend 
104   you their ↑phone uh you can use thei↑rs↓ 
105  → uh (0.8) uh b-but- (0.8) i don't understand 
106   what (1.5) <what is your intention by handing 
107   a telephone to the officer and asking 
108   him to do something please↑> 
109   (1.5) 
 
The judge orients twice to the matter of his own understanding in the extract above. In line 97 
this is framed as ‘I wasn’t exactly sure’, and in line 105 this is explicitly stated as ‘I don’t 
understand’. This has the issue of the phone once again being reintroduced by the judge. The 
defence at this point has oriented to the matter as closed, but it is reopened with the judge 
making two enquiries regarding the reason. The first of these is implicit in lines 97-8 (‘I’m 
not exactly sure what the purpose of that was’). The defence once again refers backwards 
away from the ‘now’, indicating that this orients to prior talk, but references the initial 
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interruption made by the prosecution in the potential loss of his mobile phone. The judge 
responds to this, but then makes an explicit question of the intent behind handing the phone 
to the officer with emphasis on ‘what’ and a slower pace of speech (lines 106-8). The force of 
this question is marked in comparison to the previous talk and it could be inferred that the 
judge’s understanding of the situation remains unclear, despite the prior rulings and the 
previous orientation to the matter as closed. The following extract has been shortened for 
convenience, but represents a lengthy turn in which the defence attorney provides a more 
detailed explanation – this time without interruptions. 
 
Extract 5.14 
 
110 DEF1  i intend to demonstrate (.) that (1.4) 
111   telephone (0.3) numbers (1.3) within the 
112   telephone (0.3) messaging system (0.4) are 
113   assigned (0.5) different numbers (0.5) than 
114   the telephones have↓ (0.6) 
   ... 
126   mail- message centre where you can leave 
127   a message your friend can pick it up↑ (.) 
128   using the same code=the same telephone 
129   number (0.4) and ther- it generates no 
130   record (.) ↑any↑where 
131   (1.6) 
 
This is the first instance in this sequence where a prolonged explanation is provided regarding 
the defence’s proposition as to the voicemail system and the telephone numbers. This 
sequence is marked by the lack of interruptions from the judge. Though it provides more 
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detail regarding the defence’s theory and provides an illustration of the theory (redacted), it is 
not oriented to as providing the judge with the requisite understanding of the issue at hand (as 
can be seen below). 
 
Extract 5.15 
 
132 JUD  well i assume it generates a record 
133   as to what number you ↑called (1.5) 
134   whether it's the voice (1.0) voice (.) mail 
135   number or your (0.3) ↑office number↓ 
136 DEF1  but it generates a record [for-] 
137 JUD       [for ] the number 
138   you called= 
139 DEF1  =n the- the ↑voicemail number that you 
140   called= 
141 JUD  which is the number you called= 
142 DEF1  =and the nu- voicemail message tells you  
143   (0.6) that the number you have reached 
144   <is belongs to> someone ↑else (1.2) but 
145   that number doesn't get ↑recorded (0.8) 
146   my point is↓ [(        )] 
147 JUD     [reported to what] by 
148   [(what)  ] 
149 DEF1  [anywhere] 
150   (1.3) 
151 JUD     what do you mean 
152 DEF1  (yeah well) anywhe:re (.) anyplace (.) 
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153   there is no record keeping [system] 
154 JUD       [well  ] i mean 
155   (.) uh (0.5) you may have to put on evidence 
156   to show↑ all that u:m (2.2) are you familiar 
157   with what he's talking about↑ 
158 WIT → >no sir not at all< 
159 JUD  .hh °↑all ↑right° (.) he's not familiar with 
160   what you're ↑talking about so if you 
161   wanna do a demonstration you'll have 
162   to call your own witness to demonstrate 
163   it 
164 DEF1  °i understand°  [(   )] 
165 JUD     [okay] i don't preclude- (0.3) 
166   i don't preclude you calling a witness 
167   to demonstrate what you're trying to 
168   sho:w but i'm not willing (0.5) allow you 
169   to conduct a demonstration in this 
170   court↑room↓ (0.4) from the testimony of a 
171   witness who is not familiar with what 
172   you're ↑talking about↓ 
173 DEF1  i understand 
174 JUD  okay (0.9) >all=right< (0.4) objection 
175   sustained (0.8) without prejudice to the 
176   right to call up- for you to call a 
177   witness to show what it is you're 
178   trying to show (.) okay↑ 
179 DEF1  alright i-i i may have one more (0.3) 
180 JUD  ↑that's fine 
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181 DEF1  °when the jury comes in°= 
182 JUD  =that's fine 
183   (1.9) 
184 JUD  all right u:hh why don't we take u:hh 
185   a little break uh be in recess about 
186   five minutes by then the jury'll be 
187   back and (.) w- 
188   ((video cuts)) 
189   (9.9) 
 
The sense-making of the defence’s previous turn by the judge is highlighted through the use 
of ‘I assume’ (line 132). Though this is not direct disagreement with the previous turn, it 
introduces a distinction between a ‘number’ and a ‘voicemail number’ (lines 134-5), which 
continues throughout lines 137-141. A further point of clarification comes at line 147-153, 
with the judge’s interruption regarding the record-keeping system. This interruption overlaps 
with the defence’s turn and comes in as the defence states ‘my point is’, rendering the n 
following utterance difficult to discern. The judge does not directly orient to understanding, 
but begins to foreshadow his reasoning and ruling in highlighting the defence ‘may’ need to 
put their own evidence on to show this. The use of ‘may’ at this point hedges the statement, 
rather than providing a concrete decision. The orientation to the witness at this point seeks 
additional clarification that the witness is unfamiliar with the phone number theory presented 
by the defence, which is responded to in the negative at line 158. It is only after this 
clarification that we then receive another reasoning sequence in which there is an orientation 
towards a decision (lines 159-163), which the defence orient to as understanding (line 164), 
followed by a reasoning sequence (lines 165-172). This reasoning sequence includes a caveat 
allowing the evidence to be presented by the defence, but not through this witness in the 
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state’s case. As has been outlined above in the reason-ruling pattern, this is then followed by 
the ruling (lines 174-178) that upholds the objection yet again. 
 There is no direct orientation towards the knowledge and understanding of the judge 
in this extract; however, this sequence leads into a closing interaction before the video cuts 
off for the recess. Unlike previous turns, there is no additional questioning at this point 
regarding ‘where’ we ‘are now’, but appears to be a co-construction of mutual understanding 
as to how matters will proceed, with the sequence in lines 179-182, in which neither turn by 
the defence appears to be structurally complete (lines 179 and 181), but is oriented to by the 
judge as being acceptable (‘that’s fine’; lines 180 and 182). 
 Were there no additional data after this sequence, it could be inferred that 
understanding has been established by the judge regrading this topic and the matter is closed. 
This, however, was not the case. As can be seen below, the recording resumes after the recess 
with the jury still absent from the courtroom. 
 
Extract 5.16 
 
190   (   ) um (2.0) the defendant and counsel are 
191   present u:m (1.0) ↑mr gaskins i'm trying to 
192   um (3.9) trying to understand what point 
193   you're (.) making u:m (1.2) and you ↑seem 
194   to have suggested that there is some practice 
195   of drug dealers uh this officer is a 
196   drug officer but he's not familiar 
197   with it apparently (1.3) u:hh (xxx has) 
198   some mechanism to attempt to conceal 
199   (1.0) u:hh (0.8) their ca↑lls umm (1.1) by 
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200   calling a (0.9) voicemail (0.5) umm (1.0) 
201   centre (1.4) in lieu of calling 
202   each other (0.9) to: get (0.9) °↓messages° 
203   (1.7) 
204 DEF1  exactly 
205 JUD  >okay< .hh u:hh (0.8) <so you haven't lost me 
206   entirely↓ i (.) think i understand↓> (1.2) 
207 DEF1  i think-= 
208 JUD  =d- i jus- i understand what you're 
209   saying but do ↑you intend to el- uh 
210   do you believe that through cross 
211   examination of the state's witnesses 
212   or presentation of your of your own↑ 
213   (0.3) of any evidence that (.) you u:h 
214   <seek to elicit> u:hh (0.9) that there'll 
215   be any testimony↑ by any witness 
216   that this practshi- practice 
217   actually occurred in this case↑ 
218   (1.1) 
219 DEF1  i think the telephone records will 
220   show that↓ 
221   (5.5) 
222 JUD  an- (0.8) will show (0.2) that with regard 
223   to what num↑bers↓ 
224 DEF1  °the two-oh-one exchange° 
225   (4.0) 
226 JUD  .hh well i guess you're gonna hafta (0.5) 
227   <call somebody that- (0.9) is familiar 
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228   with that (0.5) practice> and can (.) can 
229   (0.4) elicit that because (.) apparently 
230   this officer s-is not familiar with 
231   that↓ (0.6) okay (.) i'm just trying to 
232   figure it out↓ 
233 DEF1  y-y-you you understand where i'm 
234   going i-i mean you and i are on 
235   the same- 
236 JUD  WEll i understand what you're telling 
237   me but don't- i- have yet to uh 
238   hear a witness who uh is uh prepared 
239   to answer your questions in the 
240   affirmative (0.6) okay 
241 DEF1  i-i'll finish up quickly with 
242   [(the witness)] 
243 JUD  [all right] °well that's fine° (1.3) 
244   >all=right↑< u:hh (0.6) ask the jury to come 
245   in please↑ 
 
The above extract begins with an announcement of who is present, as is in-keeping with the 
vocalisation of circumstances for the benefit of the record (lines 190-191). What is notable 
here is that the jury are not remarked upon at all, but are instead omitted from a listing of who 
is present (thus presenting the implication of their absence). 
 This final extract regarding the topic of the mobile phone experiment is marked as it 
not only occurs after the topic has been closed, but orients (this time directly) to the judge’s 
understanding. Another overall feature of this sequence is that the judge does not make 
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another reason/ruling, but instead orients solely to his own understanding of the defence’s 
theory and how they are seeking to manifest this in their proposed line of questioning. 
 Rather than the judge asking the defence to explain their stance, the judge opens this 
topic with his own summary of prior talk (lines 191-202). The orientation towards 
understanding is directly referenced at line 192, with a focus no longer on the act of the 
mobile phone experiment itself and its permissibility. Instead, the orientation of the summary 
is towards the argument being made by the defence regarding the use of phone numbers and 
voicemail numbers and its links to the practice of drug dealers. This is linked to the witness 
(and thereby the overall line of questioning) as an officer who has experience in investigating 
drug-related criminal activity. There is continued use of hedging, with the words ‘seem’ (line 
193) and ‘apparently’ (line 197) emphasised during talk. This could be viewed as 
highlighting the hypothetical and (currently) unsubstantiated claims of the assertion within 
the trial, as well as indicating that this sequence is seeking clarification for understanding. 
With this summary oriented to in the positive by the defence, the judge orients to a hedged 
state of understanding (lines 205-6). The judge then stipulates a more specific form of his 
understanding as being limited to what the defence is proposing, but moves from this to 
questioning whether or not the defence believes this will be elicited through cross-
examination of witnesses; thereby creating a distinction between a) the proposed theory 
regarding the telephone numbers and b) whether or not this can be elicited from the state’s 
witness(es) (lines 208-217). The judge’s orientation towards understanding is further 
referenced in lines 231-2 (‘I’m just trying to figure it out’), though this comes after a turn that 
reiterates prior talk regarding the defence needing to provide its own witness to elicit the 
testimony it is seeking. The judge’s understanding is then directly referenced by the defence 
(lines 233-5). This, however, invokes a sense of alignment through the phrasing (‘you 
understand where I’m going… you and I are on the same-’). The judge’s understanding is 
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oriented to as resolved at this point, though, in contrast to the previous sequences, no further 
rulings are made. 
 
In breaking down this interaction, it has been placed within the remit of resolving issues 
within the legal framework, though it also overlaps with orientations towards understanding 
(see section 3.2.2). This is because these occurrences are not always mutually exclusive and it 
can be argued that an issue of understanding by the judge is a facet of resolving issues within 
the legal framework. What this extract brings to our understanding of interactions during the 
jury’s absence is the manner in which not one, but two issues were in fact in need of 
resolution outside of the jury’s hearing. 
 The first of these issues was the experiment itself and whether or not the phone call 
would be considered permissible. Within this, the following emerged as requiring discussion 
based on the turns of the judge and defence attorney and the apparent recurrence of the same 
issue: 
 
 The reasoning behind the phone call experiment (why is this physical demonstration 
considered necessary?) 
 How this relates to the line of questioning (what are the defence seeking to prove 
through this line of questioning?) 
 Whether this is allowed under the rules of law (should the objection be sustained or 
overruled?) 
 
If one extracts these as separate points in need of resolution, it is possible to unpack how the 
topic itself appears to recur, despite repeated rulings (which, in the context of court, would 
indicate a closing statement for the topic). In the first instance, the judge denies the 
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experiment (lines 45), but then seeks further information regarding its purpose. This could 
imply that the matter of allowing the phone call is resolved (in the negative), but there 
remains a lack of clarity as to why it was considered necessary by the defence in the first 
place; a difference here being nuanced between the experiment itself (disallowed) and the 
need to understand the defence’s narrative that brought it up in the first place. This devolves 
into further discussion of the experiment itself through two iterations of ‘where are we now’ 
and the subsequent sequences, rather than addressing the broader defence argument as the 
subject of enquiry (lines 74; 91). 
 The uninterrupted turn where the defence explains the broader reasoning full occurs 
after the question by the judge shifts from ‘where are we now’ to a direct address of the 
‘intention’ in handing the phone to the witness. This is not oriented to as pertaining to the 
veracity of making a phone call from the witness stand in court, but as to the underlying 
argument that the defence seeks to prove – in other words, ‘why it is considered relevant by 
the defence that the phone number is proven to be a voicemail system’ and not ‘is the 
experiment itself permissible’. 
 In separating these issues, the points in need of resolution and the need for 
clarification become somewhat clearer. Despite the topic’s being oriented to as closed (again) 
at lines 174-8, the recurrence after the recess also shows an orientation of the judge away 
from the experiment itself, but in demonstrating his understanding of the broader line of 
questioning by the defence. There is also a potential here for pre-empting further issues 
arising from this line of questioning, as the defence is asked whether they think any of the 
state’s witnesses (not just this witness) will provide the testimony they seek. 
 There was no systematic formula to emerge from this sequence as regards resolving 
issues within the legal framework, but what has emerged is the manner in which the 
seemingly same topic can emerge repeatedly and yet be subtly oriented to in different ways to 
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fulfil different requirements of the court. In this instance, it was indicated to the defence that 
they may need to provide their own witness to elicit this testimony, identifying not only the 
phone experiment itself as in need of resolution, but also the overall line of enquiry by the 
defence in its current form (extract 5.15, lines 165-178). 
 
In returning to the narrative thread, this sequence highlights an important aspect of narrative 
determination in the absence of the jury and how this legal editing is brought to bear on the 
overall defence narrative. This is not to say that the editing is somehow nefarious or illicit 
(far from it), but in this case a proposed performance – in one of the decidedly more dramatic 
attempts to admit evidence – not only disrupts the general proceedings in format, but then 
proceeds to have evidentiary and narrative value (relevance to the case) called into question. 
The defence is seeking to establish in front of the jury that there is doubt about the 
character of Grant Hayes through the use of the telephone records. In casting aspersions on 
the character of Grant Hayes, the narrative for the defence purports that this supports the 
claims that Amanda Hayes was also victimised. In this instance, the telephone number has no 
‘voice’ but is reduced to a document (the telephone records). The telephone number under 
dispute becomes representative of a voicemail system that has no physical voice in court. The 
defence attempts to have this intertextual evidence admitted and vocalised through the 
proposed demonstration. Much as with ‘reading in’ evidence (such as emails, etc.) this would 
then potentially allow the voicemail system to become tangible to the jury and support the 
narrative under construction. 
That this is then disallowed through the legal restrictions on hearsay becomes of 
macro-level import. The defence is attempting to use cross-examination and a state witness to 
give credence to its stance (and, indeed, overall agenda). This links back with the theory of 
‘legitimation’ described in 2.4, in which an attempt is made to use recognised organisational 
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authority to support one’s position (Rosulek, 2010). The role of the witness is being shifted 
from a law enforcement official who was involved in the case, to the role of ‘expert’ through 
having experience as in drug-related crime. The defence then, through this, attempts to elicit 
agreement with the theory of drug dealers calling voicemail systems directly so as not to 
leave a record of who receives the message. The projected view is that both this epistemic 
position and the evidence of the number under discussion being that of a voicemail centre 
(rather than a mobile phone) would then provide support for the defence narrative. Both of 
these aspects of legitimation are denied outwith the presence of the jury. Consequently, this 
thesis contends that this not only resolves a legal trouble, but also links with the following 
section on previewing testimony in that the narrative itself then becomes previewed for the 
judge prior to its continuation before the jury. In accordance with the rules of evidence 
(perhaps ironically) this legitimation strategy in its current form is both edited and denied. 
In a final address towards the orientation to the judge’s understanding and narrative, 
the orientation towards a hypothetical scenario as a means of eliciting understanding should 
also be discussed. As was mentioned in the truncated Extract 5.14, there is one extended turn 
in which the defence attorney attempts to explain the reasoning behind his line of 
questioning. This turn has been described as being oriented to by the judge as being 
insufficient in furthering his understanding, but from the perspective of the defence narrative, 
it is worth exploring as an uninterrupted sequence in its own right. 
 
Extract 5.17 
 
108 DEF1  i intend to demonstrate (.) that (1.4) 
109   telephone (0.3) numbers (1.3) within the 
110   telephone (0.3) messaging system (0.4) are 
111   assigned (0.5) different numbers (0.5) than 
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112   the telephones have↓ (0.6) for example (0.8) 
113   my (0.5) >telephone number< is ***** my 
114   ↑voicemail s-s-telephone number is ***** 
115   (0.6) if you dial (0.3) my (.) voicemail 
116   (1.0) s- a-anwering system (0.8) the record 
117   that is created on-on those bi↑lls is a 
118   telephone call to ***** not a (.) record 
119   to (0.3) ***** yu- (0.4) the (0.3) telephone 
120   call to ↑my office (0.3) will never show up 
121   on any telephone record anywhere in the world 
122   (0.7) the only number that will show ↑up is 
123   the telephone call to the ↑voicemail 
124   mail- message centre where you can leave 
125   a message your friend can pick it up↑ (.) 
126   using the same code=the same telephone 
127   number (0.4) and ther- it generates no 
128   record (.) ↑any↑where 
 
In this sequence, the defence creates a hypothetical scenario to explain the proposition being 
made regarding the telephone numbers; and that telephone messages could be exchanged 
between Grant Hayes and others without leaving a record of with whom he was 
communicating. The emphasis in this turn relies on the example to emphasis the anonymous 
nature of contacting a voicemail system rather than a mobile phone directly (see lines 120-
121). This can be argued to appeal to the larger macro-level requirement of reasonable doubt. 
The stance taken within this sequence, however, is also interesting. The example (lines 112-
121), sees the defence attorney referencing ‘I’ and ‘you’ in the hypothetical scenario (‘if you 
dial my voicemail’), this shifts in lines 124-5, where the stance adjusts to ‘you’ and ‘your 
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friend’. This is not to say that the use of ‘you’ specifically denotes the judge’s own person, 
but appears to take an inclusive example and then shift to a more distanced position with the 
introduction of an unknown third party. 
 This is also positioned within the talk as a hypothetical example for a proposed (and 
as yet unrealised) demonstration; wherein the demonstration itself is claiming to legitimise an 
aspect of the defence’s macro-level position. This chain is not designed to be deliberately 
convoluted, but to expose a chain of potentiality that is being adjudicated. The judge’s 
orientation to understanding and knowledge provides the epistemic position and legitimised 
authority to curtail the potential of the line of questioning as formed by the defence. This 
could be argued to link with Atkinson and Drew’s (1979) observations regarding witnesses’ 
foresight as to where a line of questioning is heading and orienting to that rather than the 
direct question itself. This observation regarding the ruling on potential questioning is, 
therefore, evident and emergent from the data, as it is oriented to by the participants 
themselves. The judge explicitly objects to the means through which the evidence is being 
presented through his understanding of the rules of evidence, but does not object to the 
potential argument in and of itself. In this, the narrative in general is not being repressed, but 
rather the form and manner of its presentation (such as asking a witness to make a surprise 
phone call in court). 
 
Having discussed the ruling-reason pattern and the orientation to the judge’s knowledge and 
understanding in resolving issues within the legal framework, the following section will 
discuss instances where testimony is viewed by the judge prior to its presentation to the jury. 
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5.4 Introducing the previews 
 
The final category of interactions to be examined is that of the voir dire of testimony before 
the judge, prior to its being made available to the jury. This is akin to a preview of the 
testimony and allows the judge to make a ruling as to whether not a piece of contested 
testimony is allowed. The format tends to be one whereby the ‘side’ who has called the 
witness asks their questions (largely uninterrupted, excepting the judge himself) and then a 
cross-examination may take place and arguments as to why the evidence should or should not 
be allowed. This can include matters such as the prejudicial weight of the testimony, as well 
as its relevance and admissibility under the rules of law. 
 Voir dire is not limited to lay witnesses only, but can also encompass expert witnesses 
(such as Dr Stimson in the trial of Grant Hayes) or any witness called to testify where there is 
a contention regarding the admissibility of evidence. That this occurs outside of the hearing 
of the jury shows how the narratives that are finally presented are tailored within the rules of 
law. This is not to provide a criticism of said rules, but does emphasis the iterations narratives 
can undergo before being presented to the jury. 
In the trial of Grant Hayes one such voir dire was that of Heidi Schumacher, a close 
friend of the victim. Her testimony was of particular note as it was not only contested by the 
defence, but a ruling was made delimiting what parts of her testimony were acceptable and 
what was to be prohibited. This same ruling was later reversed by the judge in the presence of 
the jury in response to the line of questioning undertaken by defence counsel. 
 
The purpose of voir dire in terms of delimiting the boundaries of testimony in the trial of 
Grant Hayes included the evidence of the victim’s brother, Jason Ackerson and her friend, 
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Heidi Schumacher. In both instances the defence objected to testimony regarding Grant 
Hayes’ alleged behaviour towards Laura Ackerson. 
 
Extract 5.18 (D3P3 GH) 
 
1 JUD  folks uh i need to make a technical 
2   ruling about um uh some matters 
3   uh don't concern yourself about that 
4   that's my job not yours uh but i'm 
5   gonna have to hav- excuse you and 
6   what we're gonna do is i'm gonna 
7   let you take the morning recess while 
8   we do that uh take about twenty 
9   minutes 
... 
28 JUD  u:m in the absence of the jury 
29   the def- uh witness remains 
30   on the witness stand as some 
31   testimony that may be the subject of 
32   an objection i'll preview the 
33   testimony go ahead 
 
Firstly, what is worth noting here is the mitigation the judge uses in his dismissal of the jury. 
In the previous sequence above regarding the attempted phone experiment (see extract 5.9, 
lines 21-2) the dismissal of the jury is downgraded to their taking ‘a break’, with the unusual 
act of attempting a phone call mitigated through the use of humour. In this extract, it is 
described as a ‘technical ruling’ and the jury are explicitly told not to ‘concern’ themselves 
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with it. In this is an orientation to the institutional roles being enacted, with the judge stating 
this is ‘my job not yours’ (line 4). The judge also explicitly refers to previewing the 
testimony prior to its presentation to the jury (lines 32-3). In this, the term ‘technical’ orients 
to the determination of whether or not the testimony is objectionable. Thus, ‘technical’ refers 
to the technicalities of legal discourse as applied by the rules of evidence. 
 The interactional orientation to specific roles perpetuates and reaffirms the contextual 
setting of the institution through directly referencing the overall circumstance in which the 
utterance occurs. In this, as put forward by Conversation Analysis, the institutional context is 
both context-shaped and context renewed (Goodwin and Duranti, 1992). Another remark to 
be made on this sequence is the positioning of the judge in comparison with the jury. The 
judge directs the jury and is recognised as having a legitimate authority over them (no one on 
the jury can be heard to make an active dissent or challenge the claim of the judge to this 
position). In this, there is no perceivably overt act of resistance in the establishment of a 
power relationship, but there is evidence to support the claims within criminology that 
legitimation occurs through a conditional relationship between those who make a claim to 
that position and those who abide by it (or resist) (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). In this 
instance, the jury can be heard to leave the room as directed by the judge. 
The judge’s vocabulary also explicitly asserts the claim to authority through the 
institutional role (thus also realising this role through discourse). The judge’s position within 
the turn is also interesting to note. In lines 4-8 the use of ‘I’ and ‘we’ shifts. The initial ‘I’m 
gonna have to excuse you’ is actionable (despite being mitigated by the use of ‘have to’) in 
that the jury are being dismissed and supports the approach to communication as ‘doing’ 
(ref). This then shifts to ‘what we’re gonna do is’; that then immediately becomes ‘I’m gonna 
let you…’; before again referencing ‘while we…’. The use of ‘I’ and ‘you’ appears to be 
straightforward in denoting the judge (‘I’) and the jury (‘you’) in terms of who is being 
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referenced. The use of ‘we’, however, seems slightly more complicated than might be 
supposed on an initial viewing. ‘We’ appears to denote the judge and counsel, but line 6 
appears to leave this as inconclusive. It could be read as a self-initiated self-repair (ref), 
whereby the shift from ‘we’ to ‘I’ is indicative of a correction within the turn. This could be 
supported by the use of ‘while we do that’, which could indicate the parties who will be 
involved in the aforementioned ‘technical’ issue. ‘While we do that’ in reference to the 
previous use of we also reads as vague and incomplete, given that ‘that’ has not been 
stipulated, but potentially corrected to ‘I’. In unpicking this, the orientation of ‘we do that’ 
appears to connect to the inferred discussion needed to make the technical ruling. However, 
‘we’ is not directly oriented to and thus remains in a somewhat ambiguous position since 
readings could include ‘we’ as referencing the embodiment of the state, a generalisation, or 
other participants in ruling. 
In the following extract is the testimony of Heidi Schumacher, as mentioned above. It 
is worth noting that the testimony of this witness was only subject to voir dire for the trial of 
Grant Hayes and not that of Amanda Hayes. 
 
Extract 5.19 
 
1 JUD  i'm going to advise (.) at the bench↓ that (5.1) u:m 
(5.5) 
2   the witness now on the stand heidi uh schma-macher↓ 
(3.8)  
3   uh is a witness that (3.4) has informa↑tion uh 
4   reference to: (2.1) >what we refer to as four-oh-four- 
5   bee evidence that< hh dealing with (2.4) uh other a:cts  
6   that might constitute (.) cri:mes .hh for which the  
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7   defendant’s not cha:rged 
... 
9   of any such evidence< (3.2) a:nd since the witness 
10   is here it would see- and the jury is ou:t it 
11   would seem appropriate uh- and since she's on the 
12   stand to (1.7) to elicit (1.8) what that (.) evidence  
13   would entai:l an- so i can (.) >be in a< (.) position  
14   to make some ruling >on it< in the event that the state 
15   (.) decides (.) at this time or sometime later during 
16   the trial to offer that evidence 
 
As with the previous extract, the preview of testimony is explicitly oriented to by the judge as 
being required through the possibility of it containing objectionable material that is not 
permitted under the rules of evidence. The evidence here is stipulated as relating to crimes 
that the defendant has not been charged with. 
 The closing aspect of the testimony of Heidi Schumacher will now be analysed, as 
this was pertinent to the thesis in that it presented evidence of interaction between the 
representatives of the state, the individual, and displays tailoring of the narrative outside the 
presence of the jury as in interactive and relational process. 
 
Extract 5.20 
 
476 JUD  otherwise admissible and so↑ (1.2) u:h (0.5) your 
477   objection is noted↑ (.) the objection is overru:led  
478   (0.6) the: evidence is admissable (0.7) save and  
479   except .hh uh and um (1.5) miss (ADA1) i- i instruct  
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480   you to take c- care and caution how you↑ (.) a-address  
481   (1.3) the (.) incident in which there was a: (0.6)  
482   injury to the victim's no:se in (.) two thousand and  
483   ei↑ght↓ .hh uh i don't want this (.) witness (1.3)  
484   saying what the um (3.1) what the victim said to her↑  
485   about how that happened .hh or what she did or didn't 
486   intend to do↑ about it↓ (1.1) u:m unless the 
487   *defendant's counsel    asks questions 
   *((points finger at defence)) 
488   that specifically elicit that information .hh (1.0) 
489   but the state↑ can't offer it (1.1) .hh all right hh 
490   >anything else< 
491 ADA1  your honour >can i< um (0.7) miss ***** do you 
492   understand that that that you can't (.) cannot 
493   with regard to the the incident (   ) 
494   talk about anything that laura (.) had to 
495   say to you↓ 
496 WIT  can i [say anything ] 
497 JUD    [after she arrived] 
498 ADA1         after[you arrive ( )] 
499 WIT           [after i arrive=] 
500 JUD  [after you arrive ( )] 
501 WIT  [=(         ) ] the phone call 
502 JUD   [i mean you can say what ] um you= 
503 WIT   [=is that still relevant↑] 
504 JUD  =certainly are permitted to testify: as to your 
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505   telephone conversation .hh u:h in which you 
506   could hear the defendant >as i understand it 
507   you could hear the defendant in the background 
508   so< 
509 WIT  yes 
510 JUD  okay so he was in a position to be able to hear 
511   .hh what she was saying to you↑ 
512 WIT  yes 
513 JUD  all right (0.5) .hh uh you can testify to that but 
514   after arrIving at the location you can say what 
515   you SAW (0.8) u:h and you can describe (.) the u:m 
516   (2.4) uh the condition of the vic↑tim↓ (.) you can say 
517   what you↑ said (0.3) °but you can't say what she 
518   said↓° 
519 WIT  okay= 
520 JUD   =all right↑ 
521 WIT  yes 
 
The judge’s ruling in this extract takes place in lines 476-490, including the caveat through 
which the evidence could become permissible, but only in relation to cross-examination by 
the defence (which was what occurred in jury’s presence, as mentioned above). The ADA 
takes the floor in line 491, orienting to the judge’s question of ‘anything else’. Though 
initially addressing the judge, the ADA presents a clarification question to the witness in 
determining whether or not she has understood the limitations on her testimony. Interestingly, 
the witness begins to ask a question in response (line 496), thereby not directly fulfilling the 
response aspect of the question-answer adjacency pair, but arguably giving a negative 
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response through the use of a clarification question in lieu of a closed yes or no. After 
initiating the question, the judge overlaps with ‘after she arrived’ (line 497) in what can be 
viewed as anticipating the question. The use of ‘arrive’ is then echoed in lines 498-500 by the 
ADA, the witness and finally the judge. The extensive overlapping at this point results in the 
judge speaking in parallel with the witness (lines 496-7), the witness speaking in parallel with 
the ADA (lines 498-99) and the judge speaking again in parallel with the witness (lines 500-
1). Throughout this sequence however, there is an orientation towards co-operation within the 
talk, where this repetition could be viewed as shadowing (Tannen, 1989). Tannen states that 
shadowing is automatic within conversation and occurs in sequences with overlaps such as 
the one evidenced here in lines 497-500. She also puts forward that this can be ‘co-operative 
and rapport building rather than interruptive’ (Tannen, 1989: 89). In the aspects of courtroom 
interactions analysed in this study, there has been little evidence of sequences such as this in 
the presence of the jury – and not with the participation of the judge. 
 With this co-operation one can also see the reframing of the narrative so that it can be 
produced in an institutionally acceptable way for the jury. Thus, even though the judge limits 
what can be said and this authority is legitimised in situ by the participants, the resulting 
version of the witness’ testimony (as a personal narrative (Schiffrin, 2006) that has been 
deemed relevant to the context of the trial) is co-constructed between the judge, witness and 
questioning attorney. The judge completes this sequence with clarifying the presence of the 
defendant (lines 510-11) before delivering a complete clarification of what can and cannot be 
said. This turn (lines 513-18) is not co-operatively constructed and is uninterrupted 
throughout. It does not repeat the ruling-reason formula found in lines 476-89, but seems to 
orient towards the witness. That being said, again, this could potentially (and only 
potentially) serve a dual purpose in that it explicitly restates what the limitations are for the 
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benefit of the witness, but also outlines them in an uninterrupted turn that will be ‘on the 
record’; however, there is no additional evidence to support this conjecture. 
 
 
5.5 Final remarks 
 
A theme across all the elements discussed in this chapter is the absence of the jury when 
material arises that is deemed objectionable by one side or another. The active participation 
of the judge in this process contrasts with that in the jury’s presence. In addition, in 
dismissing the jury there is some evidence to indicate that this not overly remarked upon, 
though reasons as to why would only be speculative at this stage and are beyond the scope if 
this study. Whether this is a theme across courtroom data, or merely specific to those 
interactions analysed in this study is a matter for further exploration and a limitation both of 
this analysis and dataset. 
 The explicit orientation to knowledge and understanding is a key element of this 
chapter, as it defines the rules of evidence in terms of the judge’s role as adjudicator not only 
between both sides, but also as the recognised authority of what is and is not permissible 
under law. The adversarial aspect of the adversarial system is not only enacted in the 
presence of the jury, but the judge allows scope to be ‘convinced’ of the relevance of 
admissibility of evidence. Thus, each side is presented with an opportunity to present its 
stance. 
 In terms of the narrative impact, the judge is in a position to orient to specific aspects 
of the testimony and limit what is allowable in from of the silent participant. As can be seen 
in extract 5.20, the judge engages actively with the witness to ensure her understanding of the 
limits on her testimony. This should not be overextended, however, for this is not to say that 
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witnesses always engage in this way in this setting, but does demonstrate that the witness 
maintains a discursive power in that she is permitted to speak more freely outside the 
presence of the jury (and has been tacitly invited to do so by the ADA, lines 491-5). This also 
brings to bear the institutional role of jury as one which has a legitimate authority outside of 
the role of passing judgement. It could be argued that certain institutional norms become 
contextually relevant in the presence of the jury. To further opine on this train of thought, the 
concept of institutional norms and roles are determinate in the sense of a legitimised and 
acknowledged mode of behaviour that is deemed acceptable within that legal setting, 
however; the setting itself is reflexive in that not all pre-conceived norms are fully established 
unless certain participants are present. This builds on Atkinson and Drew (1979), whereby 
the ritual aspects of the coroner’s arrival were structurally significant. In this data, it is argued 
that the presence of the jury impacts upon interaction, bringing about what are more 
commonly viewed as the institutional norms of courtroom interaction. This is not to say that 
such norms are wholly absent when the jury is not presence (the attorneys, for example, are 
censured at one point in Grant Hayes’ trial for talking to one another rather than speaking 
through the judge), but much as law is deemed to be both determinate and reflexive in this 
thesis, so are the interactions that take place within it. This allows for the negotiated space in 
which authority as recognised through institutional role can be discursively balanced within 
the interactions themselves (Thornborrow, 2002). 
 In addressing the three research questions, this chapter evidences the personification 
of the legal discourses of the ‘state’ as represented by the judge, rather than in the role of the 
prosecution. In this manner, the judge interacts with individuals in a capacity wholly removed 
from the prosecution, highlighting the theory of the state not as one fixed overarching 
‘entity’, but as a range of discourses legitimised and bound together under a common label 
(see 1.2; Gordon, 1980). The judge’s position of institutional authority as physically and 
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interactionally situated within the discourse is legitimised through its recognition and being 
oriented to by the other participants. 
 Linguistic formulations have been identified within these interactions, particularly as 
regards the reason-ruling formula employed by the judge. This orientation both to the present 
and present-as-future in articulating the decision and reasoning behind it is of particular 
interest in terms of how these institutional devices are structured in this setting. Further to this 
is the direct orientation both to legal discourses (particularly those discourses as bound by the 
term ‘relevance’ and the rules of evidence) and the judge’s knowledge and understanding. 
The orientation to knowledge and understanding is therefore viewed as having a dual 
function in orienting to both the judge’s own personal knowledge and understanding of the 
situation, and that of the legal discourses described above. 
 In ascertaining power relations in this setting, the dynamics between participants, 
whilst still regulated, show a marked difference in comparison to communicative exchanges 
made in the presence of the jury. The floor is primarily held by the judge and shows increased 
activity in terms of overlapping talk. Where overlaps occur, they appear to be primarily 
through interjections by the judge himself, or through co-constructed conversation between 
participants. Witnesses are in a position whereby further clarification can be sought from the 
judge directly. 
 This last analysis chapter draws together the final aspects of narrative being explored 
within this study, explicitly orienting to acceptable and unacceptable aspects of testimony and 
consequently editing what the jury is permitted to hear. In addition to this, as introduced in 
Chapter 2, narrative as a macro-level discourse that is threaded through the micro-level 
interactions is also explored in the attempted phone experiment, showing how narrative 
potential and projection can be redirected and subverted as a consequence of courtroom 
procedure. 
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 Having concluded the final analysis chapter of this project, the following section will 
present the overall conclusions for this project. This will bring together the core findings and 
main themes across all three analysis chapters as they relate to one another, the research 
questions, and address the overall purpose of this study. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
In 2.2 of this thesis the following research questions were introduced: 
1. In what particular ways do the state and the individual communicate with each other in 
the trials of Grant and Amanda Hayes? 
2. What functions do these patterns serve in these interactions? 
3. How are power relations between the individual and the state established and 
represented in these interactions (including narrative (co)construction, subversion, 
statement interpretation, and (re)direction of subject matter)? 
Within these questions, the theme of narrative and the interplay between agenda, macro-
narrative, and micro-interactions provided the conceptual and methodological underpinnings 
to analyses. 
 In presenting conclusions the findings for each of these questions will be summarised 
from all three analysis chapters, and links between each of the chapters will also be explicitly 
presented. Finally, the overall contribution of this study will, as outlined in the introduction 
will be revisited in light of these conclusions. 
In addressing the research questions, the state was viewed as a disparate array of discourse 
unified and legitimised through nodes of power, along with the individual as one who 
testifies in court without being party to a role that claims ‘state’ representation. 
 The cross-examination of Amanda Hayes contributed to previous findings in the field 
of linguistics in the pre-allocation of turns vis-à-vis institutional role and reformulations of 
witness answers whereby they are reframed by the questioner into a narrative-conforming 
response (Heritage, 1985). Findings also included limited instances of self-selection and of 
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the defendant (as a witness on her own behalf) maintaining the floor and disrupting the 
question and answer sequencing. In each instance of self-selection, it was found that this was 
preceded by a pause that followed on from the defendant’s response to a question. With no 
verbal indication (that should be a prerequisite for the record) that the defendant should 
continue or an overt orientation to the response as inadequate, she self-selects and voluntarily 
proffers an elaboration on the previous turn. 
 This chapter also highlighted that through interactions, asymmetry could be evidenced 
(Hutchby, 1999), but also determined that there was a level of negotiation that supports the 
concept of power as relational (Thornborrow, 2002). These power relations were evidenced 
through institutional roles, but through discursive space created within the interactions. There 
remained a limiting factor on this based on the restrictions of the trial framework, however, 
which also supports Thornborrow’s (Ibid) observation that institutional roles that are granted 
legitimacy have more resources to control the interaction than those who do not. 
 The interactions within the defence were explicitly oriented to both the agenda and 
the narrative, with the conflicting co-construction of each sides’ narrative forming an 
interesting example of resistance within talk, whilst still formulating two versions of the same 
story from the same interaction. 
 In the opening statements across both trials, the monologic introduction of the 
narrative was presented to the jury by a single speaker. These presentations formed the basis 
for the narratives from which all following interactions were formed. This was linked with 
the previous chapter as the basis upon which micro-level interactions were grounded. Despite 
the high level of cross-over between both trials, it was found that there was a significant shift 
in focus in each of the prosecution’s opening statements and both defence teams invoked very 
different strategies in their openings. For example, the prosecution focussed on the alleged 
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confession through reported speech of Amanda Hayes, whereas there was a focus on the 
victim, Laura Ackerson, and familial roles of mother and father invoked in the opening 
statement for grant Hayes. The defence for Grant Hayes humanised him and normalised his 
alleged behaviour during the custody dispute, whereas the defence for Amanda Hayes 
focussed on Grant Hayes as a deviant personality and positioning Amanda Hayes as another 
victim, alongside Laura Ackerson. The micro- and thematic analyses displayed what each 
speaker oriented to and how this was legitimised. The power relations within this chapter 
were determined less through interactive process, but were based more on the salience given 
to each topic and who, within the narrative, claimed an epistemic stance that attempted to 
position their narrative as the most valid and credible. 
 The analysis of the interactions in the jury’s absence viewed the increased activity of 
the judge and the representation of the ‘state’. Linguistic patterns in the rule-reasoning 
formula and the orientation to knowledge and understanding, both in terms of relevance and 
the rules of evidence, and the judge’s own personal knowledge and understanding were 
findings within significant linguistic features. The analysis of the aborted phone experiment 
added to this analysis as it allowed a protracted sequence through which the importance of 
these aspects could be viewed in-depth. The ‘previews’ of testimony were also significant in 
that they tailor the potential narratives that can be shown to the jury and the manner in which 
these proceedings are conducting compared with those in the jury’s presence. 
 The jury as the silent participant was salient throughout, as they were consistently 
explicitly referred to and oriented to in talk. This characterisation is held to have been 
furthered through this research and builds upon foundations laid by Carter (2011). 
The conceptual model between the three-levels of discourse was relevant throughout 
this thesis. The micro-level interactions were a consequence of and a pre-requisite for the 
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macro-level narrative and the agenda. Although the realisation of the agenda was dependant 
on the decision of the jury (as they determine whether the defendants are found guilty or not 
guilty, thus realising the agenda for one of the two adversarial sides), its existence as an 
overarching goal was the guiding force for determining the narrative strategy and the micro-
interactions. The macro-narrative and was both a determining factor for the existence of the 
agenda (rather than, for example, a different plea) and guided the micro-level interactions. 
The micro-level interactions were relevant in determining the relevance and realisation of the 
narrative for the jury and were the vehicle for the potential actualisation of the agenda. 
Macro-level societal discourses were also discussed as they were made relevant by the 
interactions themselves, such as Laura Ackerson as a mother and familial discourse and the 
portrayals of Amanda Hayes as another victim in this case. By only referencing those 
discourses that emerged from the data, this thesis holds that it is possible for micro- and 
macro- level discourses to cooperate with and complement one another within analysis 
without falling victim to overt applications of a priori conceptualisations in a top-down 
approach. 
There are limitations to this study, which have been mentioned at various points 
throughout. This study cannot determine whether or not the behaviours highlighted herein are 
general practices within courtrooms more widely, as this was a qualitative study between two 
trials that only allows for a localised comparison. Consequently, further research could 
expand upon this in the development and analysis of a wider corpus of interactions from a 
more diverse sample of trials to attempt to discover whether the features discussed here are 
restricted to these particular trials, or are relevant to wider institutional courtroom practice. 
Related to the point above, the interactions of individual interlocutors also cannot be 
generalised beyond the remit of this study. The grounds for this being that speakers may be 
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‘performed’ these interactions for the specific purpose of this trial, and as such, general 
attributions based on assumed normative behaviour cannot be made without viewing a larger 
sample of the individual speakers across different trial settings. 
A further limitation is the inability of this study to determine whether (or not) the 
linguistic strategies discussed had an impact on the jury’s decision and the extent to which 
the image management viewed within interactions was ‘received’ or oriented to by the silent 
participant as part of their judgement formation. To expand in this direction in the future 
would require access to both trial footage and jury members that was beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
Future research for these data includes, a comparison of the testimony in the voir dire 
when being previewed by the judge, to its delivery to the jury in situ and whether or not there 
are any discernible differences in the relation of the narrative in (aside from any restrictions 
from instructions) in how the interactions unfold. Additionally, a detailed comparison of both 
the opening and closing statements across both trials would build on the research of Chapter 
4 in terms of both narrative analysis and comparison; and as other speakers from the 
prosecution and defence teams contribute to the closing statements, thereby widening the 
participant pool. In broader terms, as this study was focussed narrowly on two trials, both 
using the adversarial system found in the United States of America and the United Kingdom 
(amongst others), another point of comparison for future research is that of the inquisitorial 
system (found, for example, in France and Italy, inter alia). This would provide the potential 
for research not only between trials within that system, using the same conceptual foundation 
as applied to this thesis, but also between systems. In terms of theoretically based future 
research, this further analytical work can be done regarding the use of Foucaultian discourse 
analysis and how subject positions are produced (and reproduced) in courtroom settings 
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(including the judge, defendant, witnesses, inter alia), which was beyond the current scope of 
this thesis. 
This work has contributed to the fields of criminology and linguistics in the following 
ways. Firstly, the theoretical contribution of this thesis can be seen through the application of 
the three-level conceptual methodology; providing a framework for the inter-linked concepts 
of the agenda, macro-level narrative and micro-level interactions and how these influence and 
are influenced by one another. In building on previous research (Cotterill, 2003; Heffer, 
2010; Matoesian, 1999; 2001; inter alia), this triangulation of data allowed for a detailed and 
rich analysis, whilst allowing findings to emerge from the data through an inductive 
approach. Further to this was the application of Ricoeur (1980) as the basis for narrative 
analysis. Using Ricoeur’s approach to narrative time and sequencing allowed for a more 
reflexive approach to the narrative of a courtroom. The narrative as presented in the opening 
statements was not necessarily well-suited to a pre-existing narrative schema (such as Labov 
[1972] as discussed in sections 2.3 and 4.1.1). In applying the episodic dimension of Ricoeur 
(1980: 178), which ‘characterises the story as made out of events’, individual events were 
identified as delineated by interlocutors in the opening statements through narrative coding; 
the ‘plot’ provided a retrospective coherency for these ‘scattered events’, using the concept of 
the configurational dimension. This application of Ricoeur contributes an alternative 
approach than has been used in previous studies of trial narratives (Cotterill, 2003; Heffer, 
2005; Heffer, 2010; inter alia). 
The empirical contribution of this work lies in its use of two trials that were closely 
related and were of the same type (both were criminal trials, rather than a comparison of 
criminal and civil); referring to the same homicide; having the same judge and prosecution 
team; and using the majority of the same evidence. Through this, the use of language, and the 
ways in which the speakers developed and framed the same facts in different ways was 
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demonstrated. This work also contributed to the areas of research into opening statements and 
interactions in the absence of the jury, both of which are still developing research domains. 
This study has the potential to contribute to actual data that can be used to talk about 
how trials take place. Given the popularity of crime and legal dramatizations, there can be 
misconceptions surrounding how the legal system functions and the expectations members of 
the public then have for what will take place. In having research using genuine trial data, this 
can help the public to understand a system and processes that are often inaccessible or 
impenetrable through a lack of information and the additional complexities of legal jargon 
that can be a ‘false friend’ or misleading in comparison to everyday uses of such terms 
(O’Barr, 1982). 
In outlining the potential impact of this research beyond the academic domain, there is 
scope for this study to inform potential participants who are preparing to take part in a court 
process; for example, the preparation of lay witnesses who have never been part of a trial 
before and have limited knowledge of what to expect. This would be in line with the 
application of legal research used to inform training and as part of workshops, such as those 
undertaken by Professor Stokoe and the application of CARM (Conversation Analytic Role-
play Method) for mediation and police training (2014). 
Finally, as outlined above, this thesis presents an original contribution to knowledge 
in a growing interdisciplinary field, and has demonstrated its potential value and impact on 
wider society.
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Appendix A: Transcript of Amanda Hayes Re-cross-examination 
 
1 ADAH mr gaskins just ask you about↓ (1.1) 
  2   the bo:at↓ (1.0) and that night on the boat 
  3   and what you testified when he asked 
  4   you this time (0.6) was that i knew what 
  5   grant was do:ing↓ 
  6 AH  that's correct 
  7 ADAH °okay° that's not what you said (0.6) on cross 
  8   examination yesterday↓ 
  9 AH  no ma'[am    ] 
  10 ADAH      [yester]day it was you were in 
  11   your own world and you were listening to 
  12   the ani↑mals↓ looking towards the back of 
  13   the boat (0.3) bailing out having no idea what 
  14   was in the boat or what grant hayes was 
  15   doing↓ 
  16 AH  i never said i had no idea what he was 
  17   doing↓ (.) that's incorrect= 
  18 ADAH =>what did you  [tell=] 
  19 AH      [i ] 
  20 ADAH       =the jury yesterday 
  21   about what he was doing< 
  22 AH  i said that i was facing the other direction 
  23   that i didn't see anything .hh and i did not 
  24   touch anything in regards to what he was doing 
  25   .hh i didn't say i didn't know what he was 
  26   doing i (.) absolutely knew what he was doing 
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  27   (0.3) that [is correct ] 
  28 ADAH         [tell this jury] <right now> (0.4) 
  29   what he was doing↓ 
  30 AH  a- i'm pretty sure that they just heard me 
  31   i a- i  [knew what he was doing] 
   32 ADAH   [i didn't hear you what] was he doing 
  33   (1.9) 
  34 AH  he was throw- he was getting rid of laura's 
  35   bo↑dy↓ 
  36 ADAH okay and how was he doing that↓ 
  37 AH  i'm assuming he was putting it in the water 
  38 ADAH °okay° <could you hear the spla:sh as her head 
  39   went into the water↓> 
  40   (1.6) 
  41 AH  .hh again i heard lots of things i heard (0.7) 
  42   splashing noises i heard animals i heard lots 
  43   of animals .hh [i was    ] 
  44 ADAH      [what kind of ] animals did 
  45   you he↑ar↓ 
  46 AH  i don't know what kind of animals they were↑ 
  47   i was- (.) i (0.5) have no idea 
  48 ADAH so what you↑ recall about that boat trip 
  49   (1.3) is that there were splashing noises and 
  50   you heard animals and you were bai:ling (0.8)  
  51   the boat↓ 
  52 AH  that's correct and i was trying to keep the 
  53   wa- the boat from going into the grassy areas↓ 
  54 ADAH and why was th↑at↓ 
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  55 AH  because i didn't know what was in the 
  56   grassy areas 
  57 ADAH >°okay°< so you: during the time that you're 
  58   out in the boat knowing that grant hayes 
  59   is (1.0) taki:ng (0.9) laura ackerson's the 
  60   pieces of her body and throwing them into the 
  61   water >what you're concerned about is your 
  62   o:wn safety< and the a:nimals that are in the 
  63   water 
  64   (1.1) 
  65 AH  i ↑am concerned about my safety i'm 
  66   a-afraid he's gonna tip the boat over↑ 
  67   we're gonna go ↑in the water i- i'm 
  68   afraid of- for lots of things↓ 
  69   (4.9) 
  70 AH  i- i don't think you can imagine (.) the 
  71   kind of fear that i was under↓ (0.5) i i 
  72   honestly don't think you can imagine↓ 
  73   (1.0) 
  74 ADAH the fear that you were under was that 
  75   the boat would tip over= 
  76 AH  .hh 
  77 ADAH =and the animal[s would hurt you (   )] 
  78 AH       [i had lots and lots of] 
  79   fear 
  80   (1.7) 
  81 ADAH thank you i don't- °i don't have anything 
  82   further↓ 
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  83   (0.6) 
  84 JUD  >anything else< 
  85 GAS  no further questions↓= 
  86 JUD  =all right thank you↑ (0.2) thank you ma'am 
  87   you may stand do↑wn↓ 
  88 AH  °thank you° 
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Appendix B: Tables of themes from opening statements 
Table 1: Overview of opening statement for the prosecution (Grant Hayes) 
 
Topic Summary Theme(s) Notes 
1. Introduction of 
Laura 
Ackerson 
(victim) and 
overview of the 
case 
 Laura Ackerson’s 
state of mind on the 
day she died 
 Innocence of 
the victim 
 Family 
 Foreshadowing 
murder 
 
2. Introduction of 
the prosecution 
team/purpose 
of opening 
statements 
N/A N/A  
3. Laura 
Ackerson’s 
movements on 
the 13th July 
(date of 
murder) 
 Victim’s businesses 
 Friends 
 Family relationships 
(not close) 
 Custody dispute 
 The midweek visit: 
background/contextual 
information 
 Victim’s final phone 
calls 
 Victim’s 
disappearance 
 Family 
 Foreshadowing 
murder 
Evidence that will be 
shown to the jury is 
introduced and 
foreshadowed (both 
physical and 
testimonial) 
4. Laura 
Ackerson as a 
missing person 
 The role and actions 
of Chevon Mathes 
 The role and actions 
of Detective Gwartney 
(Kinston Police 
Department) 
 The conversation 
between Det. 
Gwartney and Grant 
Hayes (18th July) 
 The introduction of 
the Raleigh Police 
Department; their role 
and actions 
 Discovery of Laura 
Ackerson’s car and 
proximity to Grant and 
Amanda Hayes’ 
residence 
 ‘Where is 
Laura?’; 
foreshadowing 
murder 
Although the overall 
topic concerns the 
search for Laura 
Ackerson, the shift 
between the initial 
investigation and the 
treatment of Grant 
and Amanda Hayes as 
suspects marks a shift 
in the narrative focus. 
This is shown through 
the division of the 
main topic from Laura 
Ackerson as a missing 
person to the police 
investigation of the 
Hayes’. 
5. Police 
investigation of 
 The search of Grant 
and Amanda Hayes’ 
 ‘Where is 
Laura?’; 
The introduction of 
the note with both 
 320 
 
Grant and 
Amanda Hayes 
apartment (inc. state 
of the apartment and 
items found) 
 The vacuum cleaner 
and the introduction of 
Sha Elmer (Amanda 
Hayes’ older daughter 
from a previous 
relationship) 
 The trip to Texas and 
moving of a large 
piece of furniture 
 The tracking of Grant 
and Amanda Hayes’ 
mobile phones 
 The description of 
their trailer’s 
movements 
foreshadowing 
murder 
 Covering up a 
crime 
Grant Hayes’ and 
Laura Ackerson’s 
handwriting is done 
here. This is a piece 
of evidence which is 
explored in detail 
during the trial. The 
state of the apartment 
is also something that 
recurs throughout the 
trial and is referenced 
through numerous 
witnesses and pieces 
of physical 
evidence/photographs. 
6. Police 
investigation in 
Texas/the 
disposal of 
Laura 
Ackerson’s 
remains/the 
arrest of Grant 
and Amanda 
Hayes 
 Two detectives from 
North Carolina (NC) 
travel to Texas (TX) – 
timeline established 
 Introduction of 
detectives’ testimony 
re. interview with 
Karen Berry in TX 
(Amanda Hayes’ 
sister). 
 Introduction of co-
operation with local 
Sheriff’s office 
 Oyster Creek near 
Karen Berry’s home 
and the significance of 
the coolers on the 
property 
 Grant and Amanda 
Hayes and the disposal 
of Laura Ackerson’s 
remains in Oyster 
Creek (19th July) 
 Answers the question 
‘where is Laura?’ 
 Discovery of remains 
by law enforcement 
 Arrest of Grant and 
Amanda Hayes 
 The continued 
discovery of Laura 
 The discovery 
of Laura 
Ackerson and 
the shift from 
missing person 
to homicide 
These three topics 
have been placed 
together as they are 
interwoven within this 
section of the opening 
statement. 
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Ackerson’s remains 
and their return to NC 
 Introduction of 
scientists who 
processed the remains 
7. The emotional 
premise/Final 
summary 
 Introduction of the 
emotional premise for 
the crime 
 New question 
regarding who would 
want Laura to be 
missing 
 Discussion of Dr 
Ginger Calloway and 
the custody evaluation 
 What the jury will 
hear regarding the 
purchases Grant 
Hayes made (duffle 
bags, coolers, ice, etc.) 
 Summary of parallel 
timeline 
 Description of Grant 
Hayes’ movements on 
14th July (purchases 
continued inc. saw) 
 Recap of key events 
 Introduction of what 
the prosecution will be 
asking for at the end 
of the trial – a guilty 
verdict – and graphic 
description of what 
Grant Hayes is guilty 
of (murder; 
dismemberment; etc.). 
 Intent and guilt 
 Justice 
The premise of hatred 
and the custody 
evaluation are also 
key aspects of the 
case that are discussed 
at length throughout 
the trial, particularly 
as Dr Calloway is 
presented as a neutral 
third party who had 
the opportunity to 
observe Grant Hayes 
and Laura Ackerson 
prior to Laura’s death. 
 
The purchase items is 
also relevant as they 
are claimed to be 
linked with the 
disposal of Laura 
Ackerson’s body (in 
particular the mention 
of the saw which is 
believed to have been 
used for the 
dismemberment) 
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Table 2: Overview of opening statement for the prosecution (Amanda Hayes) 
 
Topic Summary Theme(s) Notes 
1. Amanda Hayes 
confession/overview 
of the case 
 Introduces the 
alleged confession 
of Amanda Hayes 
to her sister 
regarding the 
murder of Laura 
Ackerson 
 Temporally 
positions the quote 
against other 
events in the 
narrative (the 
murder/discovery 
of remains etc.) 
 Guilt of the defendant The quote ‘I 
hurt her. I 
hurt her bad. 
She’s dead’ 
becomes a 
recurring 
point of 
interest 
within the 
trial. 
2. Thanks to the 
jury/the purpose of 
the opening 
statements and the 
introduction of the 
prosecution team 
N/A N/A  
3. Introduction of Laura 
Ackerson/the custody 
dispute 
 Description of 
Laura Ackerson 
 Shared custody 
with Grant Hayes 
 Grant Hayes 
having left Laura 
Ackerson for 
Amanda Hayes 
 The custody 
dispute and then 
current custodial 
arrangements 
 Laura Ackerson’s 
state of mind 
(positive) and the 
custody evaluation 
 Laura Ackerson as 
a devoted parent 
 Family 
 Devoted (young) 
mother 
 Optimism for the 
future 
 
4. Laura Ackerson’s 
movements on the 
13th July/the 
disappearance 
 Introduction of 
Chevon Mathes 
and Laura 
Ackerson’s 
business 
endeavours 
 Rarity of midweek 
visits 
 Laura Ackerson as a 
hard-working young 
mother 
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 Timeline of 
Laura’s 
movements on the 
13th July, inc. 
phone calls and 
last known 
location 
5. The severity of the 
case/the movements 
of Grant and Amanda 
Hayes on 13th July 
 Graphic 
description of the 
case’s severity; 
Laura Ackerson 
missing for 11 
days 
 Amanda Hayes’ 
movements on the 
13th July; taking 
the children out of 
the apartment, 
where they went 
 Grant Hayes’ 
movements on the 
13th July; 
purchases made 
inc. saw 
 Amanda Hayes’ 
being in the 
apartment alone 
while Grant Hayes 
was out; mention 
of Amanda Hayes’ 
mobile phone 
 Amanda Hayes’ role; 
inaction as 
compliance/indicative 
of guilt 
Introduction 
of saw as key 
piece of 
evidence. 
 
Focus on 
Amanda 
Hayes as 
being alone 
with the 
children in 
the apartment 
and presumes 
Laura 
Ackerson’s 
body was also 
there. 
6. Description of 14th 
July 
 Chevon Mathes 
actions as a 
concerned friend 
of Laura Ackerson 
 Contrasted with 
Amanda Hayes 
actions; having her 
older daughter 
look after the 
children; the need 
for a second 
vacuum cleaner 
 Implies the ‘clean up’ 
of the crime scene 
 
7. Description of 15th 
July 
 Description of 
Chevon Mathes 
attempts to contact 
Laura Ackerson 
 Grant Hayes 
movements; more 
 Implied guilt through 
inaction 
The actions 
of Grant 
Hayes in 
going to the 
custody 
exchange are 
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purchases; going to 
the custody 
exchange (where 
Laura Ackerson 
‘shockingly’ does 
not arrive) 
 Amanda Hayes as 
being at home with 
her baby and 
Laura’s body 
highlighted 
and the jury 
told to pay 
close 
attention to 
the phone call 
Grant Hayes 
makes.  
 
The theme of 
implying 
Amanda 
Hayes as 
having had 
the 
opportunity 
to get help is 
marked by its 
recurrence in 
conjunction 
with her 
having been 
alone to be 
able to do so. 
8. Saturday (16th July)  Description of 
Grant and Amanda 
Hayes shopping; 
introduction of 
coolers 
 Introduction of the 
trip to TX to visit 
Amanda Hayes’ 
sister 
 Grant Hayes 
renting the trailer 
 Amanda Hayes as 
being at home with 
a mobile phone 
and Laura 
Ackerson’s body 
 Active participation 
contrasted with 
inactive compliance 
Continued 
presentation 
of what the 
prosecution 
view as 
potential 
opportunities 
for Amanda 
Hayes to call 
for help 
9. 17th and 18th July  Actions of Chevon 
Mathes in trying to 
contact Laura 
Ackerson; 
discovery of Laura 
Ackerson as 
having missed the 
custody exchange 
 Grant and Amanda 
Hayes on their way 
 The mounting 
concern of others for 
Laura Ackerson’s 
safety and wellbeing 
 Reiteration of Laura 
Ackerson as a 
devoted mother 
In having 
established 
through the 
previous 
introduction 
of the victim 
as a devoted 
mother, this 
then adds 
weight to the 
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to TX, renting a 
room in Alabama; 
their phones as 
having been off 
claims of 
concern and 
fear felt by 
Laura 
Ackerson’s 
friends on her 
behalf as 
missing the 
custody 
exchange is 
out of 
character. 
10. Tuesday 19th July/the 
search of Grant and 
Amanda Hayes’ 
apartment/the 
confession/Detectives 
go to TX 
 Chevon Mathes 
reporting Laura 
Ackerson as a 
missing person to 
the police; 
introduction of 
Det. Gwartney 
 ‘Meanwhile in 
Texas’ Amanda 
and Grant Hayes 
are arriving at 
Amanda’s sister’s 
home 
 Paralleled with 
actions of Det. 
Gwartney 
(contacting people 
who may have 
seen Laura 
Ackerson; 
introduction of 
CCTV footage and 
Laura Ackerson’s 
car) 
 Description of Det. 
Gwartney 
contacting Grant 
Hayes and his 
alleged description 
of the events of the 
13th July; telling 
Det. Gwartney he 
is in the ‘boonies’ 
while sitting next 
to Amanda Hayes 
during the phone 
call 
 Introduction of the 
criminal investigation 
narrative contrasted 
with the actions of 
the defendant and 
Grant Hayes 
 The emphasis on 
certain pieces of 
evidence (the boat, 
coolers, etc.) 
 Amanda Hayes as an 
active participant 
 The role of the police 
 Contrasting the 
behaviour of the 
defendant(s) with that 
of police 
investigators 
 Laura Ackerson as 
(still) a missing 
person case 
These topics 
were placed 
together in 
this analysis 
as the themes 
are 
interlinked. 
The ‘scene’ 
shifts from 
North 
Carolina to 
Texas are 
marked and 
create a 
constant 
contrast 
between the 
actions of the 
investigators 
and the 
defendant(s) 
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 Grant Hayes 
telling Det. 
Gwartney that he 
and Laura 
Ackerson 
discussed her 
having full custody 
of the children 
 Det. Gwartney 
briefing Raleigh 
PD on Laura 
Ackerson’s case 
 Amanda Hayes’ 
confession to her 
sister regarding 
Laura Ackerson’s 
death; Amanda 
Hayes’ movements 
that day (purchases 
made inc. acid) 
 In NC: everyone 
wondering ‘where 
is Laura?’ 
 In TX: description 
of boat trip (boat 
as evidence 
emphasised) 
 In NC: Raleigh PD 
locate Laura 
Ackerson’s car; 
proximity to Grant 
and Amanda 
Hayes’ apartment 
 TX: coolers 
appearing around 
Amanda’s sister’s 
property 
(emphasised) 
 NC: Raleigh PD 
search of Amanda 
and Grant Hayes’ 
apartment; 
description of 
bathroom and 
further reference to 
Sha Elmer’s 
testimony 
 Raleigh PD finding 
Grant Hayes’ 
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phone to be in 
Texas 
 Amanda Hayes’ 
talking to her sister 
and claiming to be 
covering for Grant 
Hayes 
 Detectives head to 
TX as Grant and 
Amanda Hayes 
return to NC; 
execution of a 
search warrant of 
Grant and Amanda 
Hayes 
11. Detectives in TX/the 
arrest of Grant and 
Amanda Hayes 
 Dets arrive in TX; 
description of the 
interview with 
Karen Berry 
(Amanda’s sister) 
 Introduction of 
Fort Bend County 
Sherriff’s Office 
and the river 
search 
 The discovery of 
Laura Ackerson’s 
torso and other 
body parts 
 Grant and Amanda 
Hayes arrested in 
Kinston, NC 
 Continuation of 
discovery of 
remains (emphasis 
placed on 
testimony 
regarding the 
condition of the 
victim’s head) 
 Description of 
processing 
victim’s remains 
 Shift from missing 
person to homicide 
investigation 
 The treatment of the 
victim’s remains 
The condition 
of the 
victim’s 
remains is 
graphically 
marked, 
emphasising 
the sense of 
violation 
when 
contrasted 
with the 
previously 
established 
good 
character of 
the victim. 
12. The custody 
evaluation/summary 
of the case 
 Introduction of Dr 
Ginger Calloway 
and the custody 
evaluation 
 Introduction of 
Laura Ackerson’s 
 Custody evaluation 
 Laura Ackerson’s 
state of 
mind/depictions of 
Amanda and Grant 
Hayes 
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diary and her 
descriptions of 
Grant and Amanda 
Hayes 
 Summary of the 
custody dispute 
and the contentious 
atmosphere 
between Laura 
Ackerson and the 
Hayes’ 
13. Final remarks 
concerning Amanda 
Hayes 
 Case as not being 
about who struck 
the ‘fatal blow’, 
but more about the 
11 days Laura 
Ackerson was 
missing and the 6 
days before the 
boat ride; more 
about the custody 
dispute 
 Three adults were 
in the apartment 
but only two 
survived 
 Amanda Hayes 
background as an 
actress introduced 
 Reminder that his 
is not about 
movies/a stage, but 
a case about a 
young mother, the 
children who will 
not see her again 
and the role of 
Amanda Hayes in 
her death 
 What the focus of the 
case should be when 
considering the 
verdict 
 Fiction vs reality 
The 
introduction 
of Amanda 
Hayes’ 
background 
as an actress 
cold be 
viewed as an 
attempt to 
undermine 
her credibility 
alongside the 
contrast 
between the 
stage and the 
reality of a 
homicide 
having taken 
place 
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Table 3: Overview of opening statement for the defence (Grant Hayes) 
 
Topic Summary Theme(s) Notes 
1. Introduction to case  One-line summary of 
case 
 Outline of how 
Amanda Hayes 
‘accidently’ killed 
Laura Ackerson 
 Innocence of the 
defendant of 
murder 
 Death of Laura 
Ackerson as 
unintended 
Introduces 
Amanda Hayes 
as the person 
guilty of 
murder and 
places Grant 
Hayes as guilty 
of a lesser 
crime 
2. Grant Hayes’ 
background 
 Describe Grant Hayes 
a local artist/musician; 
position within the 
local community 
 The defendant as 
a person 
 
3. Grant Hayes’ 
relationship with 
Laura Ackerson 
 Introduction of Grant 
Hayes’ relationship 
with Laura Ackerson 
(“on-again off-
again”); introduction 
of timeframe over 
which their 
relationship took place 
 Introduces the 
children and the 
timeline for the end of 
the relationship 
 Describes Grant 
Hayes move to the 
(US) Virgin Islands 
and sending money to 
Laura Ackerson in 
North Carolina 
 Father 
 Providing for 
family 
 
4. Grant Hayes’ 
relationship with 
Amanda Hayes 
 Grant Hayes meeting 
Amanda in the Virgin 
Islands and the start of 
their relationship; 
mention of Sha Elmer 
(Amanda’s daughter 
from a previous 
relationship) 
 The move to New 
York (inc. timeline) 
 Description of their 
life in New York 
 Mutual decision for 
Grant Hayes and 
Laura Ackerson’s 
 Grant Hayes life 
in the Virgin 
Islands and New 
York – normal 
family life 
 Marriage 
 Custody 
arrangements as 
having been 
mutual/for the 
benefit of the 
children 
 Mitigation of 
custody dispute 
The 
introduction of 
Laura Ackerson 
as a mother 
who was 
struggling and 
of Grant Hayes 
as a caring 
father who was 
acting in the 
best interests of 
the children and 
helping his ex-
girlfriend 
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oldest son to move to 
New York; Laura 
Ackerson struggling 
with two young 
children 
 Amanda Hayes 
leaving school to be a 
full-time mother to 
Grant’s son 
 Marriage of Grant and 
Amanda Hayes 
 Laura Ackerson filing 
to resolve the ‘custody 
issue’ (previous 
arrangements were 
informal) 
5. The custody 
arrangements/issues 
 Grant and Amanda 
Hayes move to NC to 
be closer to Laura 
Ackerson, Grant’s 
second son, and the 
custody case 
 Grant’s youngest son 
needing surgery and 
Grant Hayes gaining 
custody (arrangement 
described as ‘agreed 
upon’) 
 Describes custody 
arrangements as being 
‘imperfectly’ followed 
 Outlines the custody 
issues as containing 
fights (references 
prosecution’s use of 
‘bitter’) 
 Introduces Laura 
Ackerson’s recordings 
of the exchanges; 
recordings as showing 
the arguments as 
‘normal’ with no 
‘tenor of violence’ 
 Introduces Laura’s 
diary and describes 
the hostility between 
Amanda Hayes and 
Laura Ackerson; 
 Normalisation of 
custody dispute 
 Mitigation of 
prosecution’s 
evidence 
The beginnings 
of mitigation 
can be seen 
here in 
introducing the 
state’s evidence 
and 
highlighting 
that it is in their 
possession 
(thus also 
implying that 
the extracts will 
be selective). 
Acknowledging 
potentially 
damaging 
evidence and 
reframing it 
into a different 
narrative. 
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claims Amanda Hayes 
as resentful of victim 
6. The custody 
evaluation 
 Introduction of 
custody evaluator (Dr 
Ginger Calloway); 
how she will claim the 
behaviour as being 
normal to most 
custody cases 
 Description of 
message Laura 
Ackerson sent to a 
support group saying 
her situation was 
better than others 
 Normalisation of 
the custody 
dispute 
Continued 
normalisation 
of the custody 
disputes and 
arguments 
contained 
therein 
7. Birth of Amanda 
Hayes’ youngest 
daughter 
 Birth of Grant and 
Amanda Hayes’ 
daughter 
 Laura Ackerson as 
having her children 
for 2 weeks during 
this time; claims that 
she found this difficult 
 Grant Hayes as a 
new father 
 Laura Ackerson 
as struggling with 
having the 
children full-time 
This could be 
seen as 
foreshadowing 
the alleged 
custody 
agreement 
(introduced in 
Topic 8), 
providing a 
foundation for 
claims that 
Laura Ackerson 
may have 
conceded 
custody of her 
children to their 
father 
8. The 13th July  Background of the 
midweek visits; 
description of emails 
between Grant and 
Laura 
 The introduction of 
the children’s 
favoured venue for 
going out 
 Description of the 
multiple forms of 
communication and 
exchanges between 
Grant Hayes and 
Laura Ackerson in 
finalising the 
arrangements for the 
visit 
 Grant Hayes as a 
devoted parent; 
Laura Ackerson 
who was 
struggling with 
having the 
children 
 Animosity 
between Amanda 
Hayes and Laura 
Ackerson 
 Mitigating Grant 
Hayes role – 
invocation of 
‘fear’ 
The emphasis 
on Laura 
Ackerson going 
to Grant Hayes 
house as 
something for 
which there 
was precedent 
potentially 
mitigates the 
argument that 
this was out of 
character for 
Laura Ackerson 
– that she had 
been ‘lured’ 
there. 
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 Laura Ackerson as 
running late and going 
to Grant Hayes’ 
residence (as had done 
before) 
 Introduction of the 
discussion re. custody 
case between Grant 
Hayes and the victim; 
describes the 
document produced 
 Grant Hayes pleasure 
at the agreement as he 
wanted full custody 
 Description of 
Amanda Hayes seeing 
the agreement and 
being angry as they 
did not have the 
money; Grant Hayes 
leaves the room to get 
the children ready 
 Amanda Hayes 
described as the 
person who had an 
altercation with Laura 
Ackerson over the 
latter’s attempt to hold 
her infant daughter 
 Introduction of Grant 
Hayes’ involvement in 
the aftermath – 
“terrible decisions of 
people who are 
terrified” 
Additionally, 
the FBI is 
invoked as an 
expert source 
with the 
defence using 
their 
handwriting 
analysis 
findings to 
support that 
both Grant 
Hayes and 
Laura Ackerson 
co-produced 
the document – 
implying 
mutual 
agreement 
9. The aftermath of 
13th July; the trip to 
TX 
 Amanda Hayes 
positioned as being in 
charge and telling 
Grant Hayes what to 
do 
 Amanda Hayes as the 
person who contacted 
Sha Elmer (her 
daughter) to take the 
children the next day 
 Describes how Grant 
and Amanda Hayes 
were left alone with 
the victim’s body 
 Amanda Hayes as 
the person driving 
events forward 
and making 
decisions 
 Grant Hayes 
making bad 
decisions for the 
sake of his family 
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 Description of clean-
up supplies, trailer 
rental, etc. 
 Amanda Hayes’ 
decision to go to TX – 
Grant Hayes as never 
having been there 
before and having no 
contacts there 
(“Amanda’s kin”) 
 Description of 
Amanda Hayes’ 
confession to her 
sister and the remains 
being placed in the 
creek 
10. Final remarks  The victim’s death as 
having been 
‘spontaneous’ and 
‘unpredictable’ 
 Grant Hayes as only 
being responsible for 
the clean-up and 
disposal of the 
victim’s remains 
 Mitigation of 
Grant Hayes’ role 
in the death of 
Laura Ackerson 
The language 
used here 
addresses the 
charges – by 
the death 
having been 
‘spontaneous’ it 
would imply 
that it therefore 
could not have 
been 
premeditated. 
 
Focus placed 
on a lesser 
charge – still a 
crime, but not 
of the same 
severity 
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Table 4: Overview of opening statement for the defence (Amanda Hayes) 
 
Topic Summary Theme(s) Notes 
1. Introduction of the 
role of the defence 
attorney/purpose of 
opening statements 
 Description of the role 
of the defence 
attorney 
 Summary of the 
purpose of opening 
statements (references 
prior mention of this 
in the prosecution’s 
opening statement) 
 Reiteration to the jury 
that they should rely 
on their own 
recollections when 
considering the 
evidence 
 Framing the 
context of the 
case in terms of 
the opening 
statement 
 
2. Introduction of 
Grant Hayes 
 Introduction of the 
case as being about 3 
primary individuals 
 Description of Grant 
Hayes’ character as 
being that of a ‘classic 
sociopath’ (references 
his conviction for 
Laura Ackerson’s 
murder) 
 Description of the 
custody dispute 
between Grant Hayes 
and Laura Ackerson; 
introduction of 
custody evaluation by 
Dr Ginger Calloway 
 Reads from the report 
Laura Ackerson wrote 
regarding Grant 
Hayes; uses this to 
introduce the movies 
to be used as a frame 
of reference when 
describing Grant 
Hayes’ character (Six 
Degrees of Separation 
and The Talented Mr 
Riply 
 Summary of The 
Talented Mr Riply and 
 Personality 
disorders 
 Grant Hayes as a 
dangerous 
individual 
Begins to lay 
the foundation 
for the defence 
of duress, 
introducing 
Grant Hayes as 
both the person 
responsible 
(referencing 
conviction) and 
as someone 
with the ability 
to manipulate 
and harm 
others. 
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connection to Grant 
Hayes 
3. Introduction of 
Laura Ackerson 
 Introduces the 
presence of “two 
victims in this case” 
 Laura Ackerson as 
having believed she 
was married to Grant 
Hayes, but he had 
deceived her 
 Describes Laura 
Ackerson as a loving 
mother 
 Description of custody 
arrangement and 
dispute, inc. being 
‘increasingly bitter’ 
and description of the 
then upcoming 
hearing 
 Description of Grant 
Hayes receiving the 
custody evaluation; 
relationship between 
Grant Hayes and 
Laura Ackerson 
worsening 
 Describes Amanda 
Hayes’ role as that of 
‘peacekeeper’ 
 Introduction of 
the victim(s) 
 Grant Hayes as 
the person 
responsible for 
murder 
 Amanda Hayes as 
mediator 
The 
introduction of 
Laura Ackerson 
is used as a 
means of 
supporting the 
coming 
narrative of 
Grant Hayes as 
an abusive 
spouse (at least 
mentally, if not 
physically) 
4. Introduction of 
Amanda Hayes 
 Amanda Hayes as the 
second victim in the 
case 
 Grant Hayes’ 
treatment of both 
women as being the 
same; viewing women 
as needing to be 
submissive to him 
 Amanda Hayes 
backstory in meeting 
Grant Hayes; affluent 
widow 
 Grant Hayes using the 
children as ‘social 
bait’ and describing 
Amanda Hayes as his 
‘investor’ 
 Amanda Hayes as 
having been 
manipulated by 
Grant Hayes as 
much as other 
people in his life 
 Establishing a 
pattern of abusive 
behaviour 
This introduces 
the driving 
force of the 
defence, using 
the foundation 
laid previously 
to create 
parallels 
between Grant 
Hayes’ 
treatment of the 
victim and the 
treatment of his 
then wife. 
 
The theme of 
isolation is also 
potentially 
important, as 
this adds to the 
 336 
 
 Description of swift 
marriage and Grant 
Hayes access to 
Amanda Hayes 
financial assets; 
travelling and selling 
her jewellery while 
she stayed at home 
with the children 
(plots this behaviour 
onto timeframe) 
 Description of 
Amanda Hayes as a 
new mother to her 
youngest daughter; 
Grant Hayes having 
isolated her 
 Description of the 
impending eviction by 
July 2011; Grant and 
Amanda Hayes having 
to move in with his 
parents 
concept of 
domestic abuse 
and provides a 
foundation in 
which Amanda 
Hayes may not 
have then felt 
able to reach 
out for help. 
5. The ‘Stepford 
Wife’ 
 Describes Grant 
Hayes as having 
wanted to marry a 
‘Stepford wife’ and 
Amanda Hayes as 
having been an extra 
in that movie 
 Describes the movie 
Stepford Wives 
 Reads out a piece 
written by Grant 
Hayes regarding this 
desire and his meeting 
Amanda Hayes 
 Gender roles Continues to 
develop the 
themes of 
manipulation 
and 
subjugation. 
6. The 13th July  Introduces the events 
of the 13th July 
 Outlines Laura 
Ackerson’s 
arrangements to see 
the children and her 
going to the apartment 
as a result of running 
late and being unable 
to take the children to 
the child-oriented 
restaurant 
 Grant Hayes as 
guilty of murder 
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 Grant Hayes as 
wanting to discuss the 
custody case and 
having Amanda Hayes 
take the children out 
of the room 
 Laura Ackerson and 
Grant Hayes’ 
settlement agreement 
(references letter) 
 Description of 
altercation: Amanda 
Hayes entering the 
room with her infant 
daughter and seeing 
the agreement; 
Amanda Hayes 
walking away when 
Laura Ackerson asked 
to hold the baby and 
tripping into Amanda 
Hayes; Grant Hayes 
grabbing Laura 
Ackerson from behind 
and them both falling 
to the floor; Amanda 
Hayes continuing into 
the bedroom 
 Grant Hayes asking 
Amanda Hayes to take 
the children out as he 
need to call 
Emergence Medical 
Services (EMS) for 
Laura 
 Description of 
Amanda Hayes 
movements with the 
children 
 Description of Grant 
Hayes telling Amanda 
Hayes that Laura 
Ackerson is fine and 
has returned home; 
Amanda Hayes 
believing Laura 
Ackerson is alive and 
well 
7. The aftermath; the 
trip to TX 
 Descriptions of Grant 
Hayes movements 
 Threats Race is made 
relevant here 
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from midnight 14th 
July until midnight 
16th July 
 Foreshadows that jury 
will hear where Grant 
Hayes dismembered 
Laura Ackerson; 
claims Amanda Hayes 
did not know 
 Grant Hayes’ idea to 
go to TX and his idea 
to move the furniture 
 Description of Grant 
Hayes’ activities 
surrounding the 
murder of Laura 
Ackerson 
 Amanda Hayes lack of 
knowledge that Laura 
Ackerson’s remains 
were in the trailer 
 Describes the arrival 
in TX, Grant Hayes’ 
behaviour, and his 
telling Amanda Hayes 
that Laura Ackerson is 
dead 
 Describes machete 
and Grant Hayes’ 
threatening Amanda 
Hayes if she did not 
help him; Grant Hayes 
as telling Amanda 
what to tell her sister 
 Description of 
Amanda Hayes’ 
confession to her 
sister and 
acknowledgement that 
she is covering for 
Grant Hayes 
 Describes Amanda 
Hayes helping dispose 
of the victim’s 
remains out of fear 
 Manipulation 
 Race 
 Coercion 
 Fear 
through 
reported speech 
that Grant 
Hayes is to 
have said to 
Amanda Hayes, 
who has then 
repeated it to 
her lawyer. The 
issue of race is 
not something 
that occurs 
regularly 
throughout this 
trial, but is 
noticeable in its 
occurrence as a 
claim for 
justification of 
an action. 
 
This is linked 
with the 
confession and 
provides a 
context in 
which the 
confession 
could have 
been made but 
without it 
having the 
significance of 
guilt attached to 
it in the 
prosecution’s 
opening 
statement. 
 
The description 
of fear provides 
a mitigating 
circumstance in 
which the 
defendant can 
be found 
innocent of the 
charge of 
accessory 
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8. The charges  Description of 
charges: 1st degree 
murder and why 
Amanda Hayes is 
innocent; accessory 
after the fact as being 
“diametrically 
opposed” to the first 
charge and describing 
legal requirements 
 Outlines the ‘real 
issue’ as being 
whether or not 
Amanda Hayes acted 
voluntarily in helping 
dispose of Laura 
Ackerson’s body 
 Amanda Hayes as 
being innocent of this 
as was acting under 
duress 
 Contextualisation of 
Amanda Hayes’ 
actions through her 
state of mind and 
knowledge at the time 
 Legal 
requirements and 
decision-making 
processes of the 
jury 
 
9. Final remarks  Describes to the jury 
how they will believe 
that Grant Hayes 
concealed what he had 
done for as long as 
possible; Grant Hayes’ 
motives for choosing 
places associated with 
Amanda Hayes 
 Grant Hayes as a 
‘master manipulator’ 
 Reiterates that 
Amanda Hayes is 
innocent of murder 
and that the only 
question is whether 
she voluntarily agreed 
to help conceal what 
Grant Hayes had done. 
 Manipulation 
 Legal 
requirements 
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